Kirk Lougheed

Anti-natalism is a controversial thesis in procreative ethics that says it is always, or almost always, impermissible to procreate. A recent challenge to anti-natalists suggests that since they are committed to the extinction of the human species, it is unclear why they should care about environmental preservation and protection. This is because the strongest practical reasons in favour of environmental care are based on concern for future generations, something anti-natalists do not want to exist. If anything, then, even if the anti-natalist does not have reasons to actively destroy the environment, they have few practical reasons to care about environmental destruction or to modify their behaviour. I show that this argument is flawed because while anti-natalism enables extinction, it does not necessarily support it. Adopting anti-natalism might result in extinction but it does not require aiming at it. Even if no lives are worth starting, many are worth continuing such that the anti-natalist can reasonably hope for significant life-extension or immortality. There are also many reasons that exist right now to care about the environment. Finally, this argument may entail rejecting the Principle of Double Effect. I then explore the extent to which a structurally similar argument could succeed against anti-natalism with respect to improving the world more generally, beyond merely environmental concerns. I conclude that there is no way to do so that presents a significant epistemic or practical challenge to anti-natalism. Anti-natalists can coherently strive to improve the world.

We argue against the widely assumed view that clinical ethicists have an important role to play in helping to alleviate the moral distress of clinicians. When moral distress causes pathological psychological states it properly falls within the domain of mental health professionals. Where moral distress appears to be the result of a clinician’s true normative beliefs, the ethicist should not convince them otherwise. Where the normative beliefs causing distress are false, clinical ethicists do not have any special ability to persuade clinicians to give up those normative beliefs. At best, successfully alleviating moral distress may be an unsought, accidental byproduct of addressing ethical concerns. Our discussion points to the need for more clarity around the appropriate professional scope for clinical ethicists.

The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal autonomy, attitudinal autonomy that is relevant to knowledge. I argue that regardless of whether we are externalists or internalists about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that is relevant for moral responsibility, we should be externalists about the kind of autonomy that a belief must have to qualify as knowledge.

The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal autonomy, attitudinal autonomy that is relevant to knowledge. I argue that regardless of whether we are externalists or internalists about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that is relevant for moral responsibility, we should be externalists about the kind of autonomy that a belief must have to qualify as knowledge.

The aim of this book is to question the standard Christian narrative about procreation. It explores the key philosophical arguments for anti-natalism and argues that many of them are compatible with Christianity. It also develops a risk-based argument suggesting that even a slight possibility of one’s children going to hell should give prospective parents pause. Undergirding these ideas is the uncontroversial assumption that in most cases Christians should be concerned with preventing harm. The book features coverage of the history of anti-natalism, especially within Christianity, and concludes by addressing an extensive number of objections. Christian Anti-Natalism is essential reading for all scholars, researchers and advanced students of religious ethics especially those focussing on questions related to procreation.

The extent to which clinical ethics consultations should be neutral with respect to religion is the subject of ongoing debate. One important position says that clinical ethics consultants ought to appeal to the secular bioethical consensus that is available to everyone inasmuch as possible, and that they can do so without the subsequent need to defend an underlying moral theory. This view has been criticized because it is doubtful that such a consensus exists. Abram Brummett argues for a more nuanced approach where clinical ethicists must appeal to the bioethical consensus in clinical settings, but that the consensus and underlying moral principles can be debated in academic contexts (2020). Furthermore, he suggests that the consensus need not avoid making at least some moral, epistemological, and metaphysical commitments, though not to the level of embracing a full-fledged comprehensive worldview. I argue that Brummett’s approach fails because it does not successfully avoid the implications of the lack of a secular bioethical consensus. Any defense of such a consensus is only possible at a superficial level where there may be agreement on which moral concepts to use, even though deep disagreement remains about their nature and application. While Brummett’s approach is more honest than some secular alternatives because it does not seek to avoid making any judgments about underlying commitments, it is ultimately uninformative in failing to address the fact of pluralism. To conclude, I suggest that even if I am mistaken and there really is a secular bioethical consensus, Brummett’s view implies that the consensus can never be legitimately challenged in clinical settings.

One influential understanding of the African normative conception of personhood says that humans have moral status because they have the capacity for sympathy. It is tempting to think that this account of moral status forbids abortion because foetuses have the potential for the capacity for sympathy, which guarantees them a right to life. I outline the strongest possible argument along these lines before observing that it faces some serious challenges. First, it does not do enough to explain why the mere potential for the capacity for sympathy is valuable. Second, it fails to explain why partial moral status guarantees a foetus the right to life in all circumstances unless an extreme form of pacificism is assumed. Third, it does not do an adequate job of explaining the moral status of either disabled foetuses or adult humans who will never have the potential for the capacity for sympathy. I conclude that it is doubtful that any account of African personhood will be able to successfully show that abortion is always impermissible.

In a recent article in this journal, Peter Mwipikeni argues that Thaddeus Metz’s appeal to an African relational ethic to suggest reforms that would promote global economic justice is misguided. According to Mwipikeni, the problem is that Metz’s ideas are offered within the context of a “racialised world order” that is fundamentally and structurally unjust. Without first tearing the current system down, there can be no true economic justice on the African continent, while those benefiting from the racism would not accept Metz's prescriptions. We counter that Mwipikeni’s critique mistakenly evaluates Metz’s proposed reforms based on the likelihood that they would be adopted, instead of on whether they would promote justice in principle, where such a critique in fact plagues Mwipikeni’s own, more radical proposals to a much greater degree. We also argue that incorporating more aspects of Metz’s communal ethic into the discussion demonstrates that it would in fact reject any racist system, including by forbidding such a system in the first place and subsequently prescribing compensation for its victims if it did arise.

I analyse two classic pro‐choice thought experiments in the Anglo‐American philosophical literature in Thomson's Violinist Case and Tooley's Kitten Serum Case, in light of two prominent African normative theories. Though each of these cases is designed to generate pro‐choice intuitions, I suggest they do not do so nearly as clearly when African normative theories are in view. Furthermore, even where they might yield a pro‐choice verdict, they do so for very different reasons. That African ethics, which is often labelled communitarian, differs from what one typically finds in the Anglo‐American normative tradition is hardly a new insight. However, that these differences might undermine the universality of pro‐choice thought experiments about abortion in Anglo‐American bioethics has yet to receive significant attention.

African Traditional Religion is a major world religion typically thought to be monotheistic with millions of adherents below the Sahara on the African continent. However, it has been sorely neglected by Anglo-American philosophers of religion, and thus far none of the axiological questions in what has come to be known as the axiology of theism literature have been applied to it. I will break new ground by applying axiological analysis to an important metaphysical position in African Traditional Religion known as the limited-God thesis. This conception of God denies that God is any of omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. This has important implications when thinking about the axiological status of monotheism. While it might be thought obvious that it would be worse if the limited-God existed compared to the Anselmian God, I will argue that such a conclusion is not so straightforward for two reasons. First, many exponents of African Traditional Religion deny that the problem of evil applies to the limited-God. A world where the problem of evil does not arise may well be better than a world where it does. Second, and even if this first reason fails, I appeal to recent claims by Guy Kahane suggesting that a world without gratuitous evil is actually worse than a world with gratuitous evil. I conclude that not only does this imply the limited-God is axiologically superior to the Anselmian God, but it also avoids many of the pitfalls typically associated with anti-theism and therefore may also be better than metaphysical naturalism.

In the epistemology of disagreement literature, many authors use certain cases of disagreement in order to lend support to either conciliationism or non-conciliationism. Richard Feldman and David Christensen, among others, are advocates of the view that lessons from simple idealized cases of disagreement shed light on complex cases of disagreement. In this chapter I analyze some of these simple cases in order to demonstrate that while they do lend support for conciliationism, the lessons do not necessarily carry over to more complex cases of disagreement. This is important because cases of disagreement between inquirers are better understood as complex, not simple.

In the previous chapter I argued that there are significant differences between simple and complex cases of disagreement. In this chapter I analyze the strict notion of epistemic peerhood used throughout the epistemology of disagreement literature. Such notions typically involve the idea that agents are strict evidential and cognitive equals. I show that this notion rarely, if ever, obtains in cases of real-world disagreement. If this is true, then the sceptical threat to rational inquiry posed by strong conciliationism would evaporate. However, I conclude with a new account of epistemic peerhood that is broad enough to apply to many cases of real-world disagreement between inquirers, and yet not so permissive so as to lose the epistemic significance of disagreement.

Part of the recent explosion in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement has generally confined itself to the following problem: Suppose that after an agent comes to believe proposition P she finds out that there is an epistemic peer—someone of equal intelligence and ability—who has evaluated the same body of evidence and come to believe not-P. What should her reaction be upon discovering peer disagreement? Does the existence of peer disagreement constitute a (partial) defeater to her original belief that P? Or is she rationally permitted to maintain her belief that P even in the face of peer disagreement? In this chapter I outline the main arguments for conciliationism and non-conciliationism.

In this chapter I outline and respond to a number of objections to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument. I begin with what I take to be the weakest objections and conclude with the strongest objections. The most promising objection to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument is that it conflates practical reasons with epistemic reasons. I respond to this by arguing that future epistemic benefits should indeed be considered benefits of epistemic reasoning. But the objection succeeds only if synchronic epistemic reasons are the only type of epistemic reasons included in one’s account of epistemic rationality. But an all-things-considered epistemic rationality will include both synchronic and diachronic epistemic reasons.

In this chapter I develop and defend an important argument in the epistemology of disagreement literature, initially gestured at by Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). This argument advances the idea that there are possible future epistemic benefits to be gained if an agent continues to develop and defend her beliefs in the face of peer disagreement, particularly within research contexts. These potential epistemic benefits justify a researcher remaining steadfast in the face of peer disagreement. After outlining the broad contours of the argument, I explore some empirical evidence in support of Elgin’s claim. For instance, I examine an economic model developed by Scott Page which demonstrates that in certain scenarios, peer disagreement tends to enhance epistemic practices such as problem solving and prediction making. I also outline some ideas found in psychology regarding bias and motivated reasoning which also lend empirical support to Elgin. I believe that this is one of the most promising arguments for non-conciliationism, albeit a limited version of it since it only applies in research context and as such it will be my focus for the rest of this book.

In this final chapter I tie things together, in part, by addressing the concern that if the Benefits to Inquiry Argument is sound it will license an irrational dogmatism by allowing an agent to remain steadfast in her beliefs by appealing to some vague notion of potential future epistemic benefits. I conclude the project by discussing this worry within the context of intellectual humility and competing epistemic values. My discussion will shed light on the appropriate conclusions to draw about the scope and strength of my argument. I will also note some of the similarities between my view and three dynamic responses to disagreement, Thomas Kelly’s ‘Total Evidence View’ (2010), Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Justificationist View’ (2010a, b), and Han van Wietmarschen’s ‘Well-Groundedness’ (2013).

In recent years, intellectual virtue has garnered significant attention in the philosophical literature. Though there is significant work on how to cultivate intellectual virtues, there is less explicitly on this topic within the context of religion. I aim to show how work in the epistemology of disagreement can contribute to cultivating intellectual virtue, including in the context of religious disagreement. There are epistemic benefits to be gained from fostering disagreement, at least in certain scenarios. I explain how these ideas apply to at least some cases of religious disagreement. Any religious adherent seeking to cultivate intellectual virtues should be interested in gaining epistemic benefits, and therefore should be interested in fostering religious disagreements in the relevant types of scenarios. I conclude with a brief case study in philosophy of religion that shows that disagreement in the context of cross-cultural dialogue can be quite epistemically productive.

Metz’s Moral Relational Theory says that an action is right if it respects our capacity to be party to friendly relationships. Friendliness involves exhibiting solidarity and identification with others. Though Metz’s theory often issues intuitively correct moral judgments, I argue that it fails to do so in the cases of female genital mutilation, religious offense, and homosexual romantic relationships. I conclude by exploring whether there are possible replies that can be made on behalf of Metz by examining African conceptions of well-being and flourishing, before turning to ask questions about the role that intuitions play in justifying his theory.

If believing P will result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason to believe P, or just a pragmatic reason? Conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons seems to lead to absurdity, e.g. by allowing that someone can rationally hold beliefs that conflict with her assessment of her evidence's probative force. We explain how this and other intuitively unwelcome results can be avoided. We also suggest a positive case for conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons, namely, that they exhibit a form of interpersonal normative parity that's typical of epistemic reasons but not pragmatic reasons. We then link this discussion to religious belief, suggesting that there are sometimes indirect epistemic reasons for religious belief, and that certain characterizations of religious belief are instructive in thinking about how to take account of indirect epistemic reasons.

This article is part of Religious Studies’ new initiative to publish a series of interviews with distinguished philosophers of religion. Each interview explores the personal and academic background of the interviewee and discusses their core philosophical views. The aim is to inspire students and scholars and to provide an overview of some of the most important works developed by contemporary philosophers of religion. In this interview, Kirk Lougheed interviews John Leslie, covering such topics as working in advertising after finishing his BA at Oxford, returning to graduate school, and developing and defending Axiarchism throughout his philosophical career.

This chapter introduces the reader to the main themes of the project, in addition to the contours of the book. The first question addressed is what counts as African philosophy. It argues that whether an idea counts as African is a matter of degree. It then briefly explains that the normative conception of personhood and accounts that focus on harmonious relationships are the two streams that have dominated contemporary African moral philosophy, thereby providing some of the motivation for an alternative in this book. The primary objective of the book is to construct the strongest possible account of liveliness as a moral theory, not to argue that such a theory is in fact true. The description offered in this book will necessarily include reasons to think the theory is true, but this is incidental to the main goal of offering the strongest and most plausible description of it.

One argument for the permissibility of euthanasia found in the African philosophical tradition suggests that the sole goal of life is to develop one’s vital force, which is done by relating harmoniously with one’s community. However, this is impossible for people with certain medical conditions. If the goals of life cannot be achieved, then euthanasia is permissible. I challenge this argument by showing that it overlooks the fact that severely ill patients can still be the _objects_ of communal relationships, in addition to a way for caregivers to strengthen their own vital force. I also suggest that usual readings of vital force imply that life itself is to be preserved at all costs and that this acts as a kind of deontological constraint.

I am honoured and grateful to the commentators for their thoughtful responses to my article, ‘African Life Force and the Permissibility of Euthanasia’.1 In the article, I attempted to show that any argument for the permissibility of euthanasia based on life force or vitalism is bound to fail because any ethic based on that worldview is required to preserve life above all else. Three key themes emerged in their responses and in what follows I address each of them in turn. The first theme that emerges from the commentaries has to do with dignity. In the article, I did not suggest a grounds for dignity based on a life force ethic. Instead, I focused on describing the appropriate teleological aim of anyone who endorses such an ethic since that was the most relevant to the argument. However, in different ways, many of the commentaries raise questions about the relevant account of dignity (or lack thereof) implied by life force.i Mariana Dittborn, Daniela Rojas and Sofia Salas worry that being the object of a communal relationship violates Kant’s (true) universal moral principle of respect for persons.2 For example, it could justify keeping a terminally ill patient alive as a mere means to the end of increasing the life force of caregivers. Xiang Yu and Daniel Kim suggest that the life force ethic ‘implies that a person who is the object of very few relationships has a much weaker duty to stay alive than a person who is well-loved and the …

I aim to more fully develop a theory of meaning in life based on the concept of life force that is important to a substantial number of Africans in the sub-Sahara region. While life force implies a large invisible ontology, Thaddeus Metz has recently developed an entirely naturalistic version of it known as liveliness. However, he also offers two objections that hinge on the idea that life force cannot accommodate intuitions that certain types of knowledge and progress are valuable for their own sakes. I respond by noting that elsewhere Metz has developed a defense of the intrinsic value of knowledge by appealing to the idea that meeting a person's existential needs can be important for self-realization and hence for their meaning. If this is right, then the community ought to support such a person in their pursuit of knowledge even if doing so leads to no useful outcomes.

An important belief in African Traditional Religion holds that everything, both animate and inanimate objects, are imbued with an imperceptible energy known as life force. Since life force is the greatest value, it is the grounds of morality. However, it is undertheorized in contemporary African ethics, with work on personhood and harmonious relationships taking centerstage. I seek to fill this gap in the literature by further developing an entirely secular and naturalistic moral theory of life force that avoids metaphysical controversies and is known as liveliness, which was first gestured at by Thaddeus Metz (2012, 2022). I demonstrate that while a series of objections that Metz levels against liveliness affect teleological versions, they do not apply with equal force to deontological versions. Liveliness, particularly deontological versions, ought to be considered as a contender for the best African moral theory alongside those that focus on personhood or harmonious relationships.

While there has long been philosophical thinking on the African continent, it was not until the middle of the 20th century that professional philosophy emerged on the continent. Though traditional African cultures have rich oral histories that some contemporary philosophers explicitly draw upon, it was not until universities emerged that there was philosophy conducted by professional philosophers who published their findings in academic venues. To date, much of this work has been conducted in English. The emphasis this tradition places on the community and social harmony will probably stand out immediately to any reader steeped in the Western philosophical tradition. The articles in this issue represent different styles of conducting African philosophy, such as employing analytic methods in order to develop moral theories, questioning the use of Western epistemic standards, and mining ideas from the history of Africa.

One theistic account of creation says that God created the best possible world in the form of a multiverse containing all and only all of the universes sufficiently good enough to create. Certain proponents of this view urge that it solves the problem of no best world and need not commit one to affirming divine middle knowledge. We address two recent challenges to the (open) theistic multiverse. First, Marshall Naylor argues that what he calls the Cantorian account of divine creation is better than any theistic multiverse account because it provides more satisfying answers to a number of philosophical problems (2020). Second, Elliot Crozat criticizes the open theistic multiverse by arguing that if God lacks middle knowledge, God cannot know infallibly that the universe token he creates will be the right type (i.e., sufficiently good enough for inclusion in the multiverse) (2019). We show that Naylor’s alternative violates incredibly strong moral intuitions and that Crozat’s objection fails to appreciate that on open theism God still knows all the possible future outcomes. Theistic multiverse accounts of divine creation in general, and one cojoined with open theism in particular, remain unscathed in the face of the criticisms offered by Naylor and Crozat.