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572The Semantic Significance of Faultless DisagreementPacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3): 349-371. 2014.The article investigates the significance of the so-called phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement for debates about the semantics of taste discourse. Two kinds of description of the phenomenon are proposed. The first ensures that faultless disagreement raises a distinctive philosophical challenge; yet, it is argued that Contextualist, Realist and Relativist semantic theories do not account for this description. The second, by contrast, makes the phenomenon irrelevant for the problem of wh…Read more
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379How to Condorcet a GoldmanEpisteme 12 (3): 413-425. 2015.In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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330A Puzzle About the Agnostic Response to Peer DisagreementPhilosophia 41 (4): 1253-1261. 2013.The paper argues that the view to the effect that one should suspend judgment in the face of a disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer results in a puzzle when applied to disagreements in which one party is agnostic. The puzzle is this: either the agnostic party retains her suspension of judgment, or she suspends it. The former option is discarded by proponents of the agnostic response; the latter leads the agnostic response to undermine itself
University of Modena
PhD, 2013
Madrid, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |