Richard McDonough

The charge of hypocrisy has been made in connection with several recent events—namely, the pair of "sex scandals" involving, respectively, Rep. Mark Foley and Sen. Larry Craig, the former, a Republican member of the House from Florida and the latter a Republican senator from Idaho. Foley was accused of sending sexually suggestive messages to teenage boys who had been or who were at the time congressional pages, and Craig was arrested for lewd conduct in a men's bathroom and pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of disorderly conduct. Both Foley and Craig faced immediate calls for resignation by their critics on the other side of the aisle. Both were also criticized by members of their own party. For simplicity, the Democratic critics of Foley and Craig are called "progressives" while their Republican critics are called "conservatives." There are, however, significant logical differences between the criticisms of Foley and Craig by progressives and the similar criticisms of them by conservatives. Since conservatives are generally more critical of sexual indiscretion, their criticisms of Foley and Craig are generally consistent with their own values. Since, however, progressives are generally more tolerant of sexual indiscretions, their criticisms of these men are often inconsistent. Specifically, some progressives find Foley and Craig blameworthy for hypocrisy over acts which, had they been committed by progressives, they would not see as blameworthy. This is why progressives shift the criticism to a different level—namely, that these men are hypocritical. Since Foley and Craig had been champions of "family values," progressives cannot consistently criticize them for their sexual indiscretions. The criticism has to be that, since these men had violated their own conservative standards of morality, they are hypocritical

The article argues that religious fundamentalism, understood, roughly, as the view that people must obey God's commands unconditionally, is conceptually incoherent because such religious fundamentalists inevitably must substitute human judgement for God's judgement. The article argues, first, that fundamentalism, founded upon the normal sort of indirect communications from God, is indefensible. Second, the article considers the crucial case in which God is said to communicate directly to human beings, and argues that the fundamentalist interpretation of such communications is also incoherent, and, on this basis, argues that religious fundamentalism is actually an extreme form of irreligiousness. Finally, the article considers Kierkegaard's prima facie defence of unconditional religious faith, and argues that, despite some similarity with the fundamentalists, Kierkegaard's appreciation of human finitude leads him to a profoundly anti-fundamentalist stance

Many philosophers have puzzled over the nature of the logically simple objects, the “substance” of the world, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-logico-philosophicus (TLP). Such questions are misplaced because TLP is committed to the view that talk of such metaphysically problematical entities is part of the “ladder” that must be “thrown away” after one has climbed it. Further, TLP’s demotion of its logically simple objects to mere logical subjects requires an increased emphasis on the relations between these alleged objects. TLP’s account of its logically simple objects is an application of Russell’s relational view of mathematical objects from his Principles of Mathematics applied to “reality”. Carnap develops an analogous relational or “structural” view of reality in The Logical Structure of the World. Despite important differences between them, these three philosophers can profitably be seen as replacing the traditional emphasis on substances with a relational model of reality.

Biographical account of Thomas Merton who was one of the leading Christian spiritual leaders of the 20th century. He authored more than 60 books and many reviews and essays primarily on spirituality, social justice and pacifism. His autobiographical account of his spiritual journey in The Seven Story Mountain proved immensely inspirational to many and is listed as one of the 100 best non-fiction books of the 20th century by the National Review. In later life, Merton engaged in dialogue with major Eastern spiritual figures like the Dali Lama, Thai Buddhist monk Buddhadasa, Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh and Japanese writer D.T. Suzuki. Merton wrote books on Zen Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism at a time when this was not common among Christian theologians. ​

Scholars have often struggled with the notion of mysticism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-logico-philosophicus (TLP). The paper develops a taxonomy of the multiple species of mysticism in TLP in order to show that its notion of the mystical actually has a complex hierarchial structure. A key notion in TLP’s account is its neglected notion of the “life-world” (5.621), specifically, that realm in which the “mystical” “shows itself [zeigt sich]”. A comparison is made with Heidegger’s notion in Being and Time of the fundamental phenomena of phenomenology as that that sort of phenomena that “shows itself [sich zeit].” That is, TLP’s notion of the mystical is at the same time a sketch the phenomenological structure of the “life-world”. On this basis it is argued that TLP’s account of linguistic meaning is parasitic on its notion of the “mystical” dimension of the “life-world”, which has the consequence that one cannot separate the “safe” logical and scientific portion of TLP from its mysticism as Russell and the logical positivists tried to do. The “mysticism” and “phenomenology” must stay. Finally, the paper argues that TLP is not, as often thought, a proponent of Russell’s method of analysis into “logical atoms” but actually presents a powerful critique of the analytical method.

In Reason, Truth and History, Putnam provides an influential argument for the materialist view that the supposition that we are all “actually” brains in a vat [BIV’s] is “necessarily false”. Putnam admits that his argument, inspired by insights in Wittgenstein’s later views, is “unusual”, but he is certain that it is a correct. He argues that the claim that we are BIV’s is self-refuting because, if we actually are BIV’s, then we cannot refer to real physical things like vats. Although the present author agrees, fundamentally, with Heidegger’s view that we are essentially “in a world”, and, therefore, with Putnam’s conclusion that we cannot possibly be BIV’s, the paper argues that Putnam’s argument is fallacious. The proper conclusion to draw from Putnam’s argument is that asserting that one is a BIV is beyond the limits of a BIV’s language. That is, Putnam only shows that if we actually are BIV’s, then we cannot think or assert either that we are or that we are not BIV’s. It does not show that we are not “actually” BIV’s. The cogency of this criticism is illustrated with a concrete “science-fiction” example.

Despite Conger’s classic view that one can find very little of the microcosmic doctrine in any of the Idealists, the paper argues that Kant develops several little known microcosmic doctrines over the course of his development from his first Critique to his second Critiqueto his Opus Postumum and that these are intimately connected with his various notions of “transcendental” philosophy. First, the roots of the microcosmic doctrine in Plato are explored. Second, Kant’s most basic microcosmic doctrine and its connection with his “faculty psychology” notion of transcendental philosophy in the first Critique are explored. Third, it is explained why, contrary to Conger, the Idealist tradition is a natural home for microcosmic doctrines. Fourth, Kant’s moral microcosmic doctrine, which is implicit in the “starry heavens” remark in the conclusion to second Critique and related remarks in the Opus Postumum, is discussed in some detail. This includes a discussion of the microcosmic doctrines in the Stoics. Fifth, it is shown how Kant’s various microcosmic doctrines shed considerable light on his evolving conception of transcendental philosophy from his first Critique to his final statement in the Opus Postumum.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WITTGENSTEIN: AN EXCHANGE In his review 1 of my The Argument of the 'Tractatus ': its Relevance to Contemporary Theories of Logic, Language, Mind and Phil,osophical Truth,2 John Churchill claims that my " eccentric " (C 171) 3 interpretation " does not persuade " (C 171). My interpretation is eccentric for, as Churchill himself stresses, there is a "fundamental point at which McDonough differs from virtually every other reader of the Tractatus '', namely that " one can construct explicit logical argumentation, constituting a philosophical system, leading from [Wittgenstein's] 'fundamental idea' to certain explicit, systematic conclusions about ontology, mind, meaning, and so on" (C 171). In oppo· sition to my program Churchill writes, "By attributing to Wittgen· stein an argument or doctrine (in the sense just mentioned) he con· tradicts those commentators who have understood Wittgenstein to be earnestly requiring real silence about philosophy and to be asserting seriously that the Tractatus is a self-refuting treatise, to be kicked aside, once its lessons are learned" (C 166). My mistake, it seems, is to "make [LW's] system consistent" since, if we "take [LW] at genstein's "self-refuting treatise", that I sought an escape from this his word " it is " deep[ly] inconsistent " (C 171). Churchill regards himself as expressing the standard interpretation of " the plain sense of what [LW] wrote " (C 171). However, Black reports that Wittgenstein felt that the Tractatus "was misunderstood by Russell, Moore, Frege.. • and even Ramsey " 4 and so is even led to say that" there can he no question here of any definitive reading." 5 More recently, Pears has even said that the ideas in Wittgenstein's 1 Churchill, John, The Thomist 52, no. 1 (January, 1988). 2 McDonough, Richard M., The Argument of the ' Tractatus ': its Relevance to Contemporary Theories of Logic, Language, Mind, and Philosophical Tr1ith (State University of New York Press, 1986). The Thomist incorrectly stated the title of my book, substituting " Trust" for " Truth " in the subtitle. ain the text of my reply I have used the notation (Cai) and (My), respectively, to designate p. ai and p. y in Churchill's review and my book. 4 Black, Max, A Companion to Wittgensttin's 'Traotatus' (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 1. s Ibid., p. vii. 819 320 RICHARD MCDONOUGH books do not even appear to "repeat the familiar patterns of Western thought ".6 Similar comments abound in most of the serious commentators. It is against this background, rather more pessimistic than Churchil's cheery vision of the universally acknowledged "plain sense" of Witt· genstein's "self-refuting treatise", that I sought an escape from this interpretative deadlock. If a definitive interpretation is to be established, then instead of indulging in the common practice of selectively removing remarks from the Tractatus to suit one's own fancies, one must found the interpretation on the remarks which Wittgenstein himself identified as its "fundamental ideas". Accordingly, the interpre· tative burden of my project falls on the plausibility of attributing this argument to the text. Churchill only mentions this 200+ page argument in the one dismissive sentence quoted above. But is it legitimate to dismiss the argument on such grounds? Let us assume that the Tractatus enjoins "real" silence "once its lessons are learned." The question is, when are its lessons learned? Churchill makes his own interpretative claims, and then insists (conveniently ) that one must he thereafter he silent. But perhaps its lessons are learned in digesting the argument of the Tractatus. The point is that one must still decide the correctness of the interpretation independently. Any interpreter can invoke the injunction to silence with equal justice, namely none, to enforce his own view. My interpretation is as consistent with such an injunction to silence as any other. Similar remarks apply to Churchill's dismissal of my interpretation on the grounds that it attributes a " doctrine " to Wittgenstein. Just as Churchill chooses not to view his own interpretative pronouncements as violations of the silence doctrine, while mine are violations, he also chooses not to view his own ascriptions to the Tractatus as doctrines, while, again, mine are. This kind of verhalism has infected far too much of the commentary on Tractatus. If it is...

This paper discusses Wittgenstein’s striking remark at para. 608 of Zettel, hereafter Z608, which, according to most commentators, suggests that the order of language and thought might arise out of physical chaos or nothingness at the neural center of normal language users. In opposition to this orthodox interpretation, the present paper argues that Z608, following Spengler, who is himself influenced by Goethe and Nietzsche, is actually suggesting that the order in language and thought might arise out of the creative chaos at what Spengler sees as the true center of human life, namely, human history.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.3 (2004) 297-326 [Access article in PDF] Wittgenstein, German Organicism, Chaos, and the Center of Life Richard Mcdonough No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes from brain processes. I mean this: if I talk or write, there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue further in the direction of the center. Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The case would be like the following-certain kinds of plants multiply by seed, so that a seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from which it was produced—but nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes out of it—this can only be done from the history of the seed. So an organism might come into being out of something quite amorphous, as it were, causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing. L. Wittgenstein, Zettel §608 Paragraph 608 of Zettel is one of the most remarkable passages in Wittgenstein, for it presents a more metaphysical view than one would associate with his later philosophy.1 [End Page 297] Despite Wittgenstein's well known opposition to metaphysics,2 Z §608 clearly endorses a doctrine of emergence, the view, that the order in our language and thought "arises" out of "chaos" or "nothing." The general idea in emergentism is that certain kinds of wholes, notably, organisms, are "greater than the sum of their parts."3 Although emergentism has suffered from neglect and abuse for a half century, it has recently become a live issue.4Klee, Kim, and McLaughlin emphasize the kind of emergence which involves "downward causation," the view that the emergent whole causally influences the behavior of its own parts.5 Such emergentism asserts that there is an "explanatory gap" between an organism's characteristics and its mechanical structure,6 where this gap is a matter of ontology rather than mere ignorance of the causes. The present paper argues that Wittgenstein's doctrine of emergence is central to his later philosophies of language and mind. The common view that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is primarily negative has proved a liability for Wittgenstein.7 Cognitive scientists respond that even if there are serious problems with their views, [End Page 298] "Remotely plausible theories are better than no theories at all."8 But Wittgenstein's remark at PI §109 that philosophy should not offer theories has been misunderstood. For Wittgenstein, the paradigm of a theory is mechanics (LAC28-29), and it is not the job of philosophy to explain the phenomena by adverting to hidden mechanisms (PI §435). But philosophy may offer a different kind of positive account, the kind of descriptive account appropriate to emergent organic phenomena.9 According to Z §608, this is a description of the phenomena as it emerges in a history. In order to appreciate Wittgenstein's emergentism, it is necessary to have the correct interpretation of the words "center" and "chaos" in Z §608. Many commentators take it as obvious that by "the center," Wittgenstein means the neural center.10 For in modern neuroscience, it is natural to view the brain as the control center of the organism. Wooldridge, Armstrong, Popper, Rose, Fodor, Dennett, Gillett, Greenfield, and Clark, all use "center" in this way.11Given the modern view, called "central state materialism" as background,12 Z §608 seems to claim, first, that the order of our thought and language cannot be [End Page 299] traced to the neural center, and, second, that intelligence must arise out of neural "chaos." Thus, McGinn thinks Wittgenstein is suggesting that the brain might turn out to be oatmeal.13 But careful attention to...