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John McDowell

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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Religion
Social and Political Philosophy
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
19th Century Philosophy
17th/18th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (103)
  •  372
    Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin Wright
    In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism, De Gruyter. pp. 148--69. 1991.
    Rule-FollowingLudwig WittgensteinOrdinary Language Replies to Skepticism
  •  417
    Discussions
    Mind 99 (394): 255-266. 1990.
    Demonstratives, MiscObject-Dependent ContentsAspects of ConsciousnessConceptual and Nonconceptual Co…Read more
    Demonstratives, MiscObject-Dependent ContentsAspects of ConsciousnessConceptual and Nonconceptual Content
  •  1366
    Non-cognitivism and rule-following
    In S. Holtzman & C. M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge. pp. 141--62. 2005.
    Rule-FollowingLudwig WittgensteinMoral Noncognitivism
  •  48
    Response to Crispin Wright
    In Michael McKinsey (ed.), On Knowing Our Own Minds, Blackwell. pp. 47--62. 2002.
    Content Externalist Replies to Skepticism
  • Lecture III: Non-conceptual content
    In John Henry McDowell (ed.), Mind and world: with a new introduction, Harvard University Press. 1994.
    Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
  •  591
    Discussion of John McDowell's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality”
    with David de Bruijn, Charles Goldhaber, Andrea Kern, Declan Smithies, Alison Springle, and Bosuk Yoon
    Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 99-111. 2018.
    RationalityDisjunctivismNaive and Direct RealismPerception and Knowledge, MiscPerceptual Justificati…Read more
    RationalityDisjunctivismNaive and Direct RealismPerception and Knowledge, MiscPerceptual JustificationThe Given
  •  10
    Travis on Frege, Kant, and the given : comments on 'unlocking the outer world'
    In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Søren Overgaard (eds.), In the light of experience: new essays on perception and reasons, Oxford University Press. 2018.
    PerceptionImmanuel KantFrege: Miscellaneous
  •  5
    Are meaning, understanding, etc. definite states?
    In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press. 2010.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  38
    Singular thought and the extent of 'inner space'
    In Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context, Clarendon Press. 1986.
    Aspects of ReferenceConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentThe Experience of ObjectsDe Re Belief
  •  4
    Intentionality "de re"
    In Ernest Lepore (ed.), John Searle and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 215--25. 1991.
    Intentionality, Misc
  • Meaning, bivalence, and verificationism
    In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and meaning: essays in semantics, Clarendon Press. pp. 42--66. 1976.
    The Basis of Meaning, MiscVerificationist Theories of Meaning
  •  2
    The Varieties of Reference
    with Gareth Evans
    Philosophy 61 (238): 534-538. 1986.
    Varieties of Representation
  •  151
    Reply to John MacFarlane
    Theoria 70 (2-3): 266-270. 2004.
    Semantics
  •  162
    Physicalism and primitive denotation: Field on Tarski
    Erkenntnis 13 (1). 1978.
    Alfred TarskiSemanticsPhysicalism, MiscTarskian Theories of Truth
  •  52
    A new understanding of the foundation of linear system analysis and an extension to nonlinear cases
    with Ronald Bass and Robert Kessel
    Psychological Review 100 (3): 407-419. 1993.
  •  1199
    Might There Be External Reasons?
    In James Edward John Altham & Ross Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
    Internalism and Externalism about ReasonsBernard Williams
  •  4
    The Mcdowell Discussion
    with Donald Davidson
    Philosophy International. 1997.
    Donald Davidson
  •  343
    A Note on the Significance of the Surface Inquiry
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (3-4): 317-321. 2014.
    It is a plain fact that the backs of solid objects are not in view. This has no skeptical significance, for reasons Austin explains. Skeptical implications could attach only to a corresponding non-plain fact. This brings out a distinctive interest in Clarke’s surface inquiry.
    Skepticism, Misc
  •  3
    What is a Theory of Meaning? (edited book)
    with Gareth Evans
    Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1976.
    Meaning
  •  730
    The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 376-389. 2008.
    Perception and SkepticismDisjunctivismCartesian SkepticismWilfrid SellarsKant: Metaphysics and Epist…Read more
    Perception and SkepticismDisjunctivismCartesian SkepticismWilfrid SellarsKant: Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  375
    Lecture I
    Journal of Philosophy 95 (9): 431-450. 1998.
    Wilfrid Sellars
  •  220
    Brandom on Representation and Inference
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1): 157-162. 1997.
    Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content
  •  345
    Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of ReasonsKnowledge and the Internal
    with Robert Brandom
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4): 895. 1995.
    In “Knowledge and the Internal” John McDowell presents a deep and interesting argument. I think everything he says is true and important. Still, there are a number of points that bear expanding on in order to be properly understood. So I want to say something about his point of departure: the idea of standings in the space of reasons. And I want to fill in further the picture at which he finally arrives, by saying how I think we ought to understand knowledge as a standing in the space of reasons…Read more
    In “Knowledge and the Internal” John McDowell presents a deep and interesting argument. I think everything he says is true and important. Still, there are a number of points that bear expanding on in order to be properly understood. So I want to say something about his point of departure: the idea of standings in the space of reasons. And I want to fill in further the picture at which he finally arrives, by saying how I think we ought to understand knowledge as a standing in the space of reasons, once we have freed ourselves from a prevalent deformed conception of that space. McDowell’s strategy is to show that that conception of the space of reasons is inadequate—that it deserves to be called a ‘deformation’—by showing that it leaves no room for anything recognizable as knowledge. I’ll try to reconstruct that argument by showing what it looks like in the context of a crucial dimension of the space of reasons that McDowell never mentions: its essentially social articulation. The effect of this supplementation, I think, is not to turn a bad argument into a good one, but to turn what is already a good argument into one that further illuminates the phenomena with which it deals.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  •  2
    Response to Pettit and Smith
    In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 170--179. 2008.
    Philosophy of MindAspects of Intentionality
  •  360
    Reality and Colours: Comment on Stroud
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2): 395-400. 2004.
    Any brief comment on Barry Stroud’s fine book risks bringing some of its virtues into relief precisely by lacking them. The book’s epigraph is a passage from Wittgenstein advising philosophers to take their time. Stroud never papers over difficulties, and he allows himself to be sketchy only when it does not matter for the main line of his argument. Anyone without space constraints should take him as a model. Pleading space constraints, I shall sketch two reservations.
    Color RealismColor Irrealism
  •  139
    Conceptual Capacities in Perception
    In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität, Felix Meiner Verlag. 2006.
    Perception
  •  20
    Having the world in view: Sellars, Kant, and intentionality
    Journal of Philosophy 95 (9): 431-492. 1998.
    Naive and Direct RealismWilfrid SellarsKant: Epistemology, Misc
  •  6
    Response to Costas Pagondiotis
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 115-120. 2006.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  23
    Wittgenstein on Following a Rule1
    In Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.), Rule-Following and Meaning, Mcgill-queen's University Press. pp. 45-80. 2002.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  233
    McDowell, Davidson, and SpontaneityMind and World
    with Richard Rorty
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 389. 1998.
    20th Century Philosophy
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