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6To do aestheticsIIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 435. 2013.
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50Standing in the Last Ditch: On the Communicative Intentions of Fiction MakersJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (4): 351-363. 2014.Some of us have suggested that what fiction makers do is offer us things to imagine, that this is what is distinctive of fiction and what distinguishes it from narrative-based but assertive activities such as journalism or history. Some of us hold, further, that it is the maker's intention which confers fictional status. Many, I think, feel the intuitive appeal of this idea at the same time as they sense looming problems for any proposal about fiction's nature based straightforwardly on the iden…Read more
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73Some ways to understand peoplePhilosophical Explorations 11 (3). 2008.Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto claim that those once bitter rivals, simulation theory and theory-theory, are now to be treated as partners in crime. It's true that the debate has become more nuanced, with detailed suggestions abroad as to how these two approaches might peaceably divide the field. And there is common ground between them, at least to the extent that they agree on what needs to be explained. But I see no fatal flaw in what they share. In particular, I reject the idea that most inter…Read more
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78Realism of Character and the Value of FictionIn Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Cambridge University Press. pp. 161--81. 1998.
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12Pretence, Pretending and MetarepresentingMind and Language 13 (1): 35-55. 1998.I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to preten…Read more
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9D. H. Ruben [1985]: The Metaphysics of the Social World. Routledge and Kegan Paul. x + 189 pp. £14.95 (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 127-132. 1987.
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Rationality, decentring, and the evidence for pretence in nonhuman animalsIn Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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41Preserving the traces: An answer to noël CarrollJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (3): 306-308. 2000.
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Pretence and rationality: The case of non‐human animalsIn Arts and minds, Oxford University Press. 2004.Argues that pretence is one clear indication of rationality. Makes a suggestion about the kind of evidence of pretence in animals we should be looking for. This suggestion makes claims about pretence hard to justify by comparison with, say, claims about imitation; Appeals to Morgan's canon in defence of this stance. Suggests that we can learn something about pretence by connecting it with the phenomenon of seeing‐in. Finally, offers a speculation on the evolutionary history of the capacity that …Read more
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80Pretence, pretending, and metarepresentingMind and Language 13 (1): 35-55. 1998.I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to preten…Read more
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244Photography, painting and perceptionJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (1): 23-29. 1991.
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Pretence and pretendingIn Arts and minds, Oxford University Press. 2004.Assesses the claim that metarepresentation — the mental representation of a mental representation — is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. Argues that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from reality. Sketches an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing.
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17Narrative, imitation, and point of viewIn Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, Wiley-blackwell. 2007.This chapter contains sections titled: Agency and Access to the World Speaking and Seeing Imitation Some Resources of Narration The Varieties of Narrative Imitation.
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80Narrative and the Psychology of CharacterJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (1): 61-71. 2009.
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44Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton (review)Journal of Philosophy 90 (7): 367-370. 1993.
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157Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of StoriesOxford University Press. 2010.This text offers a reflection on the nature and significance of narrative in human communication.
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Interpreting the unreliableIn Arts and minds, Oxford University Press. 2004.Argues for a rethinking of the standard account of narrative unreliability. Works can be unreliable in many ways, and unreliable works do not, the author claims, always have unreliable narrators. Narrative theory needs to focus more on unreliable works, less on unreliable narrators. As an example of this, the author uses Ford's The Searchers.