Marcos Silva

De modo a explicar o sucesso das realizações científicas, as abordagens tradicionais em filosofia da ciência empregam critérios epistemológicos; abordagens socioconstrutivistas, a) também utilizam critérios epistemológicos, porém o fazem sem o rigor das abordagens tradicionais, b) quando empregam conceitos socioconstrutivistas, eles não são tão bem definidos quanto os critérios epistemológicos, e c) investem muito mais em narrativas do que propriamente em reconstruções conceituais. Temos assim portanto uma diferença metodológica entre as abordagens tradicionais e o socioconstrutivismo., diferença essa que será o objeto central deste artigo. O conceito central que perpassa o artigo é o de que, embora as narrativas socioconstrutivistas sejam formas legítimas de se explicar o sucesso da ciência, elas possuem algumas limitações.

Em sua obra, Robert Brandom apresenta uma teoria expressivista da lógica. Segundo o autor, a lógica tem o papel expressivo de tornar explı́citas as relações inferenciais implı́citas em nossas práticas linguı́sticas. Estas relações inferenciais conferem conteúdo aos conceitos. Neste artigo, exploraremos a tese de que o expressivismo lógico de Brandom é uma teoria antirrealista acerca da lógica. Realistas lógicos costumam defender a existência independente de fatos lógicos em relação a nossas práticas cognitivas e linguı́sticas, de modo que a lógica, uma vez que seria capaz de representar estes fatos, descreveria verdadeiramente a estrutura da realidade. Por contraste, antirrealistas lógicos não se comprometem com a existência independente de fatos lógicos para entenderem a natureza da lógica. Em contraste com uma visão realista, mostramos que o antirrealismo de Brandom tem como consequências uma ontologia simples e econômica e a fundação de uma alternativa pragmatista para se examinar a normatividade da lógica, o fenômeno da pluralidade de lógicas rivais e a natureza de nossa racionalidade.

ABSTRACT The argument of inference to the best explanation sets up that, given a phenomenon to be explained, several rival hypotheses race to provide an explanation and the hypothesis that explains the phenomenon better than its rival gives good reasons for the belief in its truth and, therefore, for the acceptance of such hypothesis. The argument supposes that these rival hypotheses share the same phenomenon to be explained. In this paper it is argued that, in a few scientific episodes, scientists with different hypotheses, even if sharing the phenomenon to be explained, have different goals regarding the handling of the phenomenon; but then an issue arises as to the structure of the argument, since setting different aims to handle a phenomenon would result in an axiological targeting by the scientists, one not enclosed in the structure of the argument. In addition, axiological targeting can also show itself as something crucial for the issue of accepting a hypothesis, a state of affair not foreseen in the argument of inference to the best explanation again. The purpose of this paper is, by means of “research programs” principle by Imre Lakatos, and by means of a case study – the acceptance of the DNA double helix model – to sustain the concept that the axiological difference may prove to be crucial for the acceptance of one hypothesis rather than other rival hypotheses.

Resumo: O artigo apresenta e discute quatro objeções que têm sido direcionadas ao socioconstrutivismo, enquanto concepção de ciência: i) sua impossibilidade teórica; ii) sua implausibilidade teórica; iii) sua irrelevância; iv) sua indesejabilidade. O artigo sustenta a inadequação das quatro objeções, sugere a importância do socioconstrutivismo, mas defende que essa posição não é nem a única nem a melhor, para nossa compreensão da ciência, porém, apenas mais uma, dentre tantas contribuições filosóficas para essa compreensão. ABSTRACT: This paper introduces and discusses four objections that have been adressed to social constructivism as an approach regarding science: i) its theoretical impossibility; ii) its theoretical implausibility; iii) its irrelevance; iv) its undesirability. This paper advocates the unsuitability of the four objections, means the significance of social constructivism, but argues for that this philosophical stance is neither the only nor the best one for our understanding of the science, but instead just one of many philosophical contributions to this understanding.

This book presents and discusses the varying and seminal role which colour plays in the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Having once said that “Colours spur us to philosophize”, the theme of colour was one to which Wittgenstein returned constantly throughout his career. Ranging from his Notebooks, 1914-1916 and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the posthumously published Remarks on Colours and On Certainty, this book explores how both his view of philosophical problems generally and his view on colours specifically changed considerably over time. Paying particular attention to his so-called intermediary period, it takes a case-based approach to the presentation of colour in texts from this period, from Some Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks to his Big Typescript.

By 1929, after the full acknowledgment of the colour–exclusion problem, Wittgenstein had to admit that material incompatibilities presented in conceptual systems could not be reduced to formal tautologies and contradictions. Wittgenstein then, in his middle period, had to examine the kind of negation which, for instance, colour systems should render, which expose not just one but many or, in some cases, infinite inferentially articulated alternatives. Here, inspired by Brandom’s inferentialism, I explore the idea that Wittgenstein, in his middle period, advocated a form of inferentialism based on the inferentially articulated content of propositions in Satzsysteme. At that time, Wittgenstein suggested that every sentence should be logically connected to many others. I call this feature inferential thickness. Therefore, I use Löf’s normative read of verificationism to explain Middle Wittgenstein’s holist solution to problems concerning the use of negation related to material incompatibilities and determination of propositional sense. I also investigate the distinction between contrariety and contradiction and some possible connections to a mandatory restriction of the principle of excluded middle in Satzsysteme.

O artigo aplica tópicos do inferencialismo semântico de Brandom para iluminar o verificacionismo do Wittgenstein Intermediário, como o papel expressivista da negação, o holismo semântico do inferencialismo e a não-redutibilidade de relações conceituais de incompatibilidade em termos de relações puramente formais. Para tanto, introduz uma leitura normativa do problema da exclusão de cores e do seu impacto no meio notacional tractariano como motivação para o verificacionismo e suas relações com o inferencialismo e o expressivismo. Finalizo mostrando que o poder expressivo de tabelas de verdade pode ser aumentado a partir de mutilações sistemáticas de suas linhas.

Here, the logical behaviour of negation in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is compared with Demos' account of denial. Even if we hold negation as a pure syntactical device, at least in some context, it brings a handful of complex semantic information – potentially an infinite amount. We advocate then the existence of at least two negations due to the existence of two different and non-reducible types of exclusion. The first negation is a Tractarian and classical one, based on the notion of contradiction, whereas the second is a non-classical negation, based on the notion of contrariety.

One of the reasons colours, or better the conceptual organisation of the colour system, could be relevant to the philosophy of logic is that they necessitate some mutilation of truth tables by restricting truth functionality. This paper argues that the so-called ‘Colour Exclusion Problem’, the first great challenge for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, is a legitimate philosophical motivation for a systematic mutilation of truth tables. It shows how one can express, through these mutilations, some intensional logical relations usually expressed by the Aristotelian Square of Oppositions, as contrariety and subcontrariety.

Here I present some arguments against an alleged mathematical isomorphic relation between elementary propositions and states of affairs in the Tractatus. This is a standard proposal to understand the world-language relation in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. I advocate that the application of this type of isomorphism in the Tractarian conceptual framework conflicts with some of its philosophical peculiarities. This technical approach especially overlooks some crucial Tractarian tenets, such as a sharp modal distinction between form and structure and Wittgenstein’s rejection of a priori true propositions.

We advocate here that the tractarian image of Logic was the great responsible for its collapse. We examine then some mentions of colors in Wittgenstein´s first book to show that its logic holds a conflict between truth-functionality (explicitly assumed and advocated there) and a (hidden) holism. This antagonism was already set in the very formulation of its ontology. Wittgenstein himself admits he did not notice this by the time of the Tractatus ´ elaboration. If he had noticed it, he could have anticipated the Color Exclusion Problem. We discuss also unexpected interferences of space and time in the environment, which presented both the special kind of color exclusion (to be found in other systems) and his original notions of Logic. This shows inter alia that the image of coordinate system was modulating both the logical space notion in the Tractatus and its natural development in several systems of propositions [ Satzsysteme ] in his return to Philosophy

Philosophische Bemerkungen. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Edited by r. Rhees. (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964; Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1964, p. 348). Published in the original German version without English translation. [Translator's Note: I chose to translate all the passages cited by Malcolm, the ones from the Bemerkungen as well as those of the Untersuchungen, directly from German. To this end, I used the editing of Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Werkausgabe Band 1 and 2, 1984. In time, I am very grateful to numerous suggestions for translation outputs and relevant corrections made by an anonymous reviewer of this magazine.]

Brito proposes a naturalistic analysis of morality, disagreeing with some authors who postulate an insurmountable is-ought gap. Here, we present his main arguments and advance some criticisms to them. Brito’s strategy consists in grounding the normative notion of ought on volitive notions, like “will” and “want”. In his perspective, to reach the moral level, a will has to be directed to itself and to all other wills. We try to show that this strategy fails, since moral normativity cannot be grounded on subjective phenomena, regardless of the contents of these phenomena. We also show some incoherence in Brito’s ideias about the possibility of is-ought reduction, as he seems to advocate that it is not possible to reduce “ought” to “is” while he also proposes the reduction of oughts to facts about volition.

This edited volume explores the different and seminal ways colours matter to philosophy. Each chapter provides an insightful analysis of one or more cases in which colours raise philosophical problems in different areas and periods of philosophy. This historically informed discussion examines both logical and linguistic aspects, covering such areas as the mind, aesthetics and the foundations of mathematics. The international contributors look at traditional epistemological and metaphysical issues on the subjectivity and objectivity of colours. In addition, they also assess phenomenological problems typical of the continental tradition and contemporary problems in the philosophy of mind. The chapters include coverage of such topics as Newton’s and Goethe’s theory of light and colours, how primary qualities are qualitative and colours are primary, explaining colour phenomenology, and colour in cognition, language and philosophy. "This book beautifully prepares the ground for the next steps in our research on and philosophising about colour" Daniel D. Hutto "It is not an overstatement to say that How Colours to Philosophy is a ground breaking publication" Mazviita Chirimuuta "Anyone interested in philosophical issues about color will find it highly stimulating." Martine Nida-Rümelin "The high quality papers included in this anthology succeed admirably in enriching current philosophical thinking about colour” Erik Myin “This is certainly the most complete collection of philosophical essays on colours ever published” André Leclerc “All in all this collections represents a new milestone in the ongoing philosophical debate on colours and colour expressions” Ingolf Max