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116Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoningThinking and Reasoning 8 (1). 2002.This paper describes Peirce's systems of logic diagrams, focusing on the so-called ''existential'' graphs, which are equivalent to the first-order predicate calculus. It analyses their implications for the nature of mental representations, particularly mental models with which they have many characteristics in common. The graphs are intended to be iconic, i.e., to have a structure analogous to the structure of what they represent. They have emergent logical consequences and a single graph can ca…Read more
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4What's wrong with grandma's guide to procedural semantics: A reply to Jerry FodorCognition 6 (3): 249-261. 1978.
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86The language of emotions: An analysis of a semantic fieldCognition and Emotion 3 (2): 81-123. 1989.
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29The interaction between reasoning and decision making: an introductionCognition 49 (1-2): 1-9. 1993.
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17Reasoning by model: The case of multiple quantificationPsychological Review 96 (4): 658-673. 1989.
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21Models, necessity, and the search for counterexamplesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4): 775-777. 1994.
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33Mental models and syllogismsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3): 543-546. 1996.We resolve the two problems that Hardman raises. The first problem arises from a misunderstanding: the crucial distinction is between one-model and multiple-model problems. The second problem illuminates a deeper principle: conclusions depend on the procedures for interpreting models. We describe an algorithm that obviates the problem and empirical work that reveals a new view of syllogistic reasoning
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39Mental models and pragmaticsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 284-285. 2000.Van der Henst argues that the theory of mental models lacks a pragmatic component. He fills the gap with the notion that reasoners draw the most relevant conclusions. We agree, but argue that theories need an element of “nondeterminism.” It is often impossible to predict either what will be most relevant or which particular conclusion an individual will draw.
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13Are there only two primitive emotions? A reply to frijdaCognition and Emotion 2 (2): 89-93. 1988.
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25A model theory of modal reasoningCognitive Science 22 (1): 25-51. 1998.This paper presents a new theory of modal reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what may or may not be the case, and what must or must not be the case. It postulates that individuals construct models of the premises in which they make explicit only what is true. A conclusion is possible if it holds in at least one model, whereas it is necessary if it holds in all the models. The theory makes three predictions, which are corroborated experimentally. First, conclusions correspond to the true, but not th…Read more
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149On imagining what is true (and what is false)Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1). 2003.How do people imagine the possibilities in which an assertion would be true and the possibilities in which it would be false? We argue that the mental representation of the meanings of connectives, such as "and", "or", and "if", specify how to construct the true possibilities for simple assertions containing just a single connective. It follows that the false possibilities are constructed by inference from the true possibilities. We report converging evidence supporting this account from four ex…Read more
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99An antidote to illusory inferencesThinking and Reasoning 6 (4). 2000.The mental model theory predicts that reasoners normally represent what is true, but not what is false. One consequence is that reasoners should make "illusory" inferences, which are compelling but invalid. Three experiments confirmed the existence of such illusions based on disjunctions of disjunctions. They also established a successful antidote to them: Reasoners are much less likely to succumb to illusions if the inferences concern disjunctions of physical objects (alternative newspaper adve…Read more
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3Models, Causation, and ExplanationIn A. J. Sanford & P. N. Johnson-Laird (eds.), The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding, T & T Clark. 2003.
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34The Relation Between Factual and Counterfactual ConditionalsCognitive Science 42 (7): 2205-2228. 2018.
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93Descriptions and discourse modelsLinguistics and Philosophy 3 (3). 1979.This paper argues that mental models of discourse are key in any theory of the interpretation of definite descriptions. It considers both referential and attributive uses of such descriptions, in the sense introduced by Donnellan
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10New evidence for unconscious sequence learningBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3): 419-420. 1994.
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51Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoningCognitive Science 25 (4): 565-610. 2001.This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the first and last of these …Read more
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University of New MexicoRegular Faculty
Albuquerque, New Mexico, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |