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36On the necessity of the evidential equality condition for epistemic peerageLogos and Episteme 4 (1): 113-123. 2013.A popular definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues and share the same evidence about the targeted issue. In this paper I shall take up the challenge of defending the necessity of the evidential equality condition for a definition of epistemic peerage from criticisms that can be elicited from the literature on peer disagreement. The paper discusses two definitions that drop this conditi…Read more
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306Disagreement, Credences, and Outright BeliefRatio 31 (2): 179-196. 2018.This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences and disagreements involving outright beliefs? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's…Read more
University of Modena
PhD, 2013
Madrid, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |