Greg Currie Nj

To Carroll I say that nonrepresentational cinema is marginal in a way that nonrepresentational painting is not, and that films consisting of words only can be pictorial. Hence, my pictorial characterization of cinema is not as problematic as he suggests. To Gaut, I say that the cinematically relevant sense of imagining is not entertaining without asserting and that he underestimates the explanatory power of a simulation-based theory of imagination. He persuades me to modify some of my claims concerning the implied author. To Lopes, I say that the experience of fiction does not involve a perceptual illusion, but rather a nonillusory perceptual experience leading to certain acts of imagining. He persuades me to modify some of my claims concerning imagining seeing

How should we characterise the view that we can learn about the mind from literature? Should we say that such learning consists in acquiring knowledge of truths? That option is more attractive than it is sometimes made to seem by those who oppose propositional knowledge to practical knowledge or “knowing how”. But some writers on this topic—Lamarque and Olsen—argue that, while literature may express interesting propositions, it is not their truth that matters, but their “content”. Matters to what? To literary criticism, they reply: there is no place in criticism for “debate about the truth or falsity of general statements about human life or the human condition.” I argue, to the contrary, that ideas of truth and truthfulness are woven into the fabric of a kind of criticism that is widespread now and comes with a long and distinguished history.

I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to pretending as truth stands to belief.

Argues that pretence is one clear indication of rationality. Makes a suggestion about the kind of evidence of pretence in animals we should be looking for. This suggestion makes claims about pretence hard to justify by comparison with, say, claims about imitation; Appeals to Morgan's canon in defence of this stance. Suggests that we can learn something about pretence by connecting it with the phenomenon of seeing‐in. Finally, offers a speculation on the evolutionary history of the capacity that underlies pretence.

I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to pretending as truth stands to belief

Motor imagery typically involves an experience as of moving a body part. Recent studies reveal close parallels between the constraints on motor imagery and those on actual motor performance. How are these parallels to be explained? We advance a simulative theory of motor imagery, modeled on the idea that we predict and explain the decisions of others by simulating their decision-making processes. By proposing that motor imagery is essentially off-line motor action, we explain the tendency of motor imagery to mimic motor performance. We close by arguing that a simulative theory of motor imagery gives (modest) support to and illumination of the simulative theory of decision-prediction