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17Das Adam Smith Problem_ - _A Critical Realist PerspectiveJournal of Critical Realism 5 (2): 251-272. 2006._ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 251 - 272 The old _Das Adam Smith Problem_ is no longer tenable. Few today believe that Smith postulates two contradictory principles of human action: one in the _Wealth of Nations_ and another in the _Theory of Moral Sentiments_. Nevertheless, an Adam Smith problem of sorts endures: there is still no widely agreed version of what it is that links these two texts, aside from their common author; no widely agreed version of how, if at all, Smith's postulation of s…Read more
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39Critical Commentary on Unto OthersPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 697-701. 2002.Altruism has both an evolutionary and a psychological meaning. As the term is used in evolutionary theory, a trait is deemed altruistic if it reduces the fitness of the actor and enhances the fitness of someone else. In its psychological sense, the thesis that we have altruistic ultimate motives asserts that we care about the welfare of others, not just as a means of enhancing our own well-being, but as an end in itself. In Unto Others (hereafter UO), we consider both evolutionary altruism (Part…Read more
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55Précis of Unto OthersPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 681-684. 2002.It is a challenge to explain how evolutionary altruism can evolve by the process of natural selection, since altruists in a group will be less fit than the selfish individuals in the same group who receive benefits but do not make donations of their own. Darwin proposed a theory of group selection to solve this puzzle. Very simply, even though altruists are less fit than selfish individuals within any single group, groups of altruists are more fit than groups of selfish individuals. If a populat…Read more
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43Testing major evolutionary hypotheses about religion with a random sampleHuman Nature 16 (4): 382-409. 2005.
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11The challenge of understanding complexityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1): 163-164. 2000.Those who emphasize complexity must show how it can be studied productively. Laland et al.'s target article partially succeeds but at times gets lost in a sea of possibilities. I discuss the challenge of understanding complexity, especially with respect to multilevel evolution.
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50Sociopathy within and between small groupsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3): 577-577. 1995.If sociopathy is a biological adaptation, it probably evolved in small social groups in which individuals lacked the social mobility required for a con-man strategy to work. On the other hand, conflicts between groups may have provided a large niche for sociopathy throughout human history
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94Species of thought: A comment on evolutionary epistemologyBiology and Philosophy 5 (1): 37-62. 1990.The primary outcome of natural selection is adaptation to an environment. The primary concern of epistemology is the acquistion of knowledge. Evolutionary epistemology must therefore draw a fundamental connection between adaptation and knowledge. Existing frameworks in evolutionary epistemology do this in two ways; (a) by treating adaptation as a form of knowledge, and (b) by treating the ability to acquire knowledge as a biologically evolved adaptation. I criticize both frameworks for failing t…Read more
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3Should New Economic Thinking Be Incremental or Paradigmatic?Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 2 (1): 37-40. 2018.
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198Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciencesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4): 585-608. 1994.In both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s a…Read more
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26On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychologyBiology and Philosophy 18 (5): 669-681. 2003.The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be …Read more
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165On the relationship between evolutionary and psychological definitions of altruism and selfishnessBiology and Philosophy 7 (1): 61-68. 1992.I examine the relationship between evolutionary definitions of altruism that are based on fitness effects and psychological definitions that are based on the motives of the actor. I show that evolutionary altruism can be motivated by proximate mechanisms that are psychologically either altruistic or selfish. I also show that evolutionary definitions do rely upon motives as a metaphor in which the outcome of natural selection is compared to the decisions of a psychologically selfish (or altruisti…Read more
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268On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychologyBiology and Philosophy 18 (5): 669-81. 2003.The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can b…Read more
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22Multilevel selection and the social transmission of behaviorHuman Nature 10 (3): 291-310. 1999.Many evolutionary models assume that behaviors are caused directly by genes. An implication is that behavioral uniformity should be found only in groups that are genetically uniform. Yet, the members of human social groups often behave in a uniform fashion, despite the fact that they are genetically diverse. Behavioral uniformity can occur through a variety of psychological mechanisms and social processes, such as imitation, consensus decision making, or the imposition of social norms. We presen…Read more
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55Multilevel selection and the return of group-level functionalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2): 305-306. 1998.We reinforce Thompson's points by providing a second example of the paradox that makes group selection appear counterintuitive and by discussing the wider implications of multilevel selection theory.
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14Multilevel selection and Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Morality: A translation manualPhilosophical Psychology 31 (5): 669-679. 2018.
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29More on group selection and human behaviorBehavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4): 782-787. 1996.The six commentaries raise five issues about multi-level selection theory that we attempt to address: (1) replicators without vehicles, (2) group selection and movement between groups, (3) absolute versus relative fitness, (4) group-level psychological adaptions, and (5) multi-level selection as a predictive theory.
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1Laying the foundation for evonomicsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 39. 2016.The target article is a major step toward integrating the biological and human-related sciences. It is highly relevant to economics and public policy formulation in the real world, in addition to its basic scientific import. My commentary covers a number of points, including avoiding an excessively narrow focus on agriculture, the importance of multilevel selection and complex systems theory, and utopic versus dystopic scenarios for the future.
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62Language as a community of interacting belief systems: A case study involving conduct toward self and others (review)Biology and Philosophy 10 (1): 77-97. 1995.Words such as selfish and altruistic that describe conduct toward self and others are notoriously ambiguous in everyday language. I argue that the ambiguity is caused, in part, by the coexistence of multiple belief systems that use the same words in different ways. Each belief system is a relatively coherent linguistic entity that provides a guide for human behavior. It is therefore a functional entity with design features that dictate specific word meaning. Since different belief systems guide …Read more
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6Das Adam Smith Problem - A Critical Realist Perspective (review)Journal of Critical Realism 5 (2): 251-272. 2006.The old Das Adam Smith Problem is no longer tenable. Few today believe that Smith postulates two contradictory principles of human action: one in the Wealth of Nations and another in the Theory of Moral Sentiments . Nevertheless, an Adam Smith problem of sorts endures: there is still no widely agreed version of what it is that links these two texts, aside from their common author; no widely agreed version of how, if at all, Smith's postulation of self-interest as the organising principle of econ…Read more
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19Innate psychology and open-ended processes: Finding the middle groundBehavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 219-219. 2000.Rolls's mechanistic account of emotion can help to bridge a rift within the field of evolutionary psychology. One side of the rift emphasizes the importance of innate psychological mechanisms that evolved to solve specific problems encountered in the ancestral environment. The other side emphasizes learning, development, and culture as open-ended evolutionary processes in their own right. Rolls shows how these two views can be reconciled, allowing a productive middle ground to be explored.
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80Group selection: The theory replaces the bogey manBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4): 639-654. 1994.In both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s a…Read more
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26Groups as units of functional analysis, individuals as proximate mechanismsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3): 279-280. 2014.
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54Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional changeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (4): 395-416. 2014.Humans possess great capacity for behavioral and cultural change, but our ability to manage change is still limited. This article has two major objectives: first, to sketch a basic science of intentional change centered on evolution; second, to provide examples of intentional behavioral and cultural change from the applied behavioral sciences, which are largely unknown to the basic sciences community.All species have evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that enable them to respond adaptiv…Read more
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29Emotions and actions associated with norm-breaking eventsHuman Nature 14 (3): 277-304. 2003.Norms have a strong influence on human social interactions, but the emotions and actions associated with norm-breaking events have not been systematically studied. We asked subjects to imagine themselves in a conflict situation and then to report how they would feel, how they would act, and how they would imagine the feelings and actions of their opponent. By altering the fictional scenario that they were asked to imagine (weak vs. strong norm) and the perspective of the subject (norm-breaker vs…Read more
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35Das Adam Smith Problem: A Critical Realist PerspectiveJournal of Critical Realism 5 (2): 251-272. 2006.The old Das Adam Smith Problem is no longer tenable. Few today believe that Smith postulates two contradictory principles of human action: one in the Wealth of Nations and another in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Nevertheless, an Adam Smith problem of sorts endures: there is still no widely agreed version of what it is that links these two texts, aside from their common author; no widely agreed version of how, if at all, Smith's postulation of self-interest as the organising principle of econo…Read more
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102Das Adam Smith Problem - A Critical Realist PerspectiveJournal of Critical Realism 5 (2): 251-272. 2006.The old Das Adam Smith Problem is no longer tenable. Few today believe that Smith postulates two contradictory principles of human action: one in the Wealth of Nations and another in the Theory of Moral Sentiments . Nevertheless, an Adam Smith problem of sorts endures: there is still no widely agreed version of what it is that links these two texts, aside from their common author; no widely agreed version of how, if at all, Smith's postulation of self-interest as the organising principle of econ…Read more
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28Collaborating on evolving the futureBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (4): 438-460. 2014.We thank the commentators for an extraordinarily diverse and constructive set of comments. Nearly all applaud our goal of sketching a unified science of change, even while raising substantive points that we look forward to addressing in our reply, which we group into the following categories: What counts as evolutionary; Ethical considerations; Complexity; Symbotypes, culture, and the future; What intentional cultural change might look like; An evolving science of cultural change; and Who decide…Read more