Steven Burik

This article argues that Derrida’s thinking is relevant to comparative philosophy. To illustrate this, at various stages classical Daoism is compared with Derrida’s thought, to highlight Derrida’s “applicability” and to see how using Derrida can contribute to new interpretations of Daoism. The article first looks into Derrida’s engagement (or lack thereof) with non-Western thought, and then proceeds to his extensive work regarding language and translation, comparing this with views on classical Chinese language and translation of key Daoist characters. It then explores Derrida’s efforts at opening up philosophy to its outside, and argues that he was very much concerned with other ways of thinking and their possible influence on Western thought. The final section argues both that Derrida’s abiding concern with otherness and alterity forms a fertile background from which to reinvestigate traditional interpretations of classical Daoism and that employing his way of thought can lead us to interesting new perspectives on Daoism.

I argue that continental philosophical resources are more appropriate for comparative philosophy regarding classical Daoism since they in various ways challenge the dominant metaphysical orientation of Western thought and give us a better and more appropriate vocabulary to make sense of important Daoist ideas within the confines of Western languages. Since classical Daoism is largely non-metaphysical or at least not metaphysical in the same way as the Western history of philosophy is, it makes sense that those within the Western tradition who have sought to displace the dominant metaphysical tradition would be more in tune with such non-metaphysical considerations. I focus on Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida and present three interrelated areas of comparison with classical Daoism. First, I discuss the constant complication of any seriously dualist approach and with that the attempt to put humans in a constructive and primarily interdependent relationship with the rest of the world, which points to a form of process philosophy. Second, I focus on ideas regarding the use and limitations of language that both traditions display, and on the resulting efforts to understand language differently. Lastly, I present the decentering of the subject or the self is another feature prominent in both Daoism and the continental thinkers, although in different ways.

The light metaphor is a perpetual favorite for philosophers, both East and West. I seek to revaluate its opposite, darkness. I claim that there are good reasons to favor darkness over light, or at least to not see them as mutually incompatible or in hierarchical fashion. In recent Western philosophy, both Heidegger and Derrida argue that what the light metaphor represents, the promise of clarity and objectivity, is exactly what makes Western metaphysics problematic. In Chinese philosophy, classical Daoism offers a thinking that does not favor the light metaphor over its opposite. Daoists have the good sense to acknowledge darkness as a positive contribution to human life, at the very least on par with light. I argue that both the Western criticism of the light metaphor, and the Daoist approach to light and darkness, can be read as challenging the metaphysics of presence and providing an alternative way of thought.

This paper draws a comparison between Derrida’s “trace” and the idea of dao in classical Daoism. It is argued that if dao is read in a non-metaphysical way, then the Derridean idea of “trace” will show large overlaps with dao. I then show how, despite some obvious differences, a “trace” reading of dao enables a clearer understanding of dao that would see it not as a metaphysical principle, ineffable but transcendent nonetheless, but rather as an immanent working of the patterned processes that makes up both the natural and human world. I also argue that the notion of trace in classical Daoism or other characters denoting trace, are most often used in a more traditional way and hence are not useful for understanding what Derrida means with his notion of “trace.”

Eric Nelson has written a very comprehensive study of the reception of Chinese and EasternBuddhist philosophy in Western thought, with a special focus on the German thinkers of theearly twentieth century. Nelson shows great erudition in bringing together a wide variety ofthinkers from both East and West, including importantly some lesser known, but very relevantthinkers from both the Western tradition and Eastern philosophy. Although Nelson focusesmostly on the encounters and interactions between German philosophers and Chinese thinkers,his aim with this commendable book is wider. Nelson employs the encountersbetween German and Chinese thinkers in the wider context of comparative and/or interculturalphilosophy, and his aim is therefore stated as being an attempt to consider ‘whether amore nuanced and historically appropriate conception of philosophy can emerge through criticallyengaging and reflecting on the modern encounter between Western and non-Westernphilosophy, and articulating its intercultural and intertextual dynamics’.

The brief response by Rui Zhu provides an interesting take on the perennial problem of what comparative philosophy is or should be. While Zhu makes some interesting observations about and suggestions for comparative philosophy, he chooses contributions to the thinking about the possibilities and methodologies of comparative philosophy that are rather old, though, and my first wonder is: why these two papers, and not more recent contributions to the development of the methodology of comparative philosophy, as can be found in numerous recently published work? Such more recent publications tend to take a more nuanced approach to the idea of commensurability than the two essays from 1991, given the...

It is often argued that comparative philosophy is afflicted by an inherent contradiction. For in order to be truly comparative, it needs to assume some over arching position with regard to the thinkers or thoughts under comparison, to somehow stand above or beyond what is being compared. In other words, it must transcend the things under comparison. If the comparative philosopher does not undertake at least the transcendence of her own culture, then she is in danger of imposing her own standards on foreign ways of thought.