•  80
    Saving God: Religion after idolatry (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2009.
    Saving God is a rich and provocative book. It aims to "save God" from idolatrous believers, who take God to be largely concerned with the welfare and destiny of human creatures. Banning idolatry, Johnston is led to a panentheistic conception of "the Highest One," who (or which) is not separable from Nature. With echoes of Spinoza and, to a lesser extent, Whitehead, Johnston argues that the natural world is all that there is, but, properly understood, can be seen as "the site of the sacred."
  •  39
    Consciousness Explained (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 46 (2): 398-399. 1992.
    Dennett aims to develop an empirical, scientifically respectable theory of human consciousness--one that demystifies the mind by showing how the various phenomena that compose consciousness "are all physical effects of the brain's activities".
  •  211
    Why Christians should not be libertarians: An Augustinian challenge
    Faith and Philosophy 20 (4): 460-478. 2003.
    The prevailing view of Christian philosophers today seems to be that Christianity requires a libertarian conception of free will. Focusing on Augustine’s mature anti-Pelagian works, I try to show that the prevailing view is in error. Specifically, I want to show that---on Augustine’s view of grace-a libertarian account of free will is irrelevant to salvation. On Augustine’s view, the grace of God through Christ is sufficient as weIl as necessary for salvation. Salvation is entirely in the hands …Read more
  •  31
    Recent work in the philosophy of mind
    Philosophical Books 30 (January): 1-9. 1989.
  •  50
    Review of Objects and Persons, by Trenton Merricks (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4). 2003.
    Book Information Objects and Persons. Objects and Persons Trenton Merricks . Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2001 , pp. xii + 203 , £30 ( cloth ), £14.99 ( paper ) . By Trenton Merricks. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xii + 203. £30 (cloth:), £14.99 (paper:).
  •  131
    Self-directed and self-evaluative attitudes are often connected to one’s social position. Before investigating the dependence relations between individual self-evaluation and social positioning, however, there is a prior question to answer: What are the conditions under which an individual can have any self-directed attitudes at all? In order to be the subject of self-directed or selfevaluative attitudes, I shall argue, an individual must have linguistic and social relations. I’ll discuss the fi…Read more
  •  75
    On being one's own person
    In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. 2004.
  •  140
    It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there are different kinds of first-perso…Read more
  •  317
    The shrinking difference between artifacts and natural objects
    American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers. 2008.
    Artifacts are objects intentionally made to serve a given purpose; natural objects come into being without human intervention. I shall argue that this difference does not signal any ontological deficiency in artifacts qua artifacts. After sketching my view of artifacts as ordinary objects, I’ll argue that ways of demarcating genuine substances do not draw a line with artifacts on one side and natural objects on the other. Finally, I’ll suggest that philosophers have downgraded artifacts because …Read more
  •  120
    Folk psychology
    In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Mit Press. 1999.
    In recent years, folk psychology has become a topic of debate not just among philosophers, but among development psychologists and primatologists as well
  •  41
    On the twofold nature of artefacts
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1): 132-136. 2006.
  •  23
    The Nature of True Minds (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 475-478. 1995.
  •  138
    Are beliefs brain states?
    In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics, Csli Publications (stanford). 2001.
    During the past couple of decades, philosophy of mind--with its siblings, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science--has been one of the most exciting areas of philosophy. Yet, in that time, I have come to think that there is a deep flaw in the basic conception of its object of study--a deep flaw in its conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention. Taking belief as the fundamental propositional attitude, scientifically-minded philosophers hold that…Read more
  •  3
    Nonreductive Materialsim
    In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
  •  10
    "Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality" edited by Andrew Woodfield (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1): 137. 1984.
  •  64
  •  323
    After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theore…Read more
  •  249
    The ontological status of persons
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 370-388. 2002.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll make the no…Read more
  •  1
    Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism
    Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2): 61-66. 1987.
  •  3
    Conscious and unconscious intentionality in practical realism
    MeQRiMa Rivista Di Analisi Testo Letterario E Figurativo 5 130-135. 2002.
    1. Suppose that John and Jane are junior colleagues in an academic department of a university. John, who thinks of Jane as his competitor, has seen her flirt with the head of the department. He tells his other colleagues that Jane is trying to gain an unfair advantage over him. He comes to dislike Jane, and often in conversation with people outside the department, he enjoys saying bad things about Jane.
  •  386
    What Am I?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 151-159. 1999.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable---namely, that he was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the cont…Read more
  •  27
    Judgment and Justification
    Philosophical Review 100 (3): 481. 1991.
  •  91
    Reply to Van Gulick
    Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 217-221. 1994.
  •  62
    My main reaction to "Intelligence without representation" is to applaud. Dreyfus's use of Merleau-Ponty is a refreshing new breeze in philosophy of psychology. About twenty or so years ago, philosophers struck an unfortunate course..
  •  276
    Amie Thomasson has won well-deserved praise for her book, Ordinary Objects. She defends a commonsense world view and gives us “reason to think that there are fundamental particles, plants and animals, sticks and stones, tables and chairs, and even marriages and mortgages.” (p. 181) Ordinary objects comprise a vast array of things—natural objects both scientific and commonsensical, artifacts, organisms, abstract social objects.