Markus Kohl

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories : the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.

Although Kant is often considered the founding father of the controversial principle ‘Ought Implies Can’ (OIC), it is not at all clear how Kant himself understands and defends this principle. This essay provides a substained interpretation of Kant's views on OIC. I argue that Kant endorses two versions of OIC: a version that is concerned with our physical capacities, and a version that posits a link between moral obligation and a volitional power of choice. I show that although there are important senses in which Kant's conception of OIC differs from the way in which OIC is discussed in recent philosophy, his account raises important issues for contemporary theory: for instance, it highlights the extent to which acceptance or rejection of OIC reflects convictions about the sources of normativity.

Kant's account of “precepts of prudence” raises a striking interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, he presents such precepts as normative-practical rules; on the other hand, he relegates them to theoretical philosophy. I argue that to render these two strands coherent, we must assume that our empirical nature is a source of normativity for us: prudence is normative for us just because we have an “unconditional” empirical desire for obtaining happiness, a maximum of pleasant sensations. Since rules of prudence cognize the means for causing a state of affairs that we desire and value insofar as we are receptive natural beings, these rules do not presuppose the active self-legislation of practical reason. Hence they belong to the theoretical cognition of nature.

Many commentators hold that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant also posits an objective law of non-moral practical rationality, 'the' Hypothetical Imperative. On this view, the appeal to the Hypothetical Imperative increases the dialectical options that Kantians have vis-a-vis Humean skepticism about the authority of reason, and it allows for a systematic explanation of the possibility of non-moral weakness of will. I argue that despite its appeal, this interpretation cannot be sustained: for Kant the only objective, universally valid a priori principle of practical reason that governs transcendentally free agents is the moral law. All non-moral practical rules are mere “precepts” that lack genuine objectivity, certainty, and intersubjective validity. I suggest that for Kant the rejection of the possibility of non-moral practical laws plays an important part in his argument for the supreme rational authority of moral norms over prudential precepts of happiness.

I provide a sympathetic reconstruction of Kant’s motivation for endorsing incompatibilism about human freedom. On my interpretation, Kant holds that if all the determining grounds of our actions were subject to natural necessity, we would never be free to respect or defy laws of practical reason, and for Kant such freedom is a condition for the possibility that our actions are governed by categorical imperatives. I argue that his view rests on a gripping construal of the rational imperfection that afflicts the human will

To many readers, it has seemed that Kant's discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant's view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, 'transcendental freedom' requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas 'practical freedom' requires the absence of determination by, specifically, sensuous incentives. However, I argue that the defense of freedom presented in the Canon is abandoned by Kant in the Groundwork when he first develops his conception of the absolute purity of moral motivation.

It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) is essentially the same sort of spontaneity found in the practical use of reason. Accordingly, the faculties of understanding and practical reason both possess genuine autonomy.