Paul Weingartner

The paper is divided into the following sections: In the first section a short historical survey is given which presents precursors of both Tarski’s truth-condition and Tarski’s truth definition . Secondly some purported objections against Tarski’s truth condition are stated and two important presuppositions of Tarski’s truth condition are analyzed. Thirdly TTC is enlarged in different ways as to incorporate the preconditions explicitly. Finally in the fourth section it will be shown how the revised T-conditions solve different versions of the Liar. All of these topics are discussed in much more detail in my forthcoming book, Chapter 7

It will be shown in this article that a pluralism of causality is needed. Not only, as might be expected, for such different domains as natural sciences and humanities, but even within the domain of physics different causal relations are necessary. This will be illustrated with examples from Classical Mechanics and Special Relativity, Thermodynamics and Quantum Mechanics. In these domains causal relations differ in their properties. A model for five types of causal relations is provided that is based on a decidable 6-valued logic.

With his theory of descriptions Russell wanted to solve two problems concerning denotation and reference, which are formulated here as Problem I and Problem II. After presenting each problem, we describe the main points of Russell’s solution. We deal with Russell’s concepts of existence and then elaborate his presuppositions concerning the relation of denoting and referring. Next we discuss the presuppositions or principles which underlie Russell’s understanding of the _objects_ of reference. These principles are such that if the objects of reference are material objects, they are objects of classical mechanics, or very close to such an interpretation. Finally we show how these principles have to be relaxed if the objects of reference are objects of quantum mechanics or special or general relativity.