João J. Vila-Chã

This dissertation provides an analysis of both the text and the context of the philosophy of love developed by Judah Abravanel, also known as Leone Ebreo . As a member of one of the most prestigious Jewish families of the Renaissance, Leone Ebreo was born and raised in Portugal, found temporary refuge in Spain and, after the exodus of 1492, lived most of his life in Renaissance Italy as a man-in-exile. His Dialoghi d'amore, which were first published in Rome in 1535, are a conversation of and about love between a man and a woman, i.e., Filone and Sofia . We defend that the work was intended as a parable or diagram about the very nature of Philo-Sophy, and, at the same time, as a profound elaboration of the cosmic or transcendental nature of love itself. The Dialoghi d'amore are, thus, both a dramatic representation of a particular philosophy of love and a demonstration of how philosophy as such constitutes a form of love. ;A detailed analysis of Leone Ebreo's thought, both a major example of Renaissance Philosophy and a model of interpretation, will here be the way toward progress in our own philosophical treatment of love and of the ontological condition it manifests. Since they constitute a paradigmatic example of philosophical eclecticism in the Renaissance, the Dialoghi d'amore will be read as the representative encyclopedia about the culture of sixteenth-century Europe that they in fact are. ;Through a con-textual reading of Leone Ebreo's work we try to illustrate both the philosophical importance and the existential relevance of a text that, located as it is at a crucial moment of transition between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, is clearly centered upon the Idea of Love and, as such, came to play a significant role in the development of European thought and letters

Objective of this text is to present some descriptive arguments in regard to the assertion that our affectivity constitutes is a socially structured reality. We start with the hypothesis according to which the affective life of the human being reaches its most specific goal through a process of constitution of desire in which my preferences are always defined according to the preferences of others. In order to demonstrate the conditioned character of our preferences, we shall consider ideas derived both from the phenomenology of Michel Henry and Emmanuel Housset, but also from the mimetic anthropology developed by Paul Dumouchel in line with the anthropological thought of René Girard. We show that not only our own, but also the preferences of others are socially conditioned. The language of our affections belongs to the order of conditioned propositional acts, that is, of those who are not carriers of their own conditions of truth. Our emotional life is like an act of language, whose realization presupposes conditions that are no longer in the hands of the subject of the discourse. The text ends with a brief consideration of the ontological sense of the virtue of gratitude.

Neste artigo tenta-se uma aproximação do pensamento de E. Levinas em sua busca de aberturas no discurso-do-serpara a emergência ética do sentido, de um Sentido desconstrutor dos sentidos constituídos, Sentido dos sentidos e do não-sentido. Trata-se, assim, de uma tentativa de superação do esquecimento mais tipico do centralismo da nossa tradição de pensamento: o da Intriga, que é também tensão, do Outro no seio do Mesmo - ou seja, da Transcendência na e à ordem do mundo. Mais do que o esquecimento do Ser, é o esquecimento do Outro que está na origem da presente crftica à filosofia estabelecida - "visibilidade do Mesmo para o Mesmo". Assim, entendendo-se a si mesmo como pequeno ensaio de abertura a uma "ontologia do Exilio" - "ontologia relational", capaz de renunciar ao primado dos esquemas de uma constituição transcendental do sentido e ao privitégio tradicionalmente concedido à manifestação e à presença -, o presente artigo fazuma abordagem do tratamento dado por E. Levinas (prestando em certo momento também atenção ao caminho colateral de M. Heidegger) a três fundamentais dimensões do nosso ser-no-mundo - a interrogação, a linguagem e o corpo - em ordem a uma redefinição do Sentido e da Inteligibilidade da Transcendência, ou seja, à produção de um discurso aberto à vivacidade do enigma que é a presença do Outro no seio do Mesmo. O resultado é como que uma prova em ordem a uma (futura) "filosofia da encarnação", de um pensamento da subjectividade humana em termos de "maternidade e vulnerabilidade", de um ser-aberto à intriga da relação radical no ser. /// Cet article essaye une approximation de la pensée de E. Levinas en cherchant des ouvertures dans le discours-de-l'être à l'émergence éthique du sens, sens déconstructeur des sens constitués, Sens du sens et du non-sens. Il s'agit, done, d'essayer une supération de l'oubliement le plus typique du centralisme de notre tradition de la pensée: l'oubliement de l'Intrigue, qui est aussi tension, de l'Autre dans le Mdme, e'est-à-dire de la Transcendance dans et à l'ordre du monde. Plus qu'oubliement de l'être, e'est l'oubliement de l'Autre qui est à l'origine de la présente critique à la philosophie établie - "visibilité du Même pour le Même". Se comprenant soi-même comme un petit essai d'ouverture à une "ontologie de l'Exile" - "ontologie relationelle", capable de renoncer au primat des schèmes d'une constitution transcendantale du sens et au privilège traditionellement donné par E. Levinas à la manifestation et à la présence, cet article considère le traitement donné par E. Levinas (avec quelque attention au chemin colllatéral de M. Heidegger) à trois dimensions fondamentales de notre être-dans-le-monde - l'interrogation, le langage et le corps - pour une redéfinition du Sens et de l'Intelligibilité de la Transcendance, c'est-à-dire pour un discours ouvert à l'énigme qui est la présence de l'Autre dans le Même. Le résultat est une façon d'épreuve pour une (future) philosophie de l'incarnation, d'une pensée de la subjectivité humaine par rapport à la maternité et vulnérabilité, d'un "être-ouvert à l'intrigue de la relation radical dans l'être. /// In this article an attempt is made to approach Levinas's thought from the perspective of his search for openings that can be discovered in ontological discourse and that point towards the emergence of meaning as ethical, of Meaning which deconstructs constituted meanings, the Meaning of meanings and of non-meaning. It involves an overcoming of the kind of forgetting which is central to our philosophical tradition: that of Intrigue, the tension of the Other in the heart of the Same, i. e., of Transcendence in the order of the world. More than the forgetting of Being, it is the forgetting of the Other that is at the source of the criticism of established philosophy - "the visibility of the Same for itself". In proposing an "ontology of exile", a "relational ontology", capable of renouncing the primacy of transcendental constitution of meaning and the privilege given to manifestation and presence, this article considers Levinas's treatment (with some attention given to Heidegger in this regard) of three fundamental dimensions of our being-in-the-world: interrogation, language, and the body. A redefinition of Meaning and of Inteligibility of Transcendence is thereby sought by being attentive to the production of a discourse which is sensitive to the enigma of the Other in the Same. The possibility of a (future) philosophy of incarnation, where human subjectivity can be thought of in terms of maternity and vulnerability to the degree that it is open to the intrigue in the heart of being, is being tested here.