Elisabeth Widmer

This special issue is intended to advance research in the neglected field of ‘first-wave left-Kantianism’. We understand first-wave left-Kantianism as a current consisting of thinkers in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, marked by the commonly held assumption that we are interdependently connected with one another via linguistic concepts that shape our ideas of justice. Critical philosophy is understood in outlining the contradictions in our thinking, materialized in the social and economic conditions. This special issue is meant to revive and continue the work on central authors of that tradition.

There are many ways to conceptualize state legitimacy, one approach being through the lens of human rights. While thinking of state legitimacy in terms of human rights gained prominence after the Second World War, Johann Benjamin Erhard had already compiled a list of human rights in his 1795 moral justification of revolution, positing that a state's legitimacy in exercising coercion hinges on its ability to secure these rights. In this chapter, I shall argue that Erhard's human rights account is novel in two significant respects. First, from a historical viewpoint, I argue that by placing humanity at the forefront of his philosophy, Erhard–alongside other revolutionary Kantians–presented a novel approach to state legitimacy that was notably unconventional before the 1790s. Second, from a systematic point of view, I shall show that Erhard's innovative use of the Kantian distinction between humanity-grounding duties “in themselves” and “in relation to an end” paves the way for a “critical” usage of human rights to identify existing oppressive structures. Highlighting this aspect will support a recently made suggestion to consider him a “proto-critical theorist.”

Immanuel Kant's political philosophy has, in recent years, attracted unprecedented scholarly interest. Yet, with some exceptions, scholars have paid little attention to the fact that he was at the center of a large and productive group known at the time as “the Kantian school.” These mostly younger philosophers included Johann Adam Bergk (1769–1834), Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk (1760–1837), Saul Ascher (1767–1822), Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766–1827), Johann Ludwig Ewald (1748–1822), Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), and the early Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). Writing during the French Revolution, some like Bergk, Erhard, and Fichte, sought to combine their commitment to Kant with their dedication to the ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity emerging from France. Others, like Rehberg and Ewald, sought to align legal and political principles with the practices of the old regime.

Unlike Johann Benjamin Erhard’s views on art, right, revolution, and structural misrecognition, his discussion of economic injustice, here understood as the lawful economic oppression of one’s end-setting human nature, has garnered little attention. To begin filling this gap, I focus on central passages from his 1795 book On the Right of the People to a Revolution wherein Erhard discusses two cases of economic injustice. By reconstructing these claims within his Kantian perfectionist framework, I pursue two goals. First, I seek to demonstrate that his fundamental ‘duty to oneself’ lays out a comprehensive framework for duties grounding moral obligations to remedy economic practices. My second aim is to utilize this framework to explain how he defends a natural law position that views the legal system as both a remedy for and an ideological tool of economic oppression. I argue that this twofold perspective is a strength of Erhard’s theory as it allows for the detection of oppressive economic structures without letting go of a principle of external freedom from where coercive juridical laws can be derived.

Unlike Johann Benjamin Erhard’s views on art, right, revolution, and structural misrecognition, his discussion of economic injustice, here understood as the lawful economic oppression of one’s end-setting human nature, has garnered little attention. To begin filling this gap, I focus on central passages from his 1795 book On the Right of the People to a Revolution wherein Erhard discusses two cases of economic injustice. By reconstructing these claims within his Kantian perfectionist framework, I pursue two goals. First, I seek to demonstrate that his fundamental ‘duty to oneself’ lays out a comprehensive framework for duties grounding moral obligations to remedy economic practices. My second aim is to utilize this framework to explain how he defends a natural law position that views the legal system as both a remedy for and an ideological tool of economic oppression. I argue that this twofold perspective is a strength of Erhard’s theory as it allows for the detection of oppressive economic structures without letting go of a principle of external freedom from where coercive juridical laws can be derived.

ABSTRACT Unlike Johann Benjamin Erhard’s views on art, right, revolution, and structural misrecognition, his discussion of economic injustice, here understood as the lawful economic oppression of one’s end-setting human nature, has garnered little attention. To begin filling this gap, I focus on central passages from his 1795 book On the Right of the People to a Revolution wherein Erhard discusses two cases of economic injustice. By reconstructing these claims within his Kantian perfectionist framework, I pursue two goals. First, I seek to demonstrate that his fundamental ‘duty to oneself’ lays out a comprehensive framework for duties grounding moral obligations to remedy economic practices. My second aim is to utilize this framework to explain how he defends a natural law position that views the legal system as both a remedy for and an ideological tool of economic oppression. I argue that this twofold perspective is a strength of Erhard’s theory as it allows for the detection of oppressive economic structures without letting go of a principle of external freedom from where coercive juridical laws can be derived.

Hermann Cohen, the founding father of Marburg neo-Kantianism, is known for criticising capitalism from a Kantian ethical perspective. Thus far, the role of the notion of humanity in this critique has been viewed as grounding what I shall call the ‘purposive labour reading’. This reading takes Cohen’s primary interest to lie in a reorganisation of work so that our humanity, which requires us to be treated as ends, remains intact. With the aim to better understand the relevant notion of humanity, I contextualise the discussion within the overall framework of Cohens’ neo-Kantian account of ethical cognition and situate his ideas in the context of his contemporary interlocutors. Revisiting Cohen’s remarks on socialism and capitalism against this backdrop reveals that his discussion of labour serves as an exemplar, showcasing how ethical rationality manifests in the liberal socialists’ demands. I argue that his primary aim was not to prepare the ground for a prescriptive labour theory – though this is likely to follow – but to argue for a framework alternative to historical materialism, allowing us to perceive and interpret social practices in an ethical light.

Unlike Johann Benjamin Erhard’s views on art, right, revolution, and structural misrecognition, his discussion of economic injustice, here understood as the lawful economic oppression of one’s end-setting human nature, has garnered little attention. To begin filling this gap, I focus on central passages from his 1795 book On the Right of the People to a Revolution wherein Erhard discusses two cases of economic injustice. By reconstructing these claims within his Kantian perfectionist framework, I pursue two goals. First, I seek to demonstrate that his fundamental ‘duty to oneself’ lays out a comprehensive framework for duties grounding moral obligations to remedy economic practices. My second aim is to utilize this framework to explain how he defends a natural law position that views the legal system as both a remedy for and an ideological tool of economic oppression. I argue that this twofold perspective is a strength of Erhard’s theory as it allows for the detection of oppressive economic structures without letting go of a principle of external freedom from where coercive juridical laws can be derived.

There are many ways to conceptualize state legitimacy, one approach being through the lens of human rights. While thinking of state legitimacy in terms of human rights gained prominence after the Second World War, Johann Benjamin Erhard had already compiled a list of human rights in his 1795 moral justification of revolution, positing that a state's legitimacy in exercising coercion hinges on its ability to secure these rights. In this chapter, I shall argue that Erhard's human rights account is novel in two significant respects. First, from a historical viewpoint, I argue that by placing humanity at the forefront of his philosophy, Erhard–alongside other revolutionary Kantians–presented a novel approach to state legitimacy that was notably unconventional before the 1790s. Second, from a systematic point of view, I shall show that Erhard's innovative use of the Kantian distinction between humanity-grounding duties “in themselves” and “in relation to an end” paves the way for a “critical” usage of human rights to identify existing oppressive structures. Highlighting this aspect will support a recently made suggestion to consider him a “proto-critical theorist.”

Immanuel Kant's political philosophy has, in recent years, attracted unprecedented scholarly interest. Yet, with some exceptions, scholars have paid little attention to the fact that he was at the center of a large and productive group known at the time as “the Kantian school.” These mostly younger philosophers included Johann Adam Bergk (1769–1834), Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk (1760–1837), Saul Ascher (1767–1822), Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766–1827), Johann Ludwig Ewald (1748–1822), Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), and the early Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). Writing during the French Revolution, some like Bergk, Erhard, and Fichte, sought to combine their commitment to Kant with their dedication to the ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity emerging from France. Others, like Rehberg and Ewald, sought to align legal and political principles with the practices of the old regime.

The history of political philosophy is certainly not without its share of morally objectionable ideas. Aristotle’s notion of natural slavery, the subordination of women in Rousseau, and Kant’s hierarchy of the races are just a few examples from a long list of morally problematic concepts encountered in the study of political thought. In this article, I argue that our moral discomfort is a pedagogically valuable starting point for critically engaging with political theories that contain controversial ideas. By developing a “critical-hermeneutical” framework that fosters a nuanced understanding of theories as both enablers of emancipation and solidifiers of domination, I aim to demonstrate how philosophy educators can design their courses in a socially responsible manner by transforming adverse or affirmative reactions to morally objectionable ideas into opportunities for engaging critically with a text.

At the turn of the twentieth century, few philosophical ideas in Marx’s work gained as much attention as his account of history. Orthodox Marxists made it their programme to closely follow Marx’s development thesis, which posits that the productive forces determine the course of history. The Austromarxist Max Adler (1873–1937), influenced by neo-Kantianism, took more liberties in interpreting – or, perhaps more accurately, ‘reinventing’ – the law of history in practical terms. This article reconstructs Adler’s neo-Kantian ‘reinvention’ of Marx’s account of history. According to Adler, the notion of ‘necessity’ that underpins critical judgements is not grounded in the regularity of history but rather in the moral judgements we make about how history should develop. More specifically, I defend two claims. First, by interpreting human progress as a possibility that presents itself as a necessity from the standpoint of practical rationality, I show that Adler laid the foundation for a critique of the Marxist development thesis that only later gained traction. Second, while Marxists may fear that Kantian formalism cannot address misguided ideological beliefs, I argue that Adler’s neo-Kantian formalism is robustly anti-ideological, emphasising the ideology-emancipating transformation we undergo when we recognise exploitative structures.

At the turn of the twentieth century, few philosophical ideas in Marx’s work gained as much attention as his account of history. Orthodox Marxists made it their programme to closely follow Marx’s development thesis, which posits that the productive forces determine the course of history. The Austromarxist Max Adler (1873–1937), influenced by neo-Kantianism, took more liberties in interpreting – or, perhaps more accurately, ‘reinventing’ – the law of history in practical terms. This article reconstructs Adler’s neo-Kantian ‘reinvention’ of Marx’s account of history. According to Adler, the notion of ‘necessity’ that underpins critical judgements is not grounded in the regularity of history but rather in the moral judgements we make about how history should develop. More specifically, I defend two claims. First, by interpreting human progress as a possibility that presents itself as a necessity from the standpoint of practical rationality, I show that Adler laid the foundation for a critique of the Marxist development thesis that only later gained traction. Second, while Marxists may fear that Kantian formalism cannot address misguided ideological beliefs, I argue that Adler’s neo-Kantian formalism is robustly anti-ideological, emphasising the ideology-emancipating transformation we undergo when we recognise exploitative structures.

The history of political philosophy is certainly not without its share of morally objectionable ideas. Aristotle’s notion of natural slavery, the subordination of women in Rousseau, and Kant’s hierarchy of the races are just a few examples from a long list of morally problematic concepts encountered in the study of political thought. In this article, I argue that our moral discomfort is a pedagogically valuable starting point for critically engaging with political theories that contain controversial ideas. By developing a ‘critical-hermeneutical’ framework that fosters a nuanced understanding of theories as both enablers of emancipation and solidifiers of domination, I aim to demonstrate how philosophy educators can design their courses in a socially responsible manner by transforming adverse or affirmative reactions to morally objectionable ideas into opportunities for engaging critically with a text.

Kant's political philosophy has experienced a recent revival, largely due to influential interpretations that frame his concept of right as a republican account of “non-domination.” One of the major challenges in reconstructing Kant's concept of law within neo-republican terms is his notion of citizenship. While neo-republicans have made substantial efforts to distance themselves from the traditional view that restricted voting rights to mainstream white men, Kant's distinction between “active” and “passive” citizens still echoes this conventional line of thought. Without dismissing the prevalence of the sexist and classist prejudices inherent in Kant's active/passive dichotomy, this paper argues that Kant introduces this distinction with the republican aim of securing a state governed by non-arbitrary laws. I contend that this aim explains Kant's concern with the civic character of citizens and their ability to contest structures of domination—a line of argument that aligns him more closely with contemporary neo-republicanism.

Immanuel Kant influenced a large and productive group of political philosophers in the 1790s. This volume argues that they brought out more fully the egalitarian principles of Kantian republicanism. "The Kantian school" featured young philosophers including Saul Ascher, Johann Adam Bergk, Johann Benjamin Erhard, Johann Ludwig Ewald, the early Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schlegel, and Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk. They combined their commitment to Kant with a dedication to freedom, equality, popular sovereignty, and a people's right to revolution. Furthermore, they sought to bring their notion of Kantian republicanism to bear on the political agenda in 1790s Germany. The chapters in this volume analyze their work in relation to Kant and their wider philosophical and political context. They advance three main theses. First, the Kantians defended popular sovereignty and several of them supported the extension of the right to vote to workers and women. Second, several of them developed a political perfectionism, the view that equal political rights are justified for their effects on cultivating moral character. Third, they developed sophisticated theories of state legitimacy and collective action, defending a people's right to change their constitution, either through reform or revolution. Kant's Early Followers in Political Philosophy offers a systematic view into a neglected group of thinkers at a foundational moment for modern political thought. It will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working on Kant, eighteenth century philosophy, political philosophy, and the history of early modern German political thought.

Unlike Johann Benjamin Erhard’s views on art, right, revolution, and structural misrecognition, his discussion of economic injustice, here understood as the lawful economic oppression of one’s end-setting human nature, has garnered little attention. To begin filling this gap, I focus on central passages from his 1795 book On the Right of the People to a Revolution wherein Erhard discusses two cases of economic injustice. By reconstructing these claims within his Kantian perfectionist framework, I pursue two goals. First, I seek to demonstrate that his fundamental ‘duty to oneself’ lays out a comprehensive framework for duties grounding moral obligations to remedy economic practices. My second aim is to utilize this framework to explain how he defends a natural law position that views the legal system as both a remedy for and an ideological tool of economic oppression. I argue that this twofold perspective is a strength of Erhard’s theory as it allows for the detection of oppressive economic structures without letting go of a principle of external freedom from where coercive juridical laws can be derived.

Hermann Cohen, the founding father of Marburg neo-Kantianism, is known for criticising capitalism from a Kantian ethical perspective. Thus far, the role of the notion of humanity in this critique has been viewed as grounding what I shall call the ‘purposive labour reading’. This reading takes Cohen’s primary interest to lie in a reorganisation of work so that our humanity, which requires us to be treated as ends, remains intact. With the aim to better understand the relevant notion of humanity, I contextualise the discussion within the overall framework of Cohens’ neo-Kantian account of ethical cognition and situate his ideas in the context of his contemporary interlocutors. Revisiting Cohen’s remarks on socialism and capitalism against this backdrop reveals that his discussion of labour serves as an exemplar, showcasing how ethical rationality manifests in the liberal socialists’ demands. I argue that his primary aim was not to prepare the ground for a prescriptive labour theory – though this is likely to follow – but to argue for a framework alternative to historical materialism, allowing us to perceive and interpret social practices in an ethical light.

Cassirer’s view on ethical objectivity is puzzling. In his scarce comments on Kantian ethics, he defines the “pure will” as a “function of consciousness,” which he considers a prerequisite for the possibility of objective ethical normativity embedded in empirical reality. In the existing body of literature, we find two different interpretations of Cassirer’s account of ethical objectivity. The “meta-philosophical” interpretation takes objectivity as a telos that humanity gradually approaches, thereby emphasizing the historically relative truth standards to which the teleologically-evolving symbolic forms respond. The “Kantian” interpretation takes objectivity as a concept inherent to the conduct of the moral law, highlighting the evaluative and prescriptive aspects of his philosophical method. In this paper, I defend the thesis that, by interpreting Cassirer’s ethics through the lens of Hermann Cohen’s mature ethical theory, we can see that ethical deliberation in Cassirer involves a notion of universality that is a priori and depends on a substantiated concept susceptible to change. The proposed “contingent conception of universality” thesis accounts for both: the evaluative and teleological features of Cassirer’s ethical theory, grounding an a priori account of ethical objectivity conceptualized relative to contingent truth standards that gradually improve.

This paper argues that the ‘scientific dispute’ between Hermann Cohen and Rudolf Stammler is symptomatic of a philosophical movement of left-wing Kant interpretations at the turn of the twentieth century. By outlining influential predecessors that shaped Cohen’s and Stammler’s thinking, I show that their Kantian justifications of socialism differ regarding their conception of law, history, and the political implications that follow from their practical philosophies. Against scholars who suggest that the Marburg School’s view on socialism was a coherent school of thought, I introduce the concept of ‘left-Kantianism’ as an open term that includes a wide variety of novel socialist approaches to Kant at the time.

Widmer sheds light on a neglected aspect of the Western philosophical tradition. Following an era of Hegelianism, the members of the neo-Kantian "Marburg School," such as Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen, Rudolf Stammler, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer defended socialism or left-wing ideals on Kantian principles. In doing so, Widmer breaks with two mistaken assumptions. First, Widmer demonstrates that the left-Hegelian and Marxist traditions were not the only significant philosophical sources of socialist critique in nineteenth-century Germany, as the left-Kantians identified problems of normativity that the left-Hegelians could not adequately address. Second, Widmer challenges the prevailing assumption that the political philosophies developed in the Marburg School can be comprehensively characterized as a unified school of "ethical socialism." By showing that they varied fundamentally regarding their political views and their philosophical foundations of socialism, Widmer fills a gap in the studies of neo-Kantianism that is long overdue.

This paper argues for a ‘contextualist’ approach to teaching antisemitism in philosophy class. The traditional ‘systematic’ approach emphasizes recognizing and dismantling antisemitic aspects in canonical philosophical texts. The introduced contextualist approach broadens the perspective, treating philosophy as a continuous debate embedded in cultural realities. It focuses on historical controversies rather than isolated arguments, includes the voice and the perspectives of the oppressed, and so has the potential to broaden traditional philosophical canons. In the second half of the paper, we provide a case study of the contextualist approach, applying it to the ‘Berlin antisemitism controversy’ of 1879/80. We argue that the contextualist approach is particularly valuable when dealing with antisemitism as it teaches students to analyze arguments within the socio-political landscape and to identify antisemitic elements. The students thereby acquire the skills to discern antisemitic argumentation in other contexts as well. We suggest that this approach could be used to teach other debates in the history of philosophy, especially those tackling race, sex, and gender issues.

In recent literature, it has been suggested that Lange’s social and political philosophy is separate from his neo-Kantian program. Prima facie, this interpretation makes sense given that Lange argues for an account of social norms that builds on Darwin and Smith rather than on Kant. Still, this paper argues that elements of psychophysiological transcendentalism can be found in Lange’s social and political philosophy. A detailed examination of the second edition of the History of Materialism, Schiller’s Poems, and the second edition of The Worker’s Question reveals that Lange sought to develop a systematic foundation of psychophysiological transcendentalism that is presupposed in his social and political philosophy. This allows for a more detailed understanding of Lange’s practical philosophy and assures him a position in the tradition of neo-Kantian socialism.