-
32It is argued that quantum mechanics does not have merely a predictive function like other physical theories; it consists in a formalisation of the conditions of possibility of any prediction bearing upon phenomena whose circumstances of detection are also conditions of production. This is enough to explain its probabilistic status and theoretical structure.
-
32On the Too Often Overlooked Radicality of NeurophenomenologyConstructivist Foundations 11 (2): 354-356. 2016.Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: We point out that the significance of the neurophenomenological approach to the “hard problem” of consciousness is underrated and misunderstood by the authors of the target article. In its original version, neurophenomenology implies nothing less than a change in our own being to dispel the mere sense that there…Read more
-
32On Life Beneath the Subject/Object DualityJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 125-27. 2011.
-
31Two Aspects of Śūnyatā in Quantum Physics: Relativity of Properties and Quantum Non-separabilityIn Siddheshwar Rameshwar Bhatt (ed.), Quantum Reality and Theory of Śūnya, Springer. pp. 93-117. 2019.The so-called paradoxes of quantum physics are easily disposed of as soon as one accepts that there are no such things as intrinsically existing particles and their intrinsic properties, but that both particles and properties are relational “observables.” Accordingly, quantum physics does not offer a “description of the outer world,” but rather a prescription about how to make probabilistic predictions within a participatory environment. The latter view looks quite radical with respect to standa…Read more
-
30In physics, structures are good candidates for the role of transparadigmatic invariants, which entities can no longer play. This is why structural realism looks more credible than standard entity realism. But why should structures be stable, rather than entities? Here, structural realists have no answer ; they content themselves with the mere observation that this is how things stand. By contrast, transcendental structuralism can easily make sense of this fact. Indeed, it shows that when knowled…Read more
-
29Jean-Louis Destouches: théories de la prévision et individualitéPhilosophia Scientiae 5 (1): 1-30. 2001.
-
28Physics could be defined, inter alia, as a systematic attempt at pushing actuality aside and bringing form to the fore. On the other hand, the formal descriptions which are the theoretical end-products of physics have to connect somewhere with actuality. Having to connect with actuality but holding no appropriate counterpart of actuality in it: such is the particularity of physics. As a consequence, many well-known enigma appear as paradoxes OF physics rather than just difficulties IN physics.
-
25Mathematical Demonstration and Experimental Activity: A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of PhysicsPhilosophical Investigations 41 (2): 188-203. 2018.This article aims at reducing the gap between mathematics and physics from a Wittgensteinian point of view. This gap is usually characterized by two discriminating features. The propositions of physics assert something which might be false; they have a hypothetical character. On the contrary, since mathematical propositions are rules that condition the form of assertions, they remain immune from falsification. The propositions of physics refer to facts that may confirm or refute them. On the con…Read more
-
22Néo-pragmatisme et incommensurabilité en physiquePhilosophia Scientiae 8 (1): 203-234. 2004.On distingue trois strates interdépendantes dans les paradigmes kuhniens : le savoir-faire expérimental, le formalisme, et les engagements ontologiques. Seul le niveau ontologique se trouve intégralement et explicitement exprimé dans le cadre du langage courant. Il semble donc qu’assimiler l’« incommensurabilité » des paradigmes à une intraductibilité revient à esquiver une partie du problème. Afin de compenser cette apparente incomplétude, une conception néo-pragmatiste et structuraliste de la …Read more
-
22Author’s Response: Metaphysics With no Metaphysical CommitmentConstructivist Foundations 16 (2): 167-171. 2021.: I make explicit the status of the “quasi-metaphysics” associated with neurophenomenology in the target paper. Here, metaphysics serves as a therapy and as a guide, not as a picture of…
-
18A Phenomenology of Identity: QBism and Quantum (Non-)ParticlesIn Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Raoni W. Arroyo (eds.), Non-Reflexive Logics, Non-Individuals, and the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: Essays in Honour of the Philosophy of Décio Krause, Springer Verlag. pp. 129-156. 2023.Décio Krause has achieved a thorough reconstruction of logic and set theory, to account for the unusual objects or quasi-objects of quantum physics. How can one cope with the (partial) lack of criteria of individualization and re-identification of quantum objects, when the elementary operations of counting them, and constituting sets of them, are to be performed? Here, I advocate an alternative strategy, that consists in going below the level of logic and set theory to inquire how their categori…Read more
-
17Is the life-world reduction sufficient in quantum physics?Continental Philosophy Review 54 (4): 563-580. 2020.According to Husserl, the epochè (or suspension of judgment) must be left incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of “reduction.” In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according to…Read more
-
17PhenoneurologyConstructivist Foundations 12 (2): 150-153. 2017.Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: Petitmengin’s strategy of dissolution of the “hard problem” of consciousness is shown to rely on some radical phenomenological premises that are listed and analyzed. It presupposes a starting point of research in a state of epoché ; it unfolds into a participatory conception of truth; and it ends in a quest for non-dual pristine experience. Each one of these m…Read more
-
16Lets Trust the (skilled) Subject! A Reply to Froese, Gould and SethJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 90-97. 2011.The article by Froese, Gould and Seth is a survey rather than a commentary, dealing with the intertwined issues of the validity of first- person reports and of their interest for a science of consciousness. While acknowledging that experiential research has already produced promising results, the authors find that it has not yet produced 'killer experiments' providing a definitively positive answer to these two questions, and wonder what kind of experiment would allow it. Our response will addre…Read more
-
15Neurophenomenology and the Micro‐phenomenological InterviewIn Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley. 2017.In its most radical version, Neurophenomenology asks researchers to suspend the quest of an objective solution to the problem of the origin of subjectivity, and clarify instead how objectification can be obtained out of the coordination of subjective experiences. It therefore invites researchers to develop their inquiry about subjective experience with the same determination as their objective inquiry. However, accessing lived experience raises the question of the investigation method, and of th…Read more
-
15Maintenant la finitude. Une critique épistémologique du matérialisme spéculatifPhilosophiques 47 (2): 417. 2020.Michel Bitbol.
-
11Philippe Setlakwe B louin, La Phénoménologie comme manière de vivre, préface de Natalie Depraz, Bucarest, Zeta Books, 2021, 412 p (review)Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 115 (3): 449-450. 2022.
-
8Toute science, admet-on, commence par détacher un objet en le rendant indépendant des sujets et des situations. Mais cette conception étroite de la connaissance scientifique laisse subsister des zones d'ombre. La conscience n'est pas un objet. Elle est ce sans quoi rien ne pourrait être pris pour objet. La conscience n'est pas détachable des sujets, car elle s'identifie à ce qui est vécu par un sujet. De façon analogue, en physique quantique, un phénomène n'est pas dissociable de son contexte ex…Read more
-
7Néo-pragmatisme et incommensurabilité en physiquePhilosophia Scientiae 8 203-234. 2004.On distingue trois strates interdépendantes dans les paradigmes kuhniens : le savoir-faire expérimental, le formalisme, et les engagements ontologiques. Seul le niveau ontologique se trouve intégralement et explicitement exprimé dans le cadre du langage courant. Il semble donc qu’assimiler l’« incommensurabilité » des paradigmes à une intraductibilité revient à esquiver une partie du problème. Afin de compenser cette apparente incomplétude, une conception néo-pragmatiste et structuraliste de la …Read more
-
6Le sens de la mécanique quantique doit être interrogé en revenant au plus près de l'expérience incertaine, à partir de laquelle les possibilités futures sont évaluées. L'idée même d'une pluralité de mondes est reconduite aux situations élémentaires de la vie humaine où s'opposent l'actualité collectivement reconnue et les possibilités intellectuellement envisagées.
-
6Mécanique quantique: une introduction philosophiqueFlammarion-Pere Castor. 1996.Le présent tome traite de la mécanique quantique non relativiste. Il comprend, outre ses fondements, de multiples applications de la mécanique quantique dans une plus large mesure que dans les cours généraux. Dans leur exposé des questions générales, les auteurs dégagent au maximum l'essence physique de la théorie, à partir de laquelle ils développent l'appareil mathématique. Contrairement au schéma habituel allant des théorèmes mathématiques relatifs aux opérateurs linéaires, les auteurs déduis…Read more
-
5Ce livre renouvelle le débat séculaire sur la possibilité de réduire la conscience à un processus neuronal. Il fait du lecteur l'arbitre de l'enquête, non seulement en tant que spectateur rationnel, mais aussi en tant qu'acteur apte à se reconnaître conscient aux moments décisifs de l'argumentation. Le fin mot de l'énigme ne se dissimulerait-il pas dans l'évidence que la question sur l'origine de la conscience a une conscience pour origine? Au cours de cette investigation qui mobilise la phénomé…Read more
-
5Réalité donnée, réalité construite. À propos d’un argument de SearleCahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 45 39-62. 2008.Un argument important contre le constructivisme social a été formulé par John Searle en 1995. Il consiste non seulement à admettre, mais aussi à analyser jusqu’à ses dernières implications le concept de construction sociale d’une réalité ; puis à prouver que l’une des implications en question est l’impossibilité de généraliser ce concept à toutes les réalités que nous reconnaissons dans la vie quotidienne et dans les sciences. Mieux encore, J. Searle...
-
4On the possibility and reality of introspectionKairos 6 173-198. 2013.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.
-
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneDepartment for Teaching and Research in Philosophy (UFR10)Researcher
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Department for Teaching and Research in Philosophy (UFR10)
PhD, 1997
Paris, France
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Physical Science |