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51Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoningCognitive Science 25 (4): 565-610. 2001.This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the first and last of these …Read more
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15Erratum: Descriptions and Discourse ModelsLinguistics and Philosophy 4 (1): 157-157. 1980.This piece is simply an erratum published to correct in error in the paper "Descriptions and discourse models" by Phil Johnson-Laird and Alan Garnham in Linguistics and Philosophy.
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45Referential continuity and the coherence of discourseCognition 11 (1): 29-46. 1982.Two experiments were carried out to investigate the role of referential continuity in understanding discourse. In experiment 1, a group of university students listened to stories and descriptive passages presented in three different versions: the original passages, versions in which the sentences occured in a random order, and randomised versions in which referential continuity had been restored primarily by replacing pronouns and other terms with fuller and more appropriate noun phrases. The or…Read more
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52Does everyone love everyone? The psychology of iterative reasoningThinking and Reasoning 10 (1). 2004.When a quantified premise such as: Everyone loves anyone who loves someone, occurs with a premise such as: Anne loves Beth, it follows immediately that everyone loves Anne. It also follows that Carol loves Diane, where these two individuals are in the domain of discourse. According to the theory of mental models, this inference requires the quantified premise to be used again to update a model of specific individuals. The paper reports four experiments examining such iterative inferences. Experi…Read more
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26Interaction of positive and negative labels with category composition in attribute identification concept performanceJournal of Experimental Psychology 102 (6): 1035. 1974.
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13Effects of category attention, relative frequency of relevant values, and practice on attribute identification performanceJournal of Experimental Psychology 103 (1): 160. 1974.
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25Effects of category composition and response label on attribute identification concept performanceJournal of Experimental Psychology 101 (2): 289. 1973.
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24Conditional and biconditional rule difficulty under selection and reception conditionsJournal of Experimental Psychology 89 (2): 424. 1971.
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13Nature of mediational responses in concept-identification problemsJournal of Experimental Psychology 73 (3): 391. 1967.
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16Factors affecting transfer in concept-identification problemsJournal of Experimental Psychology 72 (5): 655. 1966.
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97Logic, Models, and Paradoxical InferencesMind and Language 27 (4): 357-377. 2012.People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't…Read more
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60How falsity dispels fallaciesThinking and Reasoning 12 (2). 2006.From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants d…Read more
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University of New MexicoRegular Faculty
Albuquerque, New Mexico, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |