William Sweet

In this paper I outline some ways in which philosophy can contribute to the study of culture and pluralism, and how such a study may lead to a better understanding of philosophical enquiry. Building on earlier work (Sweet, 2002), I focus on four areas in which these contributions might be made. The first concerns the methodological, ideological, and historical presuppositions of culture and multiculturalism. The second area considers how philosophical discourse affects a culture's "self-understanding". The third area focuses on how (and how far) philosophy may enable a culture to allow diversity and pluralism within the larger community. The fourth area deals with philosophy's dialectical relation with culture -how far philosophy is a product of culture, and whether that affects philosophy's participation in culture. An exploration of these areas will show both what role philosophy has to play in the analysis of culture, and why it is important for philosophers -especially in the English-speaking world- to engage in the "philosophy of culture".

U radu ću identificirati neke primjere kulturnih sukoba koji uključuju religiju, preispitati neka ponuđena rješenja takvih sukoba, i razmotriti može li religija u bilo kojem smislu biti dio tog rješenja. Također ću ponuditi neke modele religije unutar granica demokracije – modele za koje smatram da su relevantni za demokracije na jugoistoku Europe. U predstavljanju ovih modela, tvrdim da se plodonosan pristup može pronaći u recentnim djelima kanadskog filozofa Charlesa Taylora.In this paper, I identify some examples of cultural clash that involve religion, review some proposed solutions to such clashes, and discuss whether religion in any sense can be part of that solution. I also provide some models of religion within the limits of democracy – models which, I suggest, are relevant to the democracies in Southeast Europe. In presenting these models, I claim that a fruitful approach is found in the recent work of the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor.Dans cet article, j’identifie quelques exemples de chocs culturels qui impliquent la religion, j’examine certaines solutions proposées pour de tels conflits, et j’aborde la question de savoir si la religion dans un quelconque sens puisse faire partie de cette solution. Egalement, je fournis quelques modèles de religion à l’intérieur des limites de la démocratie, des modèles qui, je le suggère, sont pertinents pour les démocraties du sud-est de l’Europe. En présentant ces modèles, j’affirme qu’une approche fructueuse se trouve dans les récents travaux du philosophe canadien Charles Taylor.Im vorliegenden Aufsatz identifiziere ich eine Anzahl Exempel für religionsmotivierte kulturelle Auseinandersetzung, nehme einige Lösungskonzepte für solche Konflikte in Augenschein und diskutiere über die Tauglichkeit der Religion, in irgendeinem Sinne ein Bestandteil dieser Lösungswege zu werden. Darüber hinaus liefere ich einige Religionsentwürfe innerhalb der Demokratiegrenzen – Modelle, die sich meines Erachtens als maßgebend für die Demokratien Südosteuropas erzeigen. In der Präsentation der erwähnten Modelle vertrete ich die Ansicht, ein fruchtbares Angehen dieser Problematik zeichne sich im jüngsten Werk des kanadischen Philosophen Charles Taylor ab

In response to the critique of his work by William Sweet, Hendrik Hart first offers some terminological clarifications. The important difference between ‘faith’ (trust in God) and ‘belief’ (our network of accepted understandings of things, expressed in concepts and propositions) is emphasized and his use of terms such as ‘religion,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘truth’ are explained. Hart then clarifies his approach to the Western philosophical tradition. He argues that Christian accommodation to philosophy and its idea of ‘reason’ as ultimate arbiter have hindered proper understanding of biblical faith. He finds support for his critique within the philosophical tradition itself, particularly in the form of feminist and postmodern thought. In the end, he offers a vision of religious truth, encapsulated in Jesus’ proclamation, “I am the truth,” that is based upon the embodiment of God’s will and intent.

It is generally acknowledged that the British Idealism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a significant influence in the philosophy, politics, and culture of that country. In this study, I argue that it also had a considerable impact throughout much of the English-speaking world, and beyond -- in Canada, Australia, the United States, South Africa, India, and even East Asia. This idealism engaged 'local' philosophical traditions and culture, contributed to them, and sometimes led to 'new' philosophies or traditions, and so may be described as a 'migrating tradition.' While the character and extent of this influence varied according to where and how it migrated, British Idealism can, nevertheless and in amodestway, be said to have had an 'empire'. This study, then, addresses both a historical issue and the broader philosophical question of why British Idealism was successful in this diaspora, and it identifies a number of features of this Idealism which may explain this

Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights examines the relations and interrelations among theoretical and practical analyses of human rights. Edited by William Sweet, this volume draws on the works of philosophers, political theorists and those involved in the implementation of human rights. The essays, although diverse in method and approach, collectively argue that the language of rights and corresponding legal and political instruments have an important place in contemporary social political philosophy.

Philosophy has not an easy time after the Second Vatican Council. As a response to this situation, the late Pope John Paul Ⅱ wrote the encyclical "Fides et ratio" and appealed to the Catholics the need for a sound philosophy. One of the philosophers he recommended in his encyclical is the French philosopher Jacques Maritain. Maritain was a prominent figure in philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. He died in 1973. After a period of relative silence after his death, his works rekindled the interest of scholars' especially Catholic philosophers. The establishment of numerous associations, academic conferences, the publication of books, papers and review dedicated to the study of his works are the witnesses to this revival of interest. There are several reasons for this return. The depth and the range of Maritain's thought, his reflection on the human person, the state and the common good, his defense for the freedom and dignity of human being, his commitment to the Catholic faith, his claim on the balance of sense perception, rational cognition, wisdom, faith and mystical thinking in human knowledge are sources of inspiration for thinkers in a world of relativism, skepticism and distrust of reason. But the most important one is that he is able to reflect on the traditional thinking of Christianity and out of his own critical thinking addresses problems of today's world. Many Catholic thinkers are helped by Maritain to have a deeper insight of their own thought from his confidence in the truth and his bold realism

In 19th century Anglo-American political philosophy, one finds an important debate concerning the nature, source and limits of rights. Two of the dominant views here were the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill and the rights-based political thought of Herbert Spencer. While there are significant differences between them, both arguably reflect a perspective that is both liberal and individualist. ;A response to these views--one that is sometimes taken to be fundamentally incompatible, if not entirely incommensurable, with the Anglo-American liberal tradition--is found in British idealist political thought. The most developed statement of this is, arguably, that of the British philosopher and social reformer, Bernard Bosanquet . Bosanquet argues that, to provide an adequate account of the nature, source and limits of human rights, one must abandon many of the individualist assumptions of his contemporaries. ;The question I address, then, is whether Bosanquet's theory of rights is a plausible response to the 'liberal individualist' views of Bentham, Mill and Spencer. In other words, does Bosanquet address the problems that he finds in these liberal individualist accounts of rights and does he provide a plausible alternative to them? ;My focus here is primarily, but not exclusively, historical. Moreover, I argue that a complete account of Bosanquet's theory of rights requires an elaboration of the "metaphysical theory of the nature of social reality"--"the social ontology"--on which it is based. Thus, in order to answer the question motivating this study, not only do I discuss Bosanquet's theory of rights in relation to the problems in the views of his contemporaries, but also show how it is related to his more general metaphysical concerns. ;In Chapter 1, "The Foundation of Rights in 'Theories of the First Look'," I set the stage for my reconstruction and presentation of Bosanquet's theory of rights. In Chapter 2, "Bosanquet's Theory of Rights," I reconstruct Bosanquet's theory of rights and respond to a number of criticisms directed directly to it. In Chapters 3 and 4, I provide and discuss what seem to be the key elements in the 'ontological' or 'metaphysical' background to Bosanquet's position. In the concluding chapter, "Bosanquet's Theory of Rights: An Assessment" , I show how Bosanquet's view avoids or responds to the problems he has identified in the theories of rights of Bentham, Mill and Spencer

ln a number of recent essays, Hendrik Hart has elaborated an account of the nature and function of religious belief that, he believes, is post-modern in inspiration and anti-foundationalist in character. ln this paper, I reconstruct what I take to be Hart’s central claims. While Hart does remind us of some important aspects of the nature of religious belief---aspects often overlooked by many critics---l suggest that there are several problems in the account he provides, that there are tensions between his view of religious belief and his claims about how it can function, and that it is not clear that he ultimately avoids adopting a variant of the foundationalism he explicitly rejects.