-
312How to Condorcet a GoldmanEpisteme 12 (3): 413-425. 2015.In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
-
309A Puzzle About the Agnostic Response to Peer DisagreementPhilosophia 41 (4): 1253-1261. 2013.The paper argues that the view to the effect that one should suspend judgment in the face of a disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer results in a puzzle when applied to disagreements in which one party is agnostic. The puzzle is this: either the agnostic party retains her suspension of judgment, or she suspends it. The former option is discarded by proponents of the agnostic response; the latter leads the agnostic response to undermine itself
University of Modena
PhD, 2013
Madrid, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |