Colin Farrelly

A century of experimental science has revealed that the rate of biological aging is malleable, influenced by genetic, environmental, lifestyle, and pharmacological factors. Translational gerontology is ushering in a new ideal for longevity science, “rate control.” Unlike disease control, which has increased survival time by suppressing causes of premature death, rate control aspires to increase healthspan and compress morbidity in late life by slowing the rate of aging through nonpharmacological (healthy environments, lifestyle) and potential pharmacological (geroprotective drugs) interventions. Aging and the Ethics of Longevity Science examines the ethical and societal implications of population aging and longevity science. Dispensing with frames that perpetuate the “Frankensteinification” of translational gerontology, philosopher Colin Farrelly encourages instead an understanding of the societal significance of longevity science predicated on wisdom-inquiry science and responsible biology.

In this paper I argue that political liberalism is not the “minimalist liberalism” characterised by Michael Sandel and that it does not support the vision of public life characteristic of the procedural republic. I defend this claim by developing two points. The first concerns Rawls's account of public reason. Drawing from examples in Canadian free speech jurisprudence I show how restrictions on commercial advertising, obscenity and hate propaganda can be justified by political values. Secondly, political liberalism also attends to the identity, and not just the interests, of its citizens. It attempts to cultivate certain virtues of character. But it does so in a way that does not entail the acceptance of a comprehensive or perfectionist doctrine. Rawls's defence of neutrality of aim does not mean the state should be neutral towards all the views its citizens espouse. I conclude that political liberalism shares little with the doctrine Sandel claims is embedded in American law.

In _A Theory of Justice_ John Rawls constructed and defended an abstract account of distributive justice founded upon hypothetical theoretical devices like the original position and veil of ignorance, the principle of maximin, and conceptual analyses of equality of opportunities. Such a methodology places a premium on abstract hypotheticals (vs. the _actual history_ of injustice), and idealizations that involve making claims that are actually false, in order to simplify an argument. This chapter critically examines the idealizations employed by Rawls’s original theory of justice. It argues that Rawlsian ideal theory is inherently flawed because Rawls’s idealizations make our normative theorizing prone to the _valuation distortions_ that arise in what psychologists call a “focusing illusion.”

Is it possible for a society with a market economy to be just? Unlike Marxists, egalitarian liberals believe that there are some conceivable circumstances where such a society could fulfil the requirements of social justice. A market society need not be exploitative. One proposal that has recently received much attention among political theorists is the suggestion that citizens should receive a basic income. Philippe Van Parijs's Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) can justify capitalism? presents one of the most sophisticated philosophical arguments in favour of a citizens' basic income. In this paper I critically assess Van Parijs's proposal for a citizens' unconditional basic income. I develop three Rawlsian objections which cast doubt on the idea that Van Parijs's proposal can play a foundational role in a viable theory of social justice. I label these objections: (1) the objection from leisure (2) the objection from citizenship and (3) the objection from self‐respect.

Humanity faces numerous critical challenges in the twenty-first century, from climate change and globalization to pandemics and the impact of technological advances. Can the ideas of past political thinkers help us refine the problem-solving skills needed to redress the practical predicaments of today? In _Classics of Political Thought for Today_, Colin Farrelly explores a wide range of historical political thinkers, demonstrating how the successes and limitations of these past figures can yield sage insights for how we identify and address the social and political problems of today. The book canvasses, and critically assesses, the ancient Greeks, social contract theory, conservatism, feminism, Black political thought, utilitarianism, and Marxism. Farrelly highlights the lessons we can learn from past political thinkers, engaging with their ideas in a way that facilitates the intellectual curiosity, insight, and optimism necessary for addressing the societal predicaments of today and tomorrow.

Folkbiology refers to people’s everyday understanding of the biological world. The early twentieth-century pioneers of public health C.-E.A Winslow (1877–1957), and his mentor H. Biggs (1859–1923), conceptualized public health as the ‘purchasable’ science of preventing disease and death from unfavorable economic and living conditions. Their ideas were foundational in shaping public health’s strategy of a ‘war against disease’ (Winslow, 1903), a strategy that was very successful in preventing the early-life mortality risks from infectious diseases, and was eventually extended to combating the chronic diseases of late life (like cancer). However, the initial framing of public health, through the lens of sanitation science, was predicated upon folkbiological premises that geroscience must abate in order to direct public health interventions toward the goal of improving the quality of life for older persons in the twenty-first century. Three folkbiological premises of sanitation science’s ‘war against disease’ are identified and critiqued: (i) the belief that health is the ‘normal’ condition of the human mechanism and disease ‘unnecessary’; (ii) the belief that the proximate causes of disease are the only modifiable risk factors public health interventions can alter; and (iii) the belief that the rate of biological aging is universal.

In this paper I argue that the account of deliberative democracy advanced by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, 2004) is a useful normative theory that can help enhance our deliberations about public policy in morally pluralistic societies. More specifically, I illustrate how the prescriptions of deliberative democracy can be applied to the issue of regulating non-medical uses of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), such as gender selection. Deliberative democracy does not aim to win a philosophical debate among rival first-order theories, such as libertarianism, egalitarianism or feminism. Rather, it advances a second-order analysis that strives to help us determine what would constitute a reasonable balance between the conflicting fundamental values that arise in the context of regulating PGD. I outline a theoretical model (called the Reasonable Genetic Intervention Model) that brings these issues to the fore. Such a model incorporates the concern for both procedural and substantive principles; and it does so in way that takes provisionality seriously

The recent case of German siblings Patrick Stübing and his sister Susan Karolewski has reignited debate over the criminalisation of sexual intercourse among consanguine descendants. The primary justification for criminalising incest is the purported increased risk of genetic disabilities among offspring, but is criminalising sexual intercourse an empirically sound and proportionate response to this increased risk? To answer this question we must consider the specifics of the harm in question and the magnitude of the harms of the intervention. The example of incest law has important implications for liberal societies. If we can justify imprisoning consenting adults for choosing partners who will increase the risk of having children with disabilities, then we set a troubling precedent for all couples who may pass on genetic disorders to their children.

John Davis (_New Methuselahs_: _The Ethics of Life_ _Extension_, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2018) advances a novel ethical analysis of longevity science that employs a three-fold methodology of examining the impact of life extension technologies on three distinct groups: the “Haves”, the “Have-nots” and the “Will-nots”. In this essay, I critically examine the egalitarian analysis Davis deploys with respect to its ability to help us theorize about the moral significance of an applied gerontological intervention. Rather than focusing on futuristic scenarios of radical life extension, I offer a rival egalitarian analysis that takes seriously (1) the health vulnerabilities of today’s aging populations, (2) the health inequalities of the “aging status quo” and, (3) the prospects for the fair diffusion of an aging intervention over the not-so-distant future. Despite my reservations about Davis’s focus on “life-extension” vs. increasing the human “healthspan”, I agree with his central conclusion that an aging intervention would be, on balance, a good thing and that we should fund such research aggressively. But, I make an even stronger case and conjecture that an intervention that slows down the rate of molecular and cellular decline from the inborn aging process will likely be one of the most important public health advancements of the twenty-first century. This is so because aging is the most prevalent risk factor for chronic disease, frailty and disability, and it is estimated that there will be over 2 billion persons age > 60 by the year 2050.

Imagination and idealism are particularly important creative epistemic virtues for the medical sciences if we hope to improve the health of the world’s ageing population. To date, imagination and idealism within the medical sciences have been dominated by a paradigm of disease control, a paradigm which has realised significant, but also limited, success. Disease control proved particularly successful in mitigating the early-life mortality risks from infectious diseases, but it has proved less successful when applied to the chronic diseases of late life (like cancer). The time is ripe for the emergence and prominence of a supplementary medical research paradigm, the paradigm of ‘healthy ageing’ which prioritises the goal of rate (of ageing) control rather than disease control. This is the difference between extending the human healthspan versus extending survival by managing (or trying to eliminate) the multi-morbidities, frailty and disability currently prevalent in late life. The idealism of the disease control paradigm is myopic because it ignores the health constraints imposed by the inborn ageing process itself, a biological reality which is already inflicting significant economic and disease burdens on the world’s ageing populations. Unless the medical sciences retard the rate of biological ageing, these problems will continue to be amplified as larger numbers of persons survive into late life.

: This paper explores some of the challenges raised by human genetic interventions for debates about distributive justice, focusing on the challenges that face prioritarian theories of justice and their relation to the argument advanced by Ronald Lindsay elsewhere in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. Also examined are the implications of germ-line genetic enhancements for intergenerational justice, and an argument is given against Fritz Allhoff's conclusion, found in this issue as well, that such enhancements are morally permissible if and only if they augment primary goods

Where does the aspiration to retard human ageing fit in the ‘big picture’ of medical necessities and the requirements of just healthcare? Is there a duty to retard human ageing? And if so, how much should we invest in the basic science that studies the biology of ageing and could lead to interventions that modify the biological processes of human ageing? I consider two prominent accounts of equality and just healthcare – Norman Daniels's application of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and Ronald Dworkin's account of equality of resources – and conclude that, once suitably amended and revised, both actually support the conclusion that anti-ageing research is important and could lead to interventions that ought to be considered ‘medical necessities’

In this article I critically examine Adam Moore's claim that the threshold for overriding intangible property rights and privacy rights is higher, in relation to genetic enhancement techniques and sensitive personal information, than is commonly suggested. I argue that Moore fails to see how important advances in genetic research are to social justice. Once this point is emphasised one sees that the issue of how formidable overriding these rights are is open to much debate. There are strong reasons, on grounds of social justice, for thinking the importance of such rights is likely to be diminished in the interests of ensuring a more just distribution of genes essential to pursuing what John Rawls calls a person's `rational plan of life'

Distributive justice concerns the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Opposition to higher rates of taxation, or even existing levels of taxation, are often made on grounds that such taxes are unfair burdens. This fairness argument can be given a number of further, more specific, formulations. Libertarians like Robert Nozick, for example, argue that taxation of income is unfair because it violates individual rights. Libertarians invoke an entitlement argument which presumes that the appropriate baseline of property rights is pretax income. Others take issue with specific policies that are supported by taxation, such as welfare provisions, and argue that welfare reform is necessary as tax burdens are only legitimate when they satisfy some form of reciprocity thesis. In this review article I critically assess these arguments. The recent publication of The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, and The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship help shed some light on each of these different arguments that are often invoked in defence of tax cuts. These three books are a welcome addition to debates about distributive justice as they help bridge the gap between normative theory and public policy. In addition to raising doubts about the arguments that taxation is unfair, I examine themes that raise important questions about taxation and justice- private property, welfare reform and inheritance. An examination of these themes should make it clear that the real challenge facing justice-theorists is to take scarcity seriously and thus I emphasis the shortcomings of simply endorsing a ‘cost-blind’ rights-oriented conception of justice. Such a conception of justice currently dominates debates in normative political theory.

Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, 99 University Avenue, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 3N6. Email: farrelly{at}queensu.ca ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract Should we invest more public funding in basic aging research that could lead to medical interventions that permit us to safely and effectively retard human aging? In this paper I make the case for answering in the affirmative. I examine, and critique, what I call the Fairness Objection to making aging research a greater priority than it currently is. The Fairness Objection presumes that support for aging research is limited to a simplistic utilitarian justification. That is, a mode of justification that is aggregative and permits imposing high costs on a few so that small benefits could be enjoyed by numerous recipients. I develop two arguments to refute the Fairness Objection. The Fairness Objection mischaracterizes the utilitarian argument for retarding human aging. It does so by invoking the fallacious conceptual distinction between "saving lives" and "extending lives", as well as making a number of mistaken assumptions concerning the likely benefits of retarding human aging. Secondly, I argue that the case for tackling aging can be made on contractualist , in addition to utilitarian, grounds. Because the harms of senescence are "morally relevant" to the harms of disease, contractualists can permit aggregation within lives. And thus no one could reasonably reject, I contend, a principle that makes the aspiration to tackle human aging more of a priority than it currently is. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

It is widely agreed, claims John Horton, “that the core of the concept of toleration is the refusal, where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct one finds objectionable”.1 Liberals champion toleration as one of the main political virtues of a just society. The tolerant society is one which protects a diverse array of fundamental freedoms ranging from freedom of conscience and religion to freedom of expression and freedom of association. Secure in the knowledge that the constitution guarantees these various freedoms, citizens can freely pursue the lifestyles they find most fulfilling, regardless of the fact that the majority of people may or may not find their..

In this article I critically examine Adam Moore’s claim that the threshold for overriding intangible property rights and privacy rights is higher, in relation to genetic enhancement techniques and sensitive personal information, than is commonly suggested. I argue that Moore fails to see how important advances in genetic research are to social justice. Once this point is emphasised one sees that the issue of how formidable overriding these rights are is open to much debate. There are strong reasons, on grounds of social justice, for thinking the importance of such rights is likely to be diminished in the interests of ensuring a more just distribution of genes essential to pursuing what John Rawls calls a person’s ”rational plan of life’

In “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Liam Murphy ~1999! makes a distinction between two approaches to normative political theory. He labels these two positions “dualism” and “monism.” The former maintains that “the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principle” ~1999: 254!. The most influential proponent of dualism is John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice Rawls defends his theory of “justice as fairness,” which recognizes a division of responsibility between the principles that apply to the main social, economic and political institutions of society, and the principles that apply to individuals. Institutions are to be arranged so that citizens’ basic rights and liberties are protected and social and economic inequalities are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. The principles that apply to individuals include various principles of natural duty, as well as the principle of fairness. These principles impose on citizens a diverse array of duties and obligations, such as the duties of mutual respect and mutual aid

In this paper I argue that the virtue ethics tradition can enhance the moral discourse on the ethics of prenatal genetic enhancements in distinctive and valuable ways. Virtue ethics prescribes we adopt a much more provisional stance on the issue of the moral permissibility of prenatal genetic enhancements. A stance that places great care on differentiating between the different stakes involved with developing different phenotypes in our children and the different possible means (environmental vs. genetic manipulation) available to parents for pursuing legitimate concerns of parental love and virtue. Key components of the virtue ethics account of morality, such as the Aristotelian account of happiness, love and the doctrine of the mean, provide an adequate basis for rejecting the claim that it is morally impermissible for parents to pursue (safe and effective) prenatal enhancements. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that a virtue ethics account of morality could actually support the stronger claim that utilising such interventions can (in certain contexts) be morally required

Richard Moon's The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression is an insightful and comprehensive study of the right to freedom of expression in Canadian constitutional law. Moon begins by stressing the importance of the distinction between freedom of expression as a moral or political ideal and as a constitutional right. The former certainly informs the latter. But the general structure of constitutional adjudication will also play an important role in determining how these issues are resolved and this may, in turn, influence our understanding of the right as a moral and political ideal. Moon focuses on the most important Canadian freedom of expression decisions which cover a wide range of topics from the regulation of racist expression and pornography to access to state and private property