Keith Stenning

"A structured connectionist model using temporal synchrony has been proposed by Shastri & Ajjanagadde. This model has provided a mechanism which encodes rules and facts involving n-ary predicates and handles some types of dynamic variable binding. Their model, however, has problems in dealing with important knowledge representation issues such as binding generation, consistency checking, unification, etc. This paper presents a restructuring of the original model which overcomes many of its limitations while, at the same time, reducing the number of types of node [sic] required and maintaining the merits of the original model."

We discuss external and internal graphical and linguistic representational systems. We argue that a cognitive theory of peoples' reasoning performance must account for (a) the logical equivalence of inferences expressed in graphical and linguistic form, and (b) the implementational differences that affect facility of inference. Our theory proposes that graphical representation limit abstraction and thereby aid “processibility”. We discuss the ideas of specificity and abstraction, and their cognitive relevance. Empirical support both comes from tasks which involve the manipulation of external graphics and tasks that do not. For the former, we take Euler's (1772) circles, provide a novel computational reconstruction, show how it captures abstractions, and contrast it with earlier construals and with Johnson‐Laird's (1983) mental models representations. We demonstrate equivalence of the graphical Euler system, and the nongraphical mental models system. For tasks not involving manipulation of external graphics, we discuss text comprehension, and the mental performance of syllogisms. By positing an internal system with the same specificity as Euler's circles, we cover the mental models data, and generate new empirical predictions. Finally, we consider how the architecture of working memory explains why such specific representations are relatively easy to store.