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Tematem artykułu jest eksplanacyjna rola jaką mogą pełnić teorie filozoficzne w badaniach z zakresu kognitywistyki. Wyróżnione zostają cztery uzupełniające się role, powiązane z różnymi koncepcjami wyjaśniania. Zgodnie z pierwszą rolą eksplanacyjną teorie filozoficzne wyjaśniają na sposób opisywany w koncepcjach naukowego wyjaśniania. Uzyskanie tego rodzaju wyjaśnień przy użyciu teorii filozoficznych wymaga jednak przeformułowania ich tez, przy użyciu pewnych rozumowań analogicznych, w twierdzenia mające charakter naukowy. Wedle drugiej roli ekplanacyjnej teorie filozoficzne wyjaśniają poprzez sformułowanie koniecznych i wystarczających warunków, które muszą być spełnione przez schemat pojęciowy opisujący pewien stan rzeczy. Podobnie w przypadku trzeciej roli teoria filozoficzna wyjaśnia poprzez wskazanie koniecznych i wystarczających warunków zgodności pomiędzy pojęciami używanymi w teorii naukowej a strukturą tej teorii. Wreszcie zgodnie z czwartą rolą teorie filozoficzne wyjaśniają poprzez zastosowanie argumentacji transcendentalnej. W końcowej części artykułu zaprezentowane są wzajemne powiązania pomiędzy czterema powyższymi rolami eksplanacyjnymi.

The article considers a claim that scientific theories can serve as models for philosophical conceptions. It is argued that a scientific theory is modelling a metaphysical conception iff the ontology connected with the metaphysical conception is included in the ontology connected with the scientific theory. However, metaphysical and scientific ontologies may be compared only after the application of interpretative procedures that constitute 'philosophical hermeneutics'. To justify this claim, it is argued that: (1) there are ontologies connected with metaphysical conceptions, (2) there are ontologies connected with scientific theories, (3) there exist logical relations between ontologies connected with metaphysical conceptions and those connected with scientific theories, (4) these ontologies are usually incomplete and need specification by using interpretative procedures. The points (1) and (2) are justified by showing that ontological statements, i.e. statements which describe categories of objects and relations between them but disregard the extensions of terms naming the objects' categories, can be inferred from typical metaphysical and scientific statements. Accordingly, it is claimed that ontological statements connected with metaphysical conceptions and scientific theories are free from the semantic differences that prevent typical metaphysical and scientific statements from standing in logical relations to each other (assumption 3). Subsequently, a set of pragmatic decisions is described, needed to specify metaphysical and scientific ontologies up to the level that allows comparisons between them (assumption 4). Finally, the article presents the notion of modelling as a relation between scientific theories and metaphysical conceptions.

One of the main functions of visual system is to construct representations of objects. These ‘visual objects’ are formed by developing the structure of more primitive visual representations. In the course of the article, I define the notions of ‘minimal visual object’, ‘maximal-non object representation’, and ‘constructing characteristic’ that differentiates minimal objects from maximal non-objects. Relying on these distinctions, I consider the type of ontological change that transforms visual regions, treated as maximal non-object representations, into basic, low-level visual objects. In order to identify such a change, theories of early vision, models of figure/ground distinction, and analytic, ontological notions of objects’ structure are discussed. Finally, a thesis is stated that external relations constitute the main structural factor that determines the ontological transition between non-object representations and visual objects.

While it is widely accepted that human vision represents objects, it is less clear which of the various philosophical notions of ‘object’ adequately characterizes visual objects. In this paper, I show that within contemporary cognitive psychology visual objects are characterized in two distinct, incompatible ways. On the one hand, models of visual organization describe visual objects in terms of combinations of features, in accordance with the philosophical bundle theories of objects. However, models of visual persistence apply a notion of visual objects that is more similar to that endorsed in philosophical substratum theories. Here I discuss arguments that might show either that only one of the above notions of visual objects is adequate in the context of human vision, or that the category of visual objects is not uniform and contains entities properly characterized by different philosophical conceptions.

The main goal of the paper is to sketch an ontological model of visual content at the low- and medium-level of visual processing, relying on psychological conceptions of vision. It is argued that influential cognitive models contain assumptions concerning “objects of content,” that is, objects whose presence is a necessary condition of the adequacy of visual representations. Subsequently, the structure of considered objects of content is presented, and its development through the perceptual process is described. In addition, during the course of the article I present some connections between analytic metaphysics and the ontology of visual content

Within cognitive psychology it is widely accepted that the human visual system represents the numerical sameness of objects. However, the relation of visual sameness itself has not attracted as much attention and no detailed description of this relation is yet available. One of the most important questions is whether this relation can be understood as classical identity, and thus whether it is an equivalence relation. Despite this research gap, I intend to show that results of some psychological works can be interpreted as having a high relevance for the question of equivalence. I demonstrate this by analyzing a study by Drew et al. (2013).

According to the traditional view, visual objects can be characterized as bundles of features and locations. This initially plausible idea is contested within the contemporary psychology and philosophy of perception, where it is claimed that the visual system can represent objects as merely ‘this’ or ‘that’, in abstraction from their qualities. In this paper, I consider whether philosophical and psychological arguments connected with the rejection of the ‘bundle’ view of visual objects show that it is needed to postulate an additional, purely individualizing characteristic, known in the philosophical tradition as ‘thisness’, within the structure of visual objects. I argue that the phenomenon of asymmetry of errors observed in Multiple Object Tracking experiments strongly suggests that reference to ‘thisness’ is needed if we are to formulate a proper diachronic identity criterion of visual objects.

It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called, “Many Properties problem”, i.e. it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some elements of content as subjects, to which features are attributed by a predication-like relation. In this paper, I reconsider this solution and claim that the Many Properties problem can be solved without invoking the notion of “subject”. What is more, I argue that an alternative approach has stronger justification given the empirical data concerning human vision.

This paper argues that the accuracy of perceptual experiences cannot be properly characterized by using the particular notion of content without breaking one of the three plausible assumptions. On the other hand, the general notion of content is not threatened by this problem. The first assumption is that all elements of content determine the accuracy conditions of an experience. The second states that objects needed for the accuracy of experiences are physical entities that stand in a perceptual relation to a subject. According to the third assumption, common experiences do not have accuracy conditions that are impossible to satisfy. The above point is demonstrated by analysing illusions of identity in which the number of objects is represented incorrectly. In the concluding parts of the paper, I investigate how an alternative account of particular content can be developed by rejecting the first assumption.

W artykule analizuję sposób, w jaki psychologiczne i neuronaukowe teorie percepcji wzrokowej posługują się pojęciem przedmiotu. Skupię się na dwóch koncepcjach, które wychodząc z odmiennych perspektyw badawczych, starają się rozwiązać tzw. problem scalania (binding problem) w percepcji. W analizie wykorzystuję pojęcia używane na gruncie analitycznej metafizyki, wskazując, że teoretyczna odmienność rozważanych koncepcji przekłada się na różnice w zakładanej przez nie charakterystyce przedmiotu. W metodologicznej części tekstu staram się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak za pomocą kategorii zaczerpniętych ze współczesnej metafizyki można zanalizować używane w teoriach problemu scalania pojęcie przedmiotu. W części drugiej prezentuję wyniki analizy w odniesieniu do psychologicznej teorii FIT (Feature Integration Theory, np. Treisman 1999) oraz modelu neuronalnej synchronizacji Schillena i Königa (1994, dalej model SK).

Od opublikowania tekstu Maxa Blacka The Identity of Indiscernibles (1952) — stanowiącego locus classicus analitycznych dyskusji dotyczących obowiązywania zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych — minęło już blisko 60 lat. W rozlicznych tekstach napisanych od tego czasu niejednokrotnie zwracano uwagę, że rozwiązanie problemu w dużej mierze determinowane jest przez przyjęte założenia, np. odnośnie zaakceptowanej wersji zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych (np. Adams 1979) lub natury przestrzeni (np. O’Connor 1976). W poniższym tekście postaram się pokazać, w jaki sposób zmiany w przyjętych założeniach wpływają na wnioski dotyczące obowiązywania zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych. Dodatkowo wskażętakże na pewne związki pomiędzy koncepcjami indywidualności a rozstrzygnięciami dotyczącymi odróżnialności