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1Der Mensch ist nicht frei. Ein GesprächIn Christian Geyer (ed.), Hirnforschung Und Willensfreiheit, Suhrkamp. pp. 20--26. 2004.
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31The explanatory role of consciousness in actionIn Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary action: brains, minds, and sociality, Oxford University Press. pp. 188--201. 2003.
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6The understanding of own and others’ actions during infancy: “You-like-Me” or “Me-like-You”?Interaction Studies 6 (3): 429-445. 2005.
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23Explaining voluntary action: The role of mental contentIn P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh University Press and Universtaetsverlag Konstanz. pp. 153--175. 1997.
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Basic principles, systems, and phenomena. Cognition and actionIn Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford handbook of human action, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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49The early origins of goal attribution in infancyConsciousness and Cognition 12 (4): 752-769. 2003.We contrast two positions concerning the initial domain of actions that infants interpret as goal-directed. The 'narrow scope' view holds that goal-attribution in 6- and 9-month-olds is restricted to highly familiar actions (such as grasping) (). The cue-based approach of the infant's 'teleological stance' (), however, predicts that if the cues of equifinal variation of action and a salient action effect are present, young infants can attribute goals to a 'wide scope' of entities including unfam…Read more
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28A psychophysical approach to action timingIn Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schröger & Hermann Müller (eds.), Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition, Psychology Press. pp. 117--136. 2004.
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36Modeling self on others: An import theory of subjectivity and selfhoodConsciousness and Cognition 49 347-362. 2017.
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14Voluntary action: brains, minds, and sociality (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2003.We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. Yet, performing and action and defining it are different matters. What counts as an action? When does it begin? Does the conscious desire to perform an action always precede the act? If not, is it really a voluntary action? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of Philosophy, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Social Science. This book brings together some to the leading thinkers from…Read more
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6Distributed document contexts in cooperation systemsIn T. R. Roth-Berghofer D. C. Richardson B. Kokinov (ed.), Modeling and Using Context, Springer. pp. 507--516. 2007.
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124Codes and their vicissitudesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 910-926. 2001.First, we discuss issues raised with respect to the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s scope, that is, its limitations and possible extensions. Then, we address the issue of specificity, that is, the widespread concern that TEC is too unspecified and, therefore, too vague in a number of important respects. Finally, we elaborate on our views about TEC's relations to other important frameworks and approaches in the field like stages models, ecological approaches, and the two-visual-pathways model. Foo…Read more
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2Free will as a social institutionIn Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?, Mit Press. pp. 257-276. 2006.
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27Cognition and actionIn Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford handbook of human action, Oxford University Press. pp. 2. 2008.
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42Dynamic Simulation and Static Matching for Action Prediction: Evidence From Body Part PrimingCognitive Science 37 (5): 936-952. 2013.Accurately predicting other people's actions may involve two processes: internal real-time simulation (dynamic updating) and matching recently perceived action images (static matching). Using a priming of body parts, this study aimed to differentiate the two processes. Specifically, participants played a motion-controlled video game with either their arms or legs. They then observed arm movements of a point-light actor, which were briefly occluded from view, followed by a static test pose. Parti…Read more
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The influence of goal-directed movements on ideomotor actionConsciousness and Cognition 9 (2). 2000.
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1Experimental Approaches to ActionIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press. 2003.
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51PoliawaC: design and evaluation of an awareness-enhanced groupware client (review)AI and Society 14 (1): 31-47. 2000.waC provides a variety of different graphical notification mechanisms which can be coupled to specific working situations using the AREA model. We also report on the evaluation of the system under real-life conditions in a German federal ministry
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64What is Shared in Joint Action? Issues of Co-representation, Response Conflict, and Agent IdentificationReview of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2): 147-172. 2011.When sharing a task with another person that requires turn taking, as in doubles games of table tennis, performance on the shared task is similar to performing the whole task alone. This has been taken to indicate that humans co-represent their partner’s task share, as if it were their own. Task co-representation allows prediction of the other’s responses when it is the other’s turn, and leads to response conflict in joint interference tasks. However, data from our lab cast doubt on the view tha…Read more
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29Commentary on Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2002). Mental imagery? In search of a theory. BBS 25 (2): 157–182Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 4. 2004.