Veljko Dubljevic

This paper examines the claims in the debate on cognitive enhancement in neuroethics that society wide pressure to enhance can be expected in the near future. The author uses rational choice modeling to test these claims and proceeds with the analysis of proposed types of solutions. The discourage use, laissez-faire and prohibition types of policy are scrutinized for effectiveness, legitimacy and associated costs. Special attention is given to the moderately liberal discourage use policy (and the gate-keeper and taxation approaches within this framework), as many authors presuppose that this type of policy would best serve public interest. Different more or less articulated models in the taxation approach (Tobacco regulation analogy, Coffee-shop system, Regulatory Authority for Cognitive Enhancements and Economic Disincentives Model) are analyzed from the point of view of justificatory liberalism. The author concludes that prohibition and laissez-faire types of policy would neither be effective nor justified. A moderately liberal public policy shows more promise, but not all approaches within this type of policy would be legitimate and effective. The “gate-keeper” approach and related models could not be justified whereas approach based on taxation with suitable models might be legitimate and effective

In my target article, I analyzed available information and policy options for the two of the most commonly used cognitive enhancement (CE) drugs: Adderall and Ritalin. I concluded that for all forms of amphetamine, including Adderall, and for instant-release forms of methylphenidate, any form of sale beyond prescription for therapeutic purposes needs to be prohibited, while some form of a taxation approach and the economic disincentives model (EDM) in particular could be an option for public policy on extended-release forms of methylphenidate . However, there has been a considerable amount of constructive criticism regarding my proposal. Some neuroethicists objected to my favoring prohibitive policies to dangerous CE drugs such as amphetamine and argued for laissez-faire or even mandatory use of enhancements. Others took issue with the conclusion that the economic disincentives model (EDM) could be an option for public policy on extended release forms of methylphenidate. Furthermore, there are those that think my argument in general and EDM in particular are failing to address the relevant issues in regulation of CE, such as social justice and real autonomy. Finally, there are those who offer suggestions on how the argument and the model of public policy for CE drugs can be improved. These comments are greatly appreciated, and I hope that my responses have captured the issues they were concerned with.