Ricardo Batista

Before the limits of the standard Quinean meta-ontology that persists in contemporary analytical metaphysics, an alternative has recently emerged, proposing metaphysical grounding. Under the inspiration of neo-Aristotelians, it seeks to overcome the Quinean constraints by reflecting on the relation of ontological dependence. However, the theorists of metaphysical grounding are currently at a stalemate among themselves: a current debate between grounding monists and grounding pluralists divides and dominates the community. The authors of this essay present the circumstances that has led to this state of affairs in order to illustrate the problematic nature of the positions in contention and to demonstrate that an elegant way out of this impasse involves Thomistic metaphysics, i.e., by conjugating the unifying principle of esse and the limiting principle of essentia. Conceived in terms of participation and analogy, it can, on the one hand, assert the advantages of the positions in conflict, namely, the principle of unity and the principle of diversity, and, on the other hand, avoid their respective weaknesses, namely, the problem of differences and the problem of disunity.