Ruth Edith Hagengruber

The philosopher Émilie du Châtelet (1706-1749) was one of the most successful authors of her time in the fields of philosophy and science. Her texts were translated into several languages during her lifetime, which demonstrates the international appeal of her work. Many aspects contribute to her reputation as one of the most outstanding and famous philosophers of the 18th century. Among them is her emphasis on hypotheses as the basis of scientific research. The ideas she developed had an impact well into the 20th century, although her name had been forgotten. Her achievements can be discussed in a classroom setting by interpreting the chapter On Hypotheses, taken from her main work, the Foundations of Physics. The material has lost none of its significance and can, therefore, be a meaningful contribution to explaining the great ideas of the history of philosophy and addressing fundamental questions such as the discernment of what is true and false.

Why should the philosophy of the Pythagoreans be reduced to Pythagoras alone? Why do we learn about the ego only from Husserl and not from Conrad-Martius? What do we know about free will from Helene Druskowitz and why is Émilie Du Châtelet unknown to us? Many of the philosophers in this collection were celebrities in their own time. What can we gain from rediscovering the knowledge of women philosophers? Philosophy reflects the foundations on which we organise our world. There is no doubt that women create structures that shape our world. Over the centuries, women thinkers have formulated ideas and concepts to explain our world and to call for its reorganisation. This collection offers a selection of these ideas and concepts from over 2000 years. The new history of philosophy emerges in this way. It provides the basis for teaching and future research. Rooted in the past, it can use that experience to contribute to a new and better way forward.

Today[aut]Hagengruber, Ruth Edith, hypothesesHypothesis, hypothesesdetermine our scientificScience, scientific activity, and no one doubts that hypotheses are an essentialEssence, essentialtool of scienceScience, scientific. This was not always the case, on the contrary. Rather, the recognition of hypotheses as a crucial element for innovation in science marked a radical change when Émilie Du Châtelet proposed hypothesesHypothesis, hypotheses as the relevant research tool, to replace by the search for causesReason. It was not only the status of hypotheses and their function that were contested. The defense of the hypothetical conjecture served to change the idea of scienceScience, scientific and consequently the idea of science’s architectureArchitecture. The epistemicEpistemicimportance of principlesPrinciple, principlesand observationObservation was relativized and became a control instrument for the power of imagination. Du Châtelet equates her epistemological turn with that of Copernicus[aut]Copernicus when he reversed the perspective of how to see the universe. For all these reasonsReason, the fourth chapter in the InstitutionsInstitutionphysiques is a core chapter of Du Châtelet’s methodology. No wonder, Du Châtelet’s chapter on hypothesesHypothesis, hypotheses was influential and found its way into the writings of d’Alembert, Condillac, Euler and Kant, and its influence continued into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, though her authorship was faded out.

In seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Immanuel Kant bestreitet Johann August Eberhard Kants Anspruch, in seiner Transzendentalphilosophie die Reichweite und Grenzen des Verstandes auf neue, zuvor nicht dagewesene Weise definiert zu haben. Eberhard dagegen meint die Prinzipien und Grundbegriffe transzendentalphilosophischer Erkenntniskritik schon aus der Leibniz-Wolffschen Schule ableiten zu können. An einschlägiger Stelle – im dritten Teil seiner Ausführungen Über den wesentlichen Unterschied der Erkenntnis durch die Sinne und durch den Verstand – belegt er diese Behauptung mit einem Verweis auf die „Definition“ der Erscheinung in den Institutions physiques der Philosophin und Mathematikerin Du Châtelet.

This book expands the known canon by presenting arguments and concepts from women philosophers, from all periods of the history of philosophy, from antiquity to the present day. The collaborative collection is an undertaking that emerged from intensive discussions on how to expand the philosophical canon, which formed the conclusion of the Libori Summer School 2019. This Libori Summer School, the third in a row, was held to enhance the study of texts written by women philosophers from Antiquity up to now and intended to give opportunity to young scholars to connect and to build networks. Presenting such a collection is even more urgent today because a diversification of the canon has long been called for. Nevertheless, to date there is little explicit material available for this purpose. To make this book suitable for both academics and students, it is structured in such a way that readers can use excerpts and individual chapters from it that suit their needs, be it in moral philosophy, politics, or phenomenology, etc. Containing chapters on women such as Suor Juana, Emilie Du Châtelet, and Nisia Floresta and supplemented by contextualization, namely by some brief biographical information and by the systematic integration of her argument into the debates of the respective periods, this book is an important resource highlighting the achievements and value of women in philosophy and calling for a further diversification of the canon.

In ihrem Beitrag: „Poisoning the well, or how economic theory damages moral imagination" (Nelson 2016) fragt Julie Nelson "What if people might act out of social and other-regarding concerns, as well as reasonable self-interest in their economic lives, but are pushed by the economic theory of self-interested utility maximization to believe that it is permissible – and perhaps even appropriate – to be irresponsible, opportunistic, and selfish when participating in markets? What if business leaders might pay attention to the implications of their decisions for workers, communities, the environment, and others who are affected by their firm's actions, but economic theory encourages them to believe that they should – and in fact must – focus on getting every last dollar of profit possible?" (Nelson 2016: 184) Ich lese diese Fragen von Nelson als einen Appell, die Theorie der Ökonomie umfassend auf ihre Tauglichkeit für unsere Lebenswirklichkeit zu hinterfragen. Die Theorien der Ökonomie mögen Disziplinen-intern funktional sein, sie sind damit noch lange nicht lebenstauglich. Im Gegenteil, sie erweisen sich als Überlebens-avers, im schlimmsten Falle, Leben-zerstörend. Die Aufgabe, das Wozu der Wirtschaftsphilosophie lässt sich von hier aus schon trefflich bestimmen. Die Herausforderung jedoch bleibt, Umfang und Perspektive, von wo aus die Kritik und auch die In-Blicknahme des Ganzen geschehen kann, zu verorten, und genau dieses Anliegen ist im Beitrag von Ingo Pies und Marc Hübscher zentral: Aus welcher Perspektive kann diese Frage beantwortet werden, wenn diese Bestimmung als denkerische Selbstaufklärung realisiert werden soll?

The Enlightenment is well known for its critical analysis of the Bible. Though the Renaissance sources have been acknowledged as an inspiration of this movement, the Querelle des femmes and its critique of the Bible has never been considered as a possible catalyst for the enlightened philosophical discourse. For centuries women have fought against interpretations of the Bible. This paper argues that the Querelle des femmes criticized the Bible not only because of its patriarchal content but also criticized philosophical thinking that, for supporting the views from the Bible and its misogynist stance, misused the instruments of rational philosophy. Arguments from 1400-1750, from Nogarola to Du Châtelet prove women philosophers’ fight in favour of a critique of the Bible from a rational point of view, reflecting also on the status of what it meant, to argue rationally.

Since 2006, her third centenary, the eminent female figure of French Enlightenment Emilie Du Châtelet has increasingly gained attention from international scholars. Given the fact that Elisabeth Badinter’s ground-breaking monograph was published in the 1980s,[1] a comprehensive description of Du Châtelet’s life and work, delivered by an expert of the French speaking community, has been long awaited. This is especially the case, since Voltaire experts Kölving and Brown have prepared the ground for French research on Du Châtelet, delivering material on her and Voltaire resulting in a voluptuous collection of “new documents and clarifications” [2] and a recently updated collection of letters from Du Châtelet.[3] In 2011, Du Châtelet’s extensive examination of the Bible was published,[4] and her translation and comments were re-edited in 2015.[5] An abundance of new material is waiting for interpretation, which is so monumental that any presentation is a challenge. Le Ru presents a succinct yet focused and well written analysis which delivers a considerable amount of information, suitable for reading by a broader audience. Likewise, this volume is exceedingly valuable for Du Châtelet scholars. It takes a very particular and systemizing stance on Du Châtelet’s entire opus and offers new perspectives. To introduce the intellectual dominion of Du Châtelet in all its facets, the book deals with philosophy, science, physics, mathematics, and morals. By doing so, Le Ru evokes the realm of Du Châtelet’s inspiration. The book is divided into two parts. The first delivers a short but profound analysis on the state of Du Châtelet scholarship. The second part adds new insights on Du Châtelet’s legacy. This highly informative book covers Du Châtelet’s work as a whole and offers its ownoutstandingly fruitful stance on research about Du Châtelet.

Women who are deprived of their histories can be compared to people who have lost their memories. They are unable to build a personal identity. This analogy may be the leading paradigm for my paper, which is primarily dedicated to epistemological questions. Throughout the last 40 years, many scholars have dedicated their endeavors to conserving the writings of women philosophers. Now we have access to valuable sources that show that the history of women philosophers stretches back as far as the history of philosophy itself. Using the history of women philosophers as a methodical approach to philosophy is a unique and indispensable means to widen and to change philosophical insights. Re-reading the history of philosophy and including the ideas of women philosophers, however, does not only add some more narratives but challenges the methodology of philosophy. The history of philosophy that we are traditionally educated in the western world is simply not true to the facts. Thus, I demand a rewriting of the history of philosophy that takes into account the ideas that are incorporated in the writings of women philosophers and that have been denied by the narratives and fabric of sexualized and patriarchally influenced thought.

Luise Adelgunde Victorie Kulmus Gottsched (1713–1763) war eine der originellsten und einflussreichsten deutschen Intellektuellen der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts, einem an herausragenden Frauen nicht armen Jahrhundert. Die Frühaufklärung hatte die Frauenbildung zu einem öffentlichen Thema gemacht. In diesem Rahmen einer neu erwachenden nationalen Politik entstand der Kult einer »Minerva«, den Luise Kulmus Gottsched als instrumentalisierte »falsche« Frauenpolitik kritisierte. Ihr stellte sie das Ideal einer gebildeten Minerva entgegen, die der Wahrheit dient und »mehr wert ist als tausend Männer«.

Grâce aux recherches de B. Schwarzbach, S. Seguin et d’autres, nous comprenons aujourd’hui à quel point Émilie Du Châtelet était engagée dans ce qu’on appelle la littérature clandestine. Son fameux ouvrage Examens de la Bible montre la force radicale de sa pensée. Madame Du Châtelet était peut-être aussi un catalyseur des idées libérales et radicales des Lumières mais la recherche, telle qu'elle se présente aujourd’hui, n'a pas encore exploré ses idées. Elle n’a pas non plus accepté l’idée que les femmes auraient pu prendre une part considérable à ce mouvement. Pourtant, ce sont elles qui ont été particulièrement exposées à l'injustice que les normes religieuses imposaient aux femmes, y compris dans la société.

In this second issue of volume one, a welcome feature are those articles that bring to our readers, new historical information about women philosophers, new analyses of important positions supported by and questions addressed by select women philosophers, as well as articles that compare and contrast the views of several women philosophers on particular topics. This issue reflects on the context of women’s theoretical contributions, with articles that address the question of women’s agency and the historical account through which women were acknowledged (or not) as originators of or contributors to important theoretical developments within the mentioned disciplines. In recent decades an overwhelming amount of philosophical works by women has been made available by historians of philosophy. This issue reflects those strides towards recovering philosophical writings by women. Issue 2 of this volume is organized chronologically and starts with a paper from Jonathan Head: “Anne Conway on Heaven and Hell”. Conway’s The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1690) offers representations of heaven and hell, revising our conventional image of hell. Conway presents hell in a way that she believes is more consistent with the postulate of a loving and just God. In part, Conway denies the possibility of eternal torment and emphasizes the benefits that suffering brings to a living being. Conway describes heaven as a realm of “perfect rest” where creatures enjoy unity and harmony with Christ and other heavenly spirits. This state involves an increasing understanding of the world, a continual process of perfection and harmony with other heavenly spirits. The article concludes with a description of Conway’s eschatology in the broader intellectual context of the revival of Origenist theology in its intellectual setting and in the changing framework of eschatological thought in the early Quaker community. Monica M. Mastrantonio discusses in her paper, “Lady Mary Wortley Montagu – a philosopher? The epistolary woman, because women could not be called Philosophers, Scientists, Entrepreneurs” aspects of a different and new transcultural worldview that reflects diversity and knowledge combined with philosophy in a new way. In the past, there were two roles with which Lady Mary Wortley Montagu was associated. One was her experience at the Turkish Embassy, where she highlighted cultural diversity. A second role she was associated with was international travel. Mastrantonio argues that Montagu was more than a literary aristocrat who could describe customs and traditions from abroad. Using Montagu’s complete letters, the author brings into discussion the fact that Montagu was also a vaccine entrepreneur and a journalist on political and urban issues, paving the way for discussions on philosophical questions. Many letter writers of the 16th and 17th centuries were already feminists who were politically and artistically active in their time and wrote letters with precision and expertise. The letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu are an important aspect in building a transcultural worldview in which diversity and knowledge combine with philosophy differently than it was before. In this short but engaging article, “American Women in the Transcendental and Pragmatist Movements”, Carol Bensick provides an overview of two important philosophical movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Transcendentalism and the Pragmatism that emerged in part from that movement. In the course of identifying numerous women who contributed to both movements, Bensick examines how some of them were included in the early history of American philosophy, only to be omitted from later histories. Bensick argues that the recent designation of women philosophers as “feminist pragmatists” is historically an inaccurate identification and one that pragmatists did not use to describe themselves. The French philosopher Simone Weil, the Swiss Jeanne Hersch and the Spanish Maria Zambrano each examined how bodily elements function in the rational search for truth. In his paper Oblique Paths to Truth: Myth and Bodily Elements in Simone Weil, Jeanne Hersch and Maria Zambrano, Piergiacomo Severini examines popular “body” myths referred to by these philosophers and analyses the language they use to express that bodily elements precede consciousness and reason. Through these myths/stories we learn that truth cannot be known directly through objects. Instead, the “knowing subject” necessarily elaborates indirect paths to transcendent truth. Severini argues that the effort to reintegrate the human attachment to the marginal world is peculiar to women philosophers in the history of philosophy and thus points to an alternative path to the human search for meaning that differs from the mainstream of Western male philosophy. As a philosopher, Hedwig Conrad-Martius has been intensively engaged throughout her life in researching the question of what reality is and has contrasted her reflections with those of Husserl and others. In her contribution “Conrad-Martius: the ´Real-Reality of the World – in Dialogue with Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl”, author Irene Breuer deals with Conrad-Martius’ concepts of reality as “real reality”, with being, existence and essence and relates them to the concepts in Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl. She discusses once again the questions of the hypostasis of being – by which the author claims that this is about the noema itself, and about the emergence of being in particular. The author’s thesis is that although Conrad-Martius rejects transcendental reduction, Conrad-Martius does accept eidetic reduction and the positing of a sphere of primordial and given facts. Driving this sphere back into a transphysical realm, it can provide a ground for Husserl’s sphere of original facts, which itself remains beyond the reach of phenomenological enquiries. Consequently, the author concludes, Conrad-Martius and Husserl meet here in their investigations, and yes, they complement each other, at a point where “the real bursts into reality”. Join us in unveiling this universe of women’s ideas. We are happy to welcome our contributors and readers, as we improve our understanding of the history of philosophical ideas by adding new perspectives and new insights. We enter a new universe of praiseworthy ideas by women theorists, one that will doubtlessly contribute to a world description that is more accurate than a narrative written without these voices. Philosophy starts here.

This inaugural volume of the Journal of the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists aims with its Issue 1 to clarify methodological issues that emerge when we rediscover the history of women philosophers. It is devoted to the questions which go hand in hand with the rediscovery of the history of women philosophers and scientists, asking whether and how we should place these newly discovered texts within the traditional patriarchal context. We do not know yet whether women are making different ways into canonical thought, or whether we should abandon the idea of canonical thought at all. Submissions that we received for the first call for papers are subsumed under the theme “Beyond Borders.” Each article deals in some way with the writing or rewriting of women’s history, filling in lapsus in the historical canons of philosophy and related disciplines, addressing the gendered political intellectual tradition from modern India, engaging with the works and ideas of women thinkers. The light-hearted title of Karen Green’s article belies the seriousness of the question it poses. In “The Human in Feminist Philosophy: Or Woman Is a Social Animal, I’m Not So Sure about Man”, Green questions the adequacy of the structuralist account of language after critically assessing its role in feminist theory since the 1970s. Green argues that the hegemony of structuralism is as much a Western hegemony as the Enlightenment tradition of a transcendent subject. Texts historically written and published by women provide the raw material for an archaeology of the female subject, which, Green argues, leads to the discovery and exploration of the female subject. She offers an initial sketch of the results of such an exploration, concluding that many male theorists have portrayed humans as inherently self-centred and egoistic, while most female philosophers have assumed that humans are inherently social. Laura Kotevska’s contribution “Writing Women into the History of Philosophy: Contextualism Re-Examined” examines the advantages and disadvantages of contextualism as used as a methodology. Philosophical works by women have been neglected by historians of philosophy until recent decades. When such works were discussed, it was usually in the context of male philosophers with whom a female philosopher was associated in some way. Kotevska explores how different options for a contextualist history of philosophy can help explain a woman’s involvement in philosophy, or how they can undermine her intellectual authority and cloud our understanding of her work. To avoid some of the epistemically damaging results that can arise when a woman’s work is placed in her patriarchal context, Kotevska concludes with three suggestions for writing and teaching works produced by women, suggestions informed by the methodological considerations addressed in the essay. Priyanka Jha’s contribution addresses “The Shaping of the ‘Political’: Gendered Intellectual History of Ideas in Modern India (1880s–1940s)”. Her premise is that in most societies, women’s thought has been reflected in a significant and robust ‘political’ tradition, that this tradition of women’s political thought is situated in a larger universe of ideas than is commonly thought. Women have been and continue to be important interlocutors in debates about concerns and values that are central to the human condition. However, the kind of centrality and attention that should have been given to this school of thought as a “political tradition” has either been barely noticed or marginalized in comparison to other ideational currents. This act is not peculiar to postcolonial societies like India but has a global resonance and a universal scope. There are very few women who have been active as political thinkers or political philosophers worldwide. This paper locates the gendered tradition of political intellectuals in modern India by examining the works and ideas of women thinkers. In the paper on “Women and Freedom of Canonical Thought: A Propaedeutics”, Christine Lopes starts from the observation that in male or patriarchal canonical thinking there is no unified image and representation of women. She uses this broad space of presentation and calls this “the ways of women”. At the same time, she notes that even today we do not know whether women will bring different ways or possibly femininely coherent ways to canonical thought, or whether we can create women’s canonical thought or abandon the idea of canonical thought. For all, therefore, it can be stated that we are given the freedom to judge canonical thinking, to include or exclude ourselves, to adapt or not. The paper discusses some basic epistemological assumptions about such freedom. Bodil Hvass Kjems begins her reflections on “The Inclusion of Women in the Curriculum of Philosophy: Challenges and Solutions” with the fact that recent decades have made accessible an overwhelming number of philosophical works by women, but that the original conflict is still present. The sheer abundance of material is far from being adequately reflected in the curricula of philosophy departments. It therefore raises the question, as many do, of what the best argumentative strategy would be to make such inclusion successful. In doing so, the author references proposals, such as those of Sarah Tyson (2014), to frame the debate in the following way. For the author, the question is whether misogyny is an intrinsic feature of the (Western) philosophical tradition or merely an unfortunate development. That is, whether the response to the integration of women’s texts is corrective or transformative to the dominant model. In doing so, it assumes that both strategies, regardless of the ontological status of the philosophical discipline, promote engagement with women’s work in ways that revolutionise contemporary philosophical practice. In her article “Privacy, Feminism, and Moral Responsibility in the Work of Elizabeth Lane Beardsley”, Julie van Camp looks at the work of an important moral philosopher, Elizabeth Lane Beardsley. The article highlights Beardsley’s philosophical contributions. Using Beardsley as a case study, van Camp points to more general problems in recognizing the work of women philosophers and ensuring their rightful place in our professional dialogue. Van Camp considers sociological and professional factors that may partly explain why the work of women philosophers has not always received the attention it seems to deserve in professional dialogue. The article concludes with suggestions about efforts we can make to address these problems, including the selection of readings for our courses and the sources we consult for our own research and writings, as well as the preservation of records of conferences and other public gatherings that honor women philosophers.

_Purpose._ The authors aim to disclose the anthropological dimension of ecocide during and after Russia’s war against Ukraine, relying on the multidisciplinary practices and intellectual production of ecofeminist women thinkers, including philosophers, sociologists, historians, psychologists, and others. _The theoretical basis_ methodological approaches in philosophical anthropology, phenomenology, analytical philosophy, communicative philosophy, existentialism, ethics of justice, and ethics of care determine the study’s theoretical basis._ Originality._ For the first time, a systematic analysis of the anthropological dimension of ecocide has been carried out based on ecofeminist methodology. The specifics of the Ukrainian resistance to ecocide were revealed as part of a single struggle – an anti-imperial and ecological struggle for independence and prosperity. It is emphasized that during the war, the opposition to ecocide is a component of the fight for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and therefore, the ideas of pacifism in this period are subordinated to this primary goal. After the war, preventing threats of ecocide should become an integral part of the struggle for stable peace and prosperity. Ecofeminist pacifist perspectives should be a priority among the most essential goals for that period. _Conclusions._ Ecofeminist methodological assessments offer valuable insights into the anthropological dimension of ecocide in wartime and post-war contexts, highlighting the complex interplay between gender, violence, and environmental destruction. By focusing on the experiences and perspectives of women and marginalized communities, ecofeminist analyses contribute to a more holistic understanding of ecocide and its impacts on both human populations and ecosystems.

Im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert waren Intelligenz und wissenschaftlicher Ehrgeiz keineswegs ausreichende Gründe für eine wissenschaftliche Laufbahn von Frauen. Die wenigen, denen aufgrund ihres hohen gesellschaftlichen Ranges und ihrer besonderen Begabung ein privates Studium ermöglicht wurde, präsentierten jedoch bereits erstaunlich moderne Überzeugungen. Die Göttinnen Diana und Minerva wurden zum Symbol der Unabhängigkeit dieser Frauen. Im vorliegenden Buch werden Biographien und Gedanken gelehrter Damen vorgestellt, die Einfluss auf die geistigen Strömungen ihrer Zeit ausübten, indem sie korrespondierten, kommunizierten, förderten und selbst schreibend tätig wurden.

The thesis of this paper is that a new kind of epistemology evolves from the use of artificial intelligence. The path it takes changes our understanding of the world, of human values and also of science and will be irreversible. The question that arises is whether this form of intelligence also influences our knowledge structure. By this I mean the area that we outline philosophically as the epistemological area. So the question is, under these circumstances, is the way we gain knowledge today still comparable to the definitions that philosophy has provided us with for centuries? The answer is: No! The paper sketches in broad outlines what the cornerstones of change will be and what consequences this will have for our way of understanding.