William Sweet

This paper takes up some themes in Peter Jonkers’s essay, ‘Philosophy and Wisdom’, but discusses, more specifically, philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’. After a short summary of what is commonly understood by wisdom, why people value wisdom, and how one may acquire wisdom, I briefly note why the philosophy that we generally encounter today has seemed, to some, to be disconnected from wisdom and the love of wisdom. I argue that, if we are more attentive to the role of love in philosophy and to texts, frequently marginalized, that reflect a ‘sapiential philosophy’, philosophy can again be ‘love of wisdom’.

Many studies in the philosophy of religion have focussed on the character of religious faith and whether there is place for a rational demonstration of religious belief. These studies frequently pit ‘evidentialists’ against ‘non-evidentialists’. Interestingly, these issues were of central concern to the 19th century philosopher John Henry Newman - principally in his Grammar of Assent and his Oxford Sermons - where Newman attempts a ‘via media’ between these two extremes. In this paper, my focus is not so much on the adequacy of Newman’s via media, as on his analysis of religious belief, and on what he takes belief and the epistemic standards relevant to determining the meaning and truth of religious belief to be. I will argue that Newman’s account provides a novel understanding of the relation of grounds for belief to faith than provided by many of his contemporaries, and that its attempt to be a via media has a surprisingly contemporary character.

Idealism, Metaphysics and Community examines the place of idealism in contemporary philosophy, and its relation to problems of metaphysics, political thought, and the study of the history of philosophy. Drawing together contributions from philosophers from several distinct traditions, this book presents a range of perspectives - revealing areas of agreement and disagreement, addressing topics of contemporary discussion, and providing new insights into philosophical idealism. Following an extensive introduction by the editor, and drawing on the work of the Canadian idealist, Leslie Armour, the book is divided into three main parts: Part 1 focuses on the British idealist, F.H.Bradley; Part 2 examines metaphysical issues and idealism, such as the realism/anti-realism debate, the relation of classical and idealist metaphysics, rational psychology, time and eternity, and the divine; Part 3 draws on idealism to address contemporary concerns in ethical theory, political philosophy, social philosophy and culture and the history of philosophy. Presenting new insights into the work of classical authors as well as contemporary philosophers, this book provides a better understanding of classical idealism and addresses important areas of contemporary philosophical, social and political concern.

Today, when systematic philosophy - and reason itself - are challenged both outside of and within philosophy, is it still possible to do metaphysics? This volume provides a broad perspective on contemporary approaches to the nature and the fundamental questions of metaphysics. Drawing on scholars from continental Europe, Asia, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain, and representing a variety of philosophical cultures and traditions, this volume surveys and extends work in metaphysics and its implications for broader philosophical concerns (e.g., in ethics and social philosophy, in mathematics and logic, and in epistemology). It also addresses such questions as the role of history and historicity in undertaking metaphysics, the nature of metaphysics, the priority of metaphysics over epistemology, and the challenges of empiricism and postmodernism.

The place of British idealism in the history of political thought has been the subject of much debate. Some have maintained that it represented "a complete change" from the liberal tradition of Mill and Bentham. We re-examine here some features of Bosanquet's political philosophy, arguing that evidence for its alleged "conservative" or "illiberal" character is far from conclusive. Still, while there are a number of key liberal values to be found in Bosanquet's thought, in several important respects he breaks with the earlier liberal tradition in Britain. This will allow us to draw some conclusions about the place of idealism in the history of 19th century British liberalism

In his 1983 book on Bradley’s Logic, Anthony Manser remarks that “[i]t has been suggested that there was, at the end of the nineteenth century, a great English philosopher named ‘Bradley-Bosanquet’.” Manser was, of course, just repeating the view of J.S. MacKenzie who wrote, in his 1928 review of the second edition of Bradley’s Ethical Studies, that “Bradley and Bosanquet have almost to be regarded as one person […] Neither is readily intelligible without the other.” And it is fairly well known that Bosanquet himself sometimes wrote that his and Bradley’s respective views were quite close — that “there is never […] any more than a verbal difference or difference of emphasis, between us.” So, despite the recognition in Bosanquet’s own time that he had a distinctive and powerful voice on philosophical topics, the impression created by the preceding remarks — that Bosanquet does not really offer a distinctive position from Bradley — has been long held, and it is no doubt partly responsible for the consequence that, until fairly recently, philosophical interest in Bosanquet’s work has taken, at best, second place to that of Bradley.