Vladimir Kuznetsov

Physical cosmology is one of the disciplines at the forefront of modern science. Using existing physical theories and creating own ones, it describes the dynamics and evolution of the Universe, transforms and modernizes the scientific picture of the world on the largest possible scale. The article analyzes the main presuppositions and outcomes of nowadays cosmology, which are based on fundamental physical principles (theories) and astronomical observations. It has been revealed that throughout its existence as a science (about 100 years), cosmology stimulated the emergence of a plenty of worldview-philosophical problems. Therefore, we need a comprehensive update of the philosophy of cosmology, which can help to realize such problems. Given the need for cooperation between cosmology and the philosophy of science, we propose to use various methodological, ontological, epistemological and other philosophical techniques to solve philosophical problems arising in cosmological research, as well as to generalize the existing knowledge about the Universe.

Scientific knowledge systems function as effective and specialized apparatus for formulating, analyzing and solving scientific problems. In science, problems become internal parts of the knowledge systems; thus they acquire new forms and properties in comparison with common-sense problems. Definite theoretical structures connected with problems and questions appear in the theory. Among them are erotetic expressions and languages, calculi and algebras of problems. On the basis of the structure-nominative reconstruction of a theory, the unified treatment of these structures is given. Methods of the theory of named sets are used in the logical analysis of problems and their systems. As a consequence a new formalized model of the problem part of theory is constructed.

There are no universally adopted answers to the natural questions about scientific concepts: What are they? What is their structure? What are their functions? How many kinds of them are there? Do they change? Ironically, most if not all scientific monographs or articles mention concepts, but the scientific studies of scientific concepts are rare in occurrence. It is well known that the necessary stage of any scientific study is constructing the model of objects in question. Many years logical modeling was dominant in the concept studies. Last decades, concepts came to be regarded as the subject of mathematical modeling. However, different authors take different features of concepts as independent variables of their models. Our objective is to characterize informally the spectra of relevant variables for the modeling of scientific concepts.

Varieties of modern philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences are represented. Specific features of those sciences are analyzed on the basis of graph classifications of the respective philosophies. The importance of reconstructions of practical theories is emphasized for all kinds of philosophies of science used by them. The first part outlines the purpose of the article and considers subject and theoretical, the se- cond — evaluative, nominal, theoretical-reconstructive and linguistic-reconstructive classifica- tions of philosophies of science. The conclusions are made about the problematic application of these classifications to the philosophies of social sciences and humanities.

Knowledge Organization Ecosystems (KOEs) represent the next evolutionary stage in the management and curation of digital knowledge, demanding conceptual models that transcend static classification and embrace dynamic, multi-actor semantic processes. This paper introduces and elaborates a comprehensive triad-based conceptual architecture, in which fundamental knowledge units are modeled as structured entities composed of three interdependent and co-evolving layers: referential grounding (Base), representational encoding (Representation), and procedural-relational linkage (Linkage). This framework is philosophically grounded in the triplet model of scientific concepts, which overcomes the limitations of reductive singlet and duplet models by capturing the asynchronous evolution of a concept’s ontic commitments, symbolic forms, and the practices that bind them. Moving beyond traditional Knowledge Organization Systems (KOSs), which prioritize stable, hierarchical structures, the proposed architecture conceptualizes knowledge objects as dynamic, operationally embedded semantic entities. These entities evolve within complex digital ecosystems shaped by algorithmic mediation, collaborative curation, and institutional governance. The triad architecture directly supports semantic interoperability across distributed systems, version-managed knowledge resources that track conceptual drift, and explainable Human–Artificial Intelligence (human–AI) knowledge workflows that make semantic assumptions transparent. By aligning conceptual modeling with ontology engineering practices, knowledge graph infrastructures, and the principles of responsible AI, this paper provides a scalable, epistemically robust foundation for building transparent, accountable, and sustainable knowledge organization infrastructures. The framework is demonstrated through a detailed application scenario tracing the evolution of the ‘Open Science’ concept within the European Open Science Cloud (EOSC), illustrating the model’s utility for analyzing and designing real-world semantic infrastructures. It contributes a significant theoretical advance to the study of KOEs and offers a concrete, transferable design framework for next-generation semantic infrastructures in data-intensive, AI-mediated research and cultural heritage environments. Keywords: knowledge organization ecosystems; triplet model; triad model; semantic infrastructure; ontology engineering

Wir stellen ein präzises Modell der wissenschaftlichen Begriffs-theorie vor, in dem die Beschreibungs-, die Wirklichkeits- und die mengentheoretische Ebene verknüpft werden. Einerseits wird ein allgemeiner Rahmen für die Gesamtheit der Begriffe, andererseits die „lokale” Struktur eines Begriffs beschrieben. Wir spezialisieren diesen Rahmen auf wissenschaftliche Begriffe, wissenschaftliche Theorien, und auf die zugehörigen strukturalistischen, wissenschaftstheoretischen Konstruktionen. We introduce a precise model for the theory of concepts in philosophy of science. In this model, we connect the level of description, the level of reality and the level of set-theoretic systems. On the one hand, we describe a general frame for the collection of concepts, and on the other hand, the „local” structure of a concept. We specialize this frame to scientific concepts, scientific theories, and to the appertaining structuralist constructions from the philosophy of science.

By specific theories, we mean scientific theories that focus on particular types of material reality or phenomena, such as elementary particles, plasma, superconducting materials, quantum tunnelling, chemical reactions, gene regulation, tectonic plate movement, and the Universe. After examining various visions of the theory division into components proposed by some of the prominent scientists (Isaak Newton, James Clerk Maxwell, Heinrich Rudolf Hertz, Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem, Max Karl Ernst Ludwig Planck, Albert Einstein, Norman Robert Campbel, Percy Williams Bridgman, and Gerardus (Gerard) ’t Hooft) and philosophers of science (Carl/Karl Raimund Popper, Thomas Samuel Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Karl Feyerabend, Mario Augusto Bunge, Ronald Nelson Giere, Joseph Donald Sneed, Wolfgang Balzer, and Carlos Ulises Moulines), one finds that these visions fail to consider all essential components and omit many important details, even of the chosen components. Incomplete and undifferentiated visions, on the one hand, overlook many critical features of a theory, including its development and connections with other theories. On the other hand, such visions often generate pseudo-problems, such as the incomparability of classical and quantum theories. As theories underpin the modern sciences, such perspectives lead to oversimplified and overly general understandings of science and its progress. The article briefly emphasizes the significance and utility of the polysystemic vision of specific theories and their development within history, philosophy, sociology, and pedagogy of science. The first part of the article presents the types of components and physicists’ views of theories. The second part addresses the views of philosophers and our conclusions. We emphasize that in the first part, we described a bridge between Newton’s unfading template of scientific theory and the newest trends in the interpretation of modern physical theories. It is a clear example of the Western scientific tradition of both continuity and change, so that the final product looks different, but its structure remains stable, familiar, and convenient for professionals. That is why it is quite possible for a modern-day scientist to read Newton and find statements useful for his practical activity, not to talk about specific pearls created by the genius.

In this paper we propose an informal exposition of the structure approach in the philosophy of science. Scientific knowledge is here considered as a collection of scientific theories. Each scientific theory has logico-linguistic, model-representing, pragmatic-procedural, and problem-heuristical subsystems and a subsystem of ties. The pivotal methodological concept for the exact description of these subsystems is the named set. We also outline the possibility of applying the structure-nominative approach to certain problems in the philosophy of science.

This article challenges the direct transfer of epistemological frameworks from physics to quantum chemistry. While the "Theory's Polysystemity" model offers a powerful analytical tool, the unique nature of chemical realities, with their hierarchical and contextual complexity, necessitates substantial adaptation of this model. We argue that chemical theory is necessarily an open and dynamic system of interconnected subsystems, where procedural, inferential, and approximative systems are as central as the nomological and ontological ones. Analyzing the case of Molecular Orbital Theory via this expanded framework, we illustrate how experimental or computational "surprise" (which we reconceptualize as "material response") does not constitute an anomaly, but rather an epistemological moment that reveals the network-like interaction between subsystems and drives their evolution This article aims to establish a chemical-specific epistemological foundation that acknowledges the particularity of its complexity and paves the way for historical and practical applications.

Existence of state-supported academies of science is a distinctive feature of the fundamental-science organization in Ukraine. Their research staff is divided into two groups: (i) personal members (academicians and corresponding members) and the rest of the researchers. First-group members have numerous economic and status privileges. It is officially purported that personal members are scientifically qualified than their colleagues. We analyzed this hypothesis on the basis of international indicators of the scientifi c activity (numbers of publications in the international peer-reviewed journals and citations in them). The indicators testify that there are no distinctions between representatives of both groups being of the same age and qualifi cation. A conclusion is made that the lifelong privileges of the first group are ill-founded.

The history and use of the acronym ‘BCS’ (named after Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer) in the science of superconductivity is traced and analysed. It is shown that a number of different theories are labelled ‘BCS’. The confusion in the application of the term ‘BCS’ is shown to be common because the term ‘theory’ itself is not precisely defined in physics. Recommendations are given to physics readers and students on how to distinguish between various theories referred to as ‘BCS’. Contributions from scientists in different laboratories to the creation and formation of the superconductivity theory are indicated.

The triplet model treats a concept as complex structure that expresses three kinds of information. The first is about entities subsumed under a concept,their properties and relations. The second is about means and ways of representing the first information in intelligent systems. The third is about linkage between the first and second ones and methods of its constructing. The application of triplet models to generalization and development of concept models in philosophy, logic, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, artificial intelligence has been demonstrated. The componential structure of the triplet model and extended concept classification have been given. Theoretical considerations are combined with historical case-studies of concept history. For scientists and students with an interest in problems of knowledge structure and representation. Abstract and Extended Summary in English

Relevance. Giftedness research has produced a rich plurality of perspectives, yet the field lacks a unified framework that can account for the dynamic, multi‑layered nature of gifted development. The purpose. This article offers a novel synthesis by introducing the triad model, originally developed in the philosophy of science, as a comprehensive framework for conceptualising and fostering giftedness. Methods. Drawing on seven recent Ukrainian studies and the extensive international literature cited therein, we demonstrate that the triad model uniquely integrates the ontological, cognitive-structural, social-leadership, evolutionary, creative-integrative, methodological, and quantitative-assessment dimensions that have so far been treated in isolation. The model posits that any mature concept (including giftedness) consists of three co‑evolving components: the the referential domain and resources of giftedness Base (B); the the symbolic and cognitive frameworks used to describe and nurture it Representation (R); and the procedural, theoretical, and institutional mechanisms Linkage (L) that connect B and R. Novelty. We introduce the principle of asynchronous evolution, which explains how the three components change at different rates, creating both continuity and transformative shifts in educational practice. By applying this framework to the Ukrainian context and synthesising findings from the seven foundational studies, we show how it resolves the fragmentation in current research, provides a theoretical foundation for national talent development systems, and offers actionable guidelines for curriculum design, teacher training, and policy. Conclusion. A shift in research from static definitions to dynamic ecosystems of gifted development is needed, as well as the practical tools, including illustrative scenarios, a teacher’s guide, and an empirical research agenda, to facilitate implementation.

This article develops an epistemological and representational analysis of theoretical particle-like constructs in modern physics, using a triad-structured framework that distinguishes between referential grounding (Base), symbolic representation (Representation), and procedural-institutional linkage (Linkage). While virtual particles in quantum field theory and condensed matter serve as our primary case study, we extend our analysis to encompass the so-called quasiparticles, e.g., Bloch electrons, phonons, plasmons, and excitations renormalized by Cooper pairing in Bardeen–Cooper–Schrieffer (BCS) superconductors. Rather than interpreting these constructs as either ontically real entities or mere calculational fictions, we conceptualize them as epistemic-mediating constructs embedded within the representational infrastructure of their respective physical theories. Our comparative analysis demonstrates that the scientific effectiveness of such constructs derives from their functional integration into modeling practices, computational techniques, and community standards, rather than from strong ontic commitments. By situating our investigation within contemporary debates on scientific representation and model-based reasoning, this paper contributes to a broader epistemology of theoretical entities across different domains of physics.