Ion Copoeru

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

The concept of intersubjectivity has undergone a strong critique for the fact that the other appears to be constituted by a singular ego through extrapolation from its own “sphere of originality.” Our hypothesis is that the difficulty does not regard the theory of constitution itself, but the fact that the other and the community are thought only in terms of representation. In order to transcend the supposed representational framework of Husserl’s phenomenology, we shall consider the concept of intersubjectivity as an interplay of representational and non-representational modes of encounter.

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

MĂDĂLINA DIACONU, Tasten, Riechen, Schmecken. Eine Ästhetik der anästhesierten Sinne, 2005 ; SILVIA STOLLER, VERONICA VASTERLING,LINDA FISHER, Feministische Phänomenologie und Hermeneutik, 2005 ; KARL SCHUHMANN, Karl Schuhmann: Selected Papers on Phenomenology. Edited by CEES LEIJENHORST and PIET STEENBAKKERS, 2004 ; HIROSHI GOTO, Der Begriff der Person in der PhänomenologieHusserls. Ein Interpretationsversuch der Husserlschen Phänomenologie als Ethik im Hinblick auf den Begriff der Habitualität, 2004 ; GÜNTER FIGAL, Lebensverstricktheit und Abstandsnahme. „Verhalten zu sich“ im Anschluss an Heidegger, Kierkegaard und Hegel, 2001 ; JACQUES DERRIDA, Le toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy, 2000.

Based on the findings about the importance of social support network in the success of treatment and long term recovery, this article will provide an insight of the successful elements in addiction individual and group counseling interaction through which addicts manage to overcome the denial of addiction, to accept the recovery program, to go through the stages of recovery, and to identify appropriate research methods for understanding the phenomenon of interaction in recovery from addictions. This exploratory study will attempt to identify an innovative perspective of the aspects pertaining to the recovery from addiction which are susceptible to be disclosed primarily by using methods inspired by the analysis of interactions. The method used in research is qualitative focus group with addictions counsellors and people in recovery, working in a counseling center. Using the application of ELAN software to annotate and transcribe interactions from the video and audio recordings, it will situate the research on addiction and recovery from addiction in the larger field of investigations on communication processes in human interactions in various cultural, social and professional contexts.

The goal of this paper is primarily to pinpoint some substantial analytical and conceptual difficulties with the account of knowledge how proposed by (Stanley & Williamson, Knowing How, 2001) [henceforth S&W] and (Stanley, Knowing (How), 2011), (Stanley, Know How, 2011) based on (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984) [henceforth G&S] semantic analysis of embedded questions. In light of such difficulties, (1) we propose supplementing their account with an integrated approach of knowledge how, and suggest adding a mereological layer to the semantic framework of embedded questions (2) we argue that the characteristics of what we call hybrid ways and hybrid knowledge strongly indicate reopening the issue of the proper account of questions towards the complementary relevant account of interrogation in communicative interactions, and the role of the context (in)forming knowledge-how. As a methodological principle, we remain neutral on the intellectualist vs anti-intellectualist debate. We also remain silent on the nature and explanation of the modes of presentations or ways of thinking that should be developed in order to adequately account for hybrid ways and hybrid knowledge.

In this paper, we shall use the perspectival view on justice in an attempt to accommodate the transcendent view on justice with the adversarial practice of justice. Its main idea is that, before seeing justice as administration, it has to be seen in itself. The first section of the paper discusses the meaning of justice from a phenomenological point of view, which enables us to envision justice as transcendent. The second section of the paper describes the pluri-perspectivism of law and justice on the procedural level. Through a series of reflections upon the procedural aspects as they are operating in the Romanian judiciary, we show how the plurality of perspectives tends to converge and finds its resolution in the rule of law and Modern democracy.

Counselors and therapists on addictions and recovery from addictions are employing a variety of methods and techniques to break through the wall of denial and resistance. Accordingly, new methods of research are needed in order to describe and eventually understand the phenomenon of addictions and the ways of recovery from addictions. The paper attempts to define and describe the internal conflict and the way it is brought to the surface and “resolved” (processed and eventually transformed) in therapeutic group interactions. For that, we are using a phenomenological approach to conceptualize addiction in terms of connectedness and methods inspired by the analysis of interactions in order to document the transformative experience necessary for the recovery from addiction.

The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the idea that it is possible not only to give a special place to reason in our life and in society, but also to offer an integrative rational framework, in in which human ends and goals find their rational expression. The text has three parts. The first describes Alfred Schutz's practical-hermeneutical approach to law and normativity, while making room for a subjective practice of reason. The second proposes to reveal, through the description of knowledge in the world of ordinary life, a form of rationality which offers us practical but consistent ways of making a decision. Ultimately, the third aims at the practical-hermeneutical reconstruction of the law, in order to integrate into the core of legal reasoning references to ends and purposes without prejudicing the objectivity of the reasoning itself. The study aims to make a contribution to the problem of dedifferentiation and positivism of practice in the modern world. Le but de ce papier est d’argumenter en la faveur de l’idée qu’il est possible non seulement de donner une place particulière à la raison dans notre vie et dans la société, mais aussi d’offrir un cadre rationnel intégratif, dans lequel les fins et buts humains trouvent leur expression rationnelle. Le texte comporte trois parties. La première décrit l’approche pratique-herméneutique d’Alfred Schutz à l’égard de la loi et de la normativité, tout en faisant place à une pratique subjective de la raison. La deuxième se propose de dévoiler, à travers la description de la connaissance dans le monde de la vie ordinaire, une forme de rationalité qui nous offre des voies pratiques mais consistantes de prendre une décision. En fin de compte, la troisième vise la reconstruction pratique-herméneutique de la loi, afin d’intégrer dans le noyau du raisonnement légal des références à des fins et buts sans porter préjudice à l’objectivité du raisonnement lui-même. L’étude veut apporter une contribution au problème de la dédifférenciation et du positivisme pratique dans le monde moderne.

Violence is signaled by a mark of discontinuity, interruption, rupture. The tripartite temporality of violence, with its strong focus on the present, points to the originary violence. Moreover, the violent event is structuring the order of the action sequences in an actual violent (embodied) interaction. The interactional dynamics in violent encounters between co-present actors shapes the specific forms of the experiencing in (and of) the violent interaction. Based on how violence is experienced in an interactive situation, the phenomenon of violence articulates itself according to three coordinates: directedness, co-performativity and de-capabilisation. The outlining of the structure of the lived experience of violence is revealing something irreducible in it. To understand the experience of violence as such, I propose that we accept the idea of violence per se and depart from the idea that the acts of violence are essentially moral actions. The core of the ethical-moral discussion concerning violence should be grounded instead on the moment of conversion identifiable when we take into account the reaction to violence.

This paper tries to show that the naturalistic view of addiction is mired in contradictions that stem from reducing the addict to a weak-willed subject who loses control over his or her body. From a phenomenological perspective, addiction reveals itself to be a habit which eventually becomes harmful, but has its primary sources in the embodied needs of a worldly subject. The aim of this paper is to uncover the dimensions of the lived addiction that are neglected in the contemporary naturalistic discourse: the lived-body and the worldly context of the addict. Firstly, we try to do justice to the variety of addictions by underlying that their new and surprising forms are determined by the intersubjective tissue wherein the subject operates. Secondly, the loss of control in addiction, how the subject deals with the tendency to satisfy a need, is experienced as powerlessness, as expressed in the accounts of ecstasy addicts regarding altered states of mind. The last section of this paper will argue that this sense of powerlessness cannot be equated with a weakness of the will because a strong, forceful will engenders the same vertigo of being prey to strange powers. The embodied aspect of addiction and the spontaneous, bodily need it saturates will clarify further this claim.

There are many ways of interpreting the behaviours related to substance misuse and addiction, which can be sort out as three basic models: biomedical, legal, and social. They are corresponding to approaches built in different epistemic and professional frameworks, such as medicine, law, and social work. Confronted with the experience of addiction, these models appear as pre-determined by a specific scientific or professional ideology; they presuppose a pre-understanding of the phenomena. I directed, therefore, my investigation on those phenomenological paths that might lead to, and circumscribe the experience of addiction and I propose an analytical framework based on three major phenomenological perspectives: descriptive, genetic, and inter-relational. This paper argues in favour of defining addiction without making reference to a form of failure, psycho-somatic or existential. On the contrary, it concludes that there is a need to adopt a definition of addiction which holds at its core the idea of empowering addicted persons, of re-constructing their capacity to take decisions about their own lives.

The Husserlian concept of intersubjectivity has been criticized for the fact that it belongs exclusively to a philosophy of representation and to a solipsistic consciousness. In this conceptual framework, the other (ego) appears to be constituted by a singular ego through the synthesis of the series of its appearances (perceptive or imaginative representations) and by extrapolation (transposition) of its own “sphere of originality”. For this theory of constitution seemed to be essentially related to the concept of objective representation that post-Husserlian phenomenologists have criticized and eventually replaced with another, in which affectivity is supposed to open the way to otherness, as we can see in Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry or Jacques Derrida. Our hypothesis is that the difficulty does not regard the theory of constitution, but the fact that the other and the community that he forms with me and with many others are thought only in terms of representation. Even those who discharged the “abstract” objective representation of Husserl’s function and replaced it with “affectivity” were not finally able to overpass the representational framework, because the other has always been for me (and vice-versa, I have been for him) only a “picture” (no matter whether representative or “affective”), something which simply “stands” before my eyes. But this is certainly a reductive way of understanding the relation between the I and the other. If we focus our attention on the phenomenon of community and not on some interpretations or simplifications of it, we realize that it is not sufficient that objective representation or affectivity or any other faculty constitute or disclose the other for the I (even if that is a necessary starting point). As a multilayered concept, “intersubjectivity”, in Husserl’s sense, is a system of transitions from mere appearance to transcendence, from passivity to activity, from cognitive and affective representation to volition and action. As soon as we see the relation between the I and the other as active, as an influence or intrusion of one consciousness in another, as an intention to “move” the other, to determine him to assume or to begin an action (a real one, effected in real life), the concept of intersubjectivity changes drastically, even though the “representation” of the other before the I and of the I in the eyes of the other remains a necessary interface. Accordingly, constitutive phenomenology has to take into consideration volition, action and communication not simply as extensions of the constitution of the thing. A reform of the theory of constitution, or rather its enlargement, to encompass this new type of “objectivity” (praxis) which would thus offer an adequate conceptual framework is strongly recommended.

In spite of some remarkable contributions, Husserl’s project of phenomenology as universal phenomenology still remains incomplete, and therefore may be questionable both in its fundamental idea – that that phenomenology should encompass all the ontologies and all the sciences in general in a final foundation - and in its accomplishments. In order to complete this task, I believe that the methodological orientation of phenomenology should be stressed, and that the distinctions operating in this second-order critique must be prolonged till their final consequences. One of the aims of this paper is a methodology guided by the theory of constitution and a more precise correlation between the levels of constitution and the levels of phenomenology. Therefore I propose a two-steps post-preliminary methodological approach, which will clarify the status of phe¬nomenology and release its genuine innovating forces. The first step is that of a sharp distinction, perhaps even a separation, between the level of the phenomenological analyses and the level of the philosophical auto-interpretation of these analyses. This distinction will allow us to discuss the various connections between these two levels in Husserlian phenomenology and to examine the way in which some specific phenomenol¬ogical analyses require a specific philosophical superstructure. The second step is the elaboration of a typology of phenomenological analyses. The chart of the systematic lines of methodological issues, elaborated by A. Steinbock, will be the starting point of a discussion, which will be oriented to the clarification of the role that the so-called empirical sciences played in the general theory of constitution. The final conclusive part of our paper contains some reflections about the viability of the Husserlian project of phenomenology as a universal philosophy.

The unitary description both of the thing and of the other allowed to the Husserlian phenomenology to overcome the classical distinction between representation and will and to treat the volition and action as specific objects. In the following paper we shall investigate the basic concepts of a phenomenology of will and action comparing it with Kant's position in this respect. Our research will focus on the phenomenological description of the passage from the inchoative moment of the action to the action to the ethical action and on the manner in which normativity arises in the milieu of the interaction. Korsgaard's concept of reflective endorsement will be our main reference in this field.

In an different manner than the classical works of Sokolowski, Tugendhat and Schuhmann, who treated the Husserlian problematic of constitution as reality – subjectivity relation, this study tries to explain that relation in a pure immanent and formal way. The constitution of the object as such presupposes a system of constitution, which, as a part of the system of "transcendental" phenomenology, takes explicitly into account the legality or typicality of the processes and requires their global articulation. Thus, in the first section, the study clarifies the relation between "analytics" and "transcendental" in the framework of the originary constitution. In the second section, through a comparative analysis of the "field" and "flux", the most elementary structures of connectivity are exposed. Finally, a research upon the formal characters of a "series" in Husserl’s doctrine of intentional modifications will be brought into discussion in order to clarify the role of the infinity in the Husserlian theory of constitution.

This paper aims to analyse an »original phenomenological scene«, which we are designating by the expression »the gallery of Dresden«, and which refers to the inclusion of an image in an other image, ad infinitum. The paper argues that the complex images are a pattern of the complexity of the noematic strata in the Husserlian phenomenology and that they are of a great importance for the phenomenological elucidation of objectuality and for the description of the structures of the »noematic sphere’ as dual-recessive structures.