•  77
    Aristotle on Enkratic Ignorance
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (4): 655-678. 2020.
    in book six of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle famously argues that the excellences of the rational and nonrational parts of the soul, that is, practical wisdom and character virtue, are interdependent: "it is not possible to possess virtue in the primary sense [κυρίως] without wisdom, nor to be wise without virtue of character."1 The latter part of this claim—that it is impossible to be practically wise without character virtue—has been a particular topic of attention in the scholarship. Whil…Read more
  •  137
    Carving, taming or gardening? Plutarch on emotions, reason and virtue
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2): 255-275. 2018.
    This article attempts to provide an overview and discussion of Plutarch’s views in his Moralia about emotions and their relation to moral virtue and reason. By tracking different clusters of imagery – artisanal, zoological and botanic – that Plutarch uses in his essays to articulate the relationship between emotions and reason, it explores three philosophical perspectives on emotions: emotions of a virtuous person are likened to a well-shaped piece of material; to animals that need to be guided …Read more