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43Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton (review)Journal of Philosophy 90 (7): 367-370. 1993.
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249Impersonal imagining: A reply to Jerrold LevinsonPhilosophical Quarterly 44 (170): 79-82. 1994.
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332Imagination, delusion and hallucinationsIn Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Mind and Language, Blackwell. pp. 168-183. 2000.Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capac…Read more
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45Imagination, Delusion and HallucinationsMind and Language 15 (1): 168-183. 2000.Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capac…Read more
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10Imagination as simulation: Aesthetics meets cognitive scienceIn Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation, Blackwell. 1995.
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31Is factuality a matter of content?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 763-763. 1999.Dienes & Perner argue that there is a hierarchy of forms of implicit knowledge. One level of their hierarchy involves factuality, where it may be merely implicit that the state of affairs is supposed to be a real one rather than something imagined or fictional. I argue that the factual or fictional status of a thought or utterance cannot be a matter of concept, implicit or explicit.
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22Imagination, Delusion and HallucinationsMind and Language 15 (1): 168-183. 2000.Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capac…Read more
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1Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive SciencePhilosophical Quarterly 48 (190): 127-129. 1998.
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117Fictional namesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (4). 1988.This Article does not have an abstract
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211Imagination as motivationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3): 201-16. 2002.What kinds of psychological states motivate us? Beliefs and desires are the obvious candidates. But some aspects of our behaviour suggest another idea. I have in mind the view that imagination can sometimes constitute motivation
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11Film, reality, and illusionIn David Bordwell Noel Carroll (ed.), Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, University of Wisconsin Press. pp. 325--44. 1996.
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4Imagination and make-believeIn Berys Nigel Gaut & Dominic Lopes (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, Routledge. 2000.
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327Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive ScienceCambridge University Press. 1995.This is a book about the nature of film: about the nature of moving images, about the viewer's relation to film, and about the kinds of narrative that film is capable of presenting. It represents a very decisive break with the semiotic and psychoanalytic theories of film which have dominated discussion. The central thesis is that film is essentially a pictorial medium and that the movement of film images is real rather than illusory. A general theory of pictorial representation is presented, whi…Read more
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61Framing NarrativesRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 17-42. 2007.Marianne Dashwood was well able to imagine circumstances both favourable and unfavourable to her. But for all her romantic sensibility she was not able to imagine these things from anything other than her own point of view. ‘She expected from other people the same opinions and feelings as her own, and she judged of their motives by the immediate effect of their actions on herself.’ Unlike her sister, she could not see how the ill-crafted attentions of Mrs. Jennings could derive from a good natur…Read more
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19Empathy for Objects1In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 82. 2011.
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24Dennis Dutton , "The Forger's Art: Forgery and The Philosophy of Art" (review)Philosophical Quarterly 35 (41): 435. 1985.
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150Both sides of the story: explaining events in a narrativePhilosophical Studies 135 (1): 49-63. 2007.Our experience of narrative has an internal and an external aspect--the content of the narrative’s representations, and its intentional, communicative aetiology. The interaction of these two things is crucial to understanding how narrative works. I begin by laying out what I think we can reasonably expect from a narrative by way of causal information, and how causality interacts with other attributes we think of as central to narrative. At a certain point this discussion will strike a problem: o…Read more
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One way creatures of fiction seem to differ from real things is in their essential properties. While you and I might not have done many of the things we did do, Anna Karenina could not, surely, have been other than a lover of Vronsky. Is that right? Not straightforwardly: while it is true that “Necessarily, someone who was not a lover of Vronsky would not be Anna”, it is also true that “Someone who was necessarily a lover of Vronsky would not be Anna”. I use a framework developed by Stalnaker to…Read more
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158Desire in imaginationIn Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 201-221. 2002.
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44Aesthetic Explanation and the Archaeology of SymbolsBritish Journal of Aesthetics 56 (3): 233-246. 2016.I argue that aesthetic ideas should play a significant role in archaeological explanation. I sketch an account of aesthetic interests which is appropriate to archaeological contexts. I illustrate the role of aesthetics through a discussion of the transition from signals to symbols. I argue that the opposition in archaeological debate between explanation and interpretation is one we should reject.
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21An Error Concerning NosesJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (1): 9-13. 2017.We identify a strategy for getting beliefs from fiction via three assumptions: a certain causal generality holds in the fiction and does so because causal generalities in fiction are carried over from what the author takes to be fact; the author is reliable on this topic, so what the author takes to be fact is fact. We do not question. While will, in particular cases, be doubtful, the strategy is vulnerable more generally to the worry that what looks like a causal generality may be instead an au…Read more
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109Arts and mindsOxford University Press. 2004.Philosophical questions about the arts go naturally with other kinds of questions about them. Art is sometimes said to be an historical concept. But where in our cultural and biological history did art begin? If art is related to play and imagination, do we find any signs of these things in our nonhuman relatives? Sometimes the other questions look like ones the philosopher of art has to answer. Anyone who thinks that interpretation in the arts is an activity that leaves the intentions of the au…Read more