Philipp Höfele

In a paradigmatic selection, the Special Issue unites contributions from biology, sustainability research, psychology and philosophy as well as media science and literary studies. It aims to discuss to what extent and on what basis the concept of nature is treated in the Anthropocene discourse with new perspectives, intentions and narratives. Not only the possibly changed conditions for a definition of nature in the Anthropocene are questioned, but also the necessity of an inter- and transdisciplinary opening, which goes along with this questioning and its connection with theoretical and practical issues.

The beginning of process philosophy is usually associated with Alfred N. Whitehead. Nevertheless, with regard to the understanding of the whole of nature as a process, there are obvious precursors to be found in the philosophy of nature around 1800 and especially in that of F.W.J. Schelling. Hans Jonas registered this proximity, at least indirectly. In his contribution to 'A Philosophical Biology,' traces of both Schelling and Whitehead can be found, even if he never quotes the former directly and thinks he has to differentiate himself from the latter despite all kinship. A central question in common for Schelling and Whitehead concerns the formation of boundaries and, thus, of structures and forms. This question appears too in Jonas’s work, albeit less radically insofar as he understands only organic life and its permanent metabolism, rather than the whole of nature, as processual. Thus, Jonas poses the question of identity formation solely with respect to organic life. The process-philosophical perspective on the whole of being, which is shared by Schelling and Whitehead but rejected by Jonas, is, however, justified from certain points of view, especially in view of a holism increasingly discussed in the Anthropocene.

This paper outlines Martin Heidegger’s and Franz Rosenzweig’s reception of Schelling’s "The Ages of the World." On the one hand, both philosophers criticize Schelling’s theo-cosmogonic project as taking the systematic claims of idealist philosophy to the extreme. On the other hand, however, basic philosophical concepts developed in the "Ages of the World" and related writings are of immense value for their own work. Rosenzweig and Heidegger adopt two concepts in particular and combine them with their own theories in different ways. Both authors refer to Schelling’s notion that the presence is locked up in itself and thus unable to open up to anything 'truly new' and different. Yet they also relate to the alternative he offers: drawing on Schelling’s concepts of a 'separation from oneself' and 'ecstasy,' Heidegger and Rosenzweig emphasize the powerlessness that results from a focus on the subject in the modern era. Like Schelling, they insist on an existential understanding of human temporality, which enables us to fully grasp the idea that the past is inaccessible and that the future holds countless unexpected possibilities in store.

The article shows that between 1802 and 1805, Schelling and Hegel borrow similar structural moments from Greek tragedy. Unlike Szondi's claim in his epochal "Essay on the Tragic" (1961), however, Schelling is by no means concerned with establishing a dialectical moment in the Hegelian sense, but with an alternative to Hegel's theory of the tragic. Schelling associates this theory with the motif of the sublime, thus making it fruitful for a critique of his present time. This is exemplified here by Schelling's Jena and Würzburg Lectures on the "Philosophy of Art" and Hegel's reflections on the 'Tragedy in the ethical life' (Tragödie im Sittlichen) in his 1802/03 essay "On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law," in which Hegel, probably in the course of his collaboration with Schelling in Jena, unfolds a theory of the tragic and makes it fruitful for the debate about natural law in his own way.

In view of the ever-increasing dominance of technology in modernity, which goes hand in hand with an ever-faster development of new technologies as well as an ever-increasing blurring of the boundaries between the natural and the artificial, an evaluation of emerging technologies cannot be put off. As early as 1979, in his work "The Imperative of Responsibility," Hans Jonas developed a 'heuristics of fear' as a principle and method for assessing the dangers of new technologies in the face of ignorance of their future consequences. As the article attempts to show, the task of this 'heuristics' amounts to more than assessing the risk of technical developments and presenting application-oriented measures based on this assessment. As a feeling, the fear should also illustrate ex negativo that which constitutes human existence as such, insofar as technology always inscribes itself in the self-image of humankind. This becomes clear when one goes back to the historical reference point of Jonas' conception of this feeling in Heidegger's analysis of Angst, from which it becomes clear that it is a matter of preserving the horizon of possibilities for human Dasein. However, Jonas does not only mean the open character of one's own existence in the sense of Heidegger. Similar to Hegel's concept of fear in "Lordship and Bondage," Jonas is concerned with a form of "selfless fear" that involves a collective We and is also concerned about future generations and their possibilities.

In recent years, technology's orientation toward, and even imitation of, natural models have experienced an enormous upswing. These nature-oriented technologies are often linked to the ethical promise of sustainable as well as ethically and socially responsible technologies that promise an answer to the challenges of the 21st century. Think, for example, of artificial intelligence as an assisting technology for climate protection in the debate on the "Digital Anthropocene." But the fulfillment of this promise is not automatic. This article aims to provide some answers to the theoretical as well as practical-ethical questions that arise with regard to nature-oriented technologies in the present age, especially the role of artificial intelligence in the Anthropocene.

Eine Theologie, die angesichts der Gräuel von Auschwitz die Hoffnung auf eine Versöhnung für alle offenhalten will, muss um der Gerechtigkeit willen eine intersubjektive Dimension des eschatologischen Gerichts annehmen, bei welchem die Klagen der Opfer eine Stimme erhalten, ohne dass zugleich Gott als Schöpfer des Ganzen anzuklagen wäre. Denn derart würde man vorschnell die Verantwortlichkeit der Täter für die von ihnen begangenen Gräueltaten auf eine höhere Instanz abwälzen. Die Frage nach der Möglichkeit eines zwischenmenschlichen Verzeihens von Unverzeihbarem, wie sie von Jankélévitch, Arendt, Derrida und Ricoeur erörtert wurde, käme dabei nicht in den Blick. Doch selbst wenn die dem Menschen allein zugestandene Möglichkeit des Guten und des Bösen ihn auch zu dem äußersten Akt einer Vergebung für die Täter befähigen sollte, so wird diese angesichts der erdrückenden Schuldgeschichte letztlich nur durch die Solidarität des auferweckten Gekreuzigten mit den Opfern möglich sein.A theology which wants to keep the hope for reconciliation up with regard to Auschwitz must, for the sake of justice, assume an intersubjective dimension of the eschatological court in which the complaints of the victims are voiced without accusing God as the creator of the whole. Since, that way, one would hastily transfer the responsibility of the perpetrators for the atrocities they committed to a higher authority. The question of the possibility of an interpersonal forgiveness of something that cannot be forgiven, as discussed by Jankélévitch, Arendt, Derrida and Ricoeur, would thus go unnoticed. However, even if the capability of the good and the bad , which is given to human beings alone, enables them to express their forgiveness for the perpetrators, which is a very extreme act, this forgiveness will, with regard to the oppressive history of guilt, only be possible by means of the solidarity of the crucified and resurrected Christ with the victims

This paper outlines a systematic relation between Fichte and Heidegger concerning their interpretations of imagination (Einbildungskraft) and image, drawing on their early and in particular their later writings. In 1929, Heidegger deems it necessary to develop his interpretation of the concept of imagination as referring to the temporality of Dasein in opposition to its interpretation as a subjective faculty in idealism, particularly in Fichte. At the same time, however, an affirmative use of the concept of imagination (Einbildung), in analogy to Fichte, can also be observed in Heidegger’s writings, as, in the 1930s, he uses it to describe the unavailable ‘event’ of Being. Moreover, in spite of his pronounced criticism of the modern understanding of the ‘world as image’, Heidegger is also aware of a positive concept of the image, that he claims for art: understood that way, the image, according to Heidegger, is able to disclose the ‘happening of truth’ (das Geschehen der Wahrheit) in the ‘shape’ (Ge-bild) of art. Conversely, in his early writings Fichte already interprets the imagination as a structure generating time and preceding the I. Yet it is only after 1800 that Fichte’s interpretation shows some analogies to Heidegger’s concept of the image, when he argues for the pictorial character of all apparent reality. Fichte conceptualises this specific character of reality both as a generating principle and as something that both originates from and is related to a concept that is situated behind reality and cannot be visualised.Der Beitrag zeigt mit Blick auf die frühen und insbesondere spateren Schriften Fichtes und Heideggers eine Nahe zwischen beiden Denkern hinsichtlich ihrer Deutungen der Einbildungskraft und des Bildes auf. Zwar meint Heidegger 1929 zunächst, seine auf die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins bezogene Interpretation der Einbildungskraft in einen Gegensatz zu der vermögenstheoretischen Auslegung derselben im Idealismus und insbesondere bei Fichte rücken zu müssen. Doch lässt sich bei ihm zugleich auch ein affirmatives Heranziehen des Einbildungsbegriffes analog zu Fichte beobachten, insofern er ihn in den dreißiger Jahren sogar zur Beschreibung des unverfügbaren ‚Ereignissesʻ des Seins heranzieht. Trotz seiner vehementen Kritik des neuzeitlichen Begreifens der ‚Welt als Bildʻ kennt überdies auch Heidegger einen positiven Bildbegriff, den er für die Kunst einklagt, die im ‚Ge-bildʻ das ‚Geschehen der Wahrheitʻ offenzulegen vermöge. Umgekehrt lässt sich auch schon beim frühen Fichte eine Interpretation der Einbildungskraft nachweisen, die diese als eine Zeit generierende und dem Ich vorgelagerte Struktur herausstellt. Doch erst nach 1800 betont Fichte ähnlich wie Heidegger die bildliche Verfasstheit aller erscheinenden Wirklichkeit, welche er in ihrem Werdecharakter sowie in ihrer Verwiesenheit auf und Abkünftigkeit von etwas dahinter noch zu Situierendem und nicht zu Verbildlichendem herauszustellen sucht.

Dans cet article, la revue critique des recherches sur les liens entre Schelling et Proust est présentée en deux étapes : dans un premier temps, nous présentons les études qui, sur le plan historique, s’intéressent avant tout aux canaux qui pourraient avoir permis à Proust de prendre connaissance de la philosophie de Schelling. Dans un deuxième temps, cette revue critique est consacrée aux interprétations qui, en dépit de l’absence de preuve historique, se fondent sur des points communs et des analogies théoriques entre la philosophie esthétique du sujet chez Proust d’une part, et les différents systèmes philosophiques de Schelling d’autre part, avant tout celui de sa philosophie de l’art et de son Système de l’idéalisme transcendantal de 1800.

The paper pursues a double systematic interest: on the one hand, it highlights a link between the concepts of memory which can be observed respectively in Schelling’s Ages of the World and In Search of Lost Time by Proust. On the other hand, it aims to outline essential characteristics of human memory. In doing so, the paper is concerned, firstly, with the appearance of memory in both authors; secondly, with the triggers of memory and their context ; thirdly, with the content of memory as a kind of vision of ideas or of essences ; fourthly, with the condition of this memory, i.e. the idea of a depth of time ; and finally with the different remembering subjects in both authors.

This article explores the question of how far, in view of the challenges of the Anthropocene, one can speak of an ‘evil activity’ that can be morally imputed to humans. The central thesis is that it is possible to speak of an ‘evil act’ in the Anthropocene with reference to two positions in the philosophical tradition. In the first place, F. W. J. Schelling presented a conception of evil in his ‘middle’ philosophy from 1809 onwards, which allows to describe an interrelationship between an individual and the whole of the biosphere. In the second place, in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment", T. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer developed reflections on the mimetic with regard to evil in anti-Semitism, which in particular make it possible to reflect morally on actions that conform to a ‘mainstream’. This interpretation of the mimetic represents the negative counterpart to the positive concept of mimesis, which Adorno developed not least in the context of his reception of Schelling. The positive concept of mimesis ultimately points to a possibility of correcting the inverted human-nature relationship in the Anthropocene.

In view of the diagnosis of the Anthropocene, the need for a “different” relationship between humans and nature that “follows nature” (naturam sequi) is often emphasized. This claim can be traced back historically to Schelling, among others. However, as soon as the concept of nature is perceived in its ambivalence and historical contingency, the naturam sequi argument seems to fall prey to the naturalistic fallacy. This article argues that Schelling, on the one hand, registers this ambivalence of nature in a multi-layered description of the developmental history of nature, but that, on the other hand, he explicitly adheres to the nature-ethical naturam sequi argument, especially in his middle period philosophy between 1807 and 1822. Schelling avoids the naturalistic fallacy by adopting a “negativistic” mode of argumentation. It is precisely in this that Schelling’s nature-ethical argumentation is very topical in view of the modern debates on nature-orientation in the Anthropocene.

The international journal Schelling-Studien offers a forum for scholarly work on Schelling’s philosophy and for overarching questions of Idealism and its impact. It brings together current international contributions to research in German, English, French and Italian. Besides an open section for contributions, some volumes contain a thematic focus section. The section ‘documents’ occupies an important role. This section contains reports on newly discovered documents on Schelling’s philosophy as well as shorter historical documents. Every volume is rounded off with reviews of the most important recent international publications. The journal Schelling-Studien is complemented by the series Beiträge zur Schelling-Forschung. The tenth volume of Schelling-Studien contains, in addition to contributions from international research, a report on a new international network entitled ‘Transformative Transmissions: German-Scandinavian Intellectual Communities 1790–1860’. The volume concludes with reviews of recent international publications. With contributions by Christian Benne | Sarah Bernard-Granger | Christoph Binkelmann | Sebastian Cabezas | Osman Choque-Aliaga | Jad Hatem | Philipp Höfele | Lore Hühn | Wilhelm G. Jacobs | Jan Kerkmann | Norihito Nakamura | Andrés Ortigosa | Phoebe Liliy Page | Jesper Lundsfryd Rasmussen | Francesco Scagliusi | Philipp Schwab | Evgenia Sonnabend | Gregorio Tenti | Amir Yaretzky | Paul Ziche.

Der Artikel beabsichtigt zu zeigen, dass bereits Kierkegaards Mitschrift der Berliner Schelling-Vorlesung von 1841/42 eine eigene Stoßrichtung des Dänen erkennen lässt, die nicht zuletzt der parallel gehörten Vorlesung des Theologen P.K. Marheineke ihren Anstoß verdanken dürfte. Ganz in diesem Sinne werden 1844 in „Der Begriff Angst“ Abweichungen gegenüber Schelling explizit benannt. Kierkegaard rezipiert hier zwei zeitlich weit auseinanderliegende Arbeiten Schellings und verknüpft diese zugleich – über die Konzepte von Wirklichkeit und Sünde – thematisch miteinander, nämlich die Berliner Schelling-Vorlesung von 1841/42 und die „Freiheitsschrift“ von 1809. Während Kierkegaard anhand der Sünde auf die Wirklichkeit des je Einzelnen in seiner radikalen Einzelheit fokussiert und sich darin als der modernere Autor erweist, thematisiert Schelling gerade 1809/10 die Rückbezogenheit des Einzelnen in seiner unverfügbaren Entscheidungswirklichkeit auf ein naturphilosophisch zu reflektierendes Ganzes, was ihm seinerseits eine ungebrochene Aktualität im Blick auf gegenwärtige naturethische Debatten garantiert.

One major challenge of the 21st century is the increasingly rapid development of new technologies and their evaluation. In this article we argue for an interdisciplinary approach to meet this demand for evaluating new and specifically bioinspired technologies. We combine the consideration of normative principles in the field of ethics with psychological-empirical research on attitudes. In doing so, the paper has a twofold concern: first, we discuss how such an interdisciplinary collaboration can be implemented by using the method of Cognitive-Affective Mapping. Cognitive-Affective Maps (CAMs) enable a graphical representation of attitudes, including cognitive and affective aspects. Second, we argue that CAMs can be helpful to remedy the deficits of traditional ethical approaches. We applied CAMs in the context of an ethics seminar in which students were instructed to create CAMs based on bioinspired technologies twice – prior to the seminar to assess their evaluation on bioinspired technologies per se (pre-assessment) and after the seminar to assess how their evaluation might have changed and especially which normative ethical principles might have been additionally considered (post-assessment). As could be shown, CAMs can visualize the students’ attitudes, including the valence of ethical principles. Further, comparing pre- and post-CAMs indicated students’ attitude change.

This chapter argues that the concern Schelling shares with Goethe is, on the one hand, to present a concept of nature and life that takes better scientific account of the phenomena of dynamics, ‘self-creation’ and purposefulness. On the other hand, this ontological question is also linked to the project of establishing an appropriate methodology that pays attention to the phenomena themselves and their holistic significance for the whole of nature and the environment. Schelling and Goethe are united by a common front against a transcendental philosophy of nature oriented towards Newton, which they sought to correct both methodologically and ontologically with regard to the concepts of nature and life. Their approaches can therefore be seen as precursors of a process-philosophical understanding of reality, which is increasingly being taken into account today in environmental ethics in view of the challenges of the present.

Schellings entwickelt sein trinitätstheologisches und christologisches Denken insbesondere ab seiner ‚mittleren‘ und seiner Spätphilosophie. Es ist dabei stets mit anderen zentralen Themen seines Denkens verknüpft wie der Potenzenlehre, der Naturphilosophie, seiner Zeit- und Geschichtsphilosophie, seinem Denken von Freiheit und Gelassenheit sowie von Mythologie und Tragik. Ich beabsichtige zu zeigen, dass die Figuren von Trinität und des Gottessohnes Christi als grundlegende Operationsfiguren dienen, die einerseits Schelling helfen zentrale Gedanken und Konzepte seines eigenen Philosophierens weiterzuentwickeln. Gleichzeitig werden andererseits die klassische christliche Trinitätslehre und Christologie dabei selbst Modifikationen und Anreicherungen unterworfen, die diese in fruchtbarer und aktueller Weise weiterzudenken erlauben.