Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh

Medical practice is practiced morality, and clinical research belongs to normative ethics. The present book elucidates and advances this thesis by: 1. analyzing the structure of medical language, knowledge, and theories; 2. inquiring into the foundations of the clinical encounter; 3. introducing the logic and methodology of clinical decision-making, including artificial intelligence in medicine; 4. suggesting comprehensive theories of organism, life, and psyche; of health, illness, and disease; of etiology, diagnosis, prognosis, prevention, and therapy; and 5. investigating the moral and metaphysical issues central to medical practice and research. Many systems of (classical, modal, non-classical, probability, and fuzzy) logic are introduced and applied. Fuzzy medical deontics, fuzzy medical ontology, fuzzy medical concept formation, fuzzy medical decision-making and biomedicine and many other techniques of fuzzification in medicine are introduced for the first time.

ZusammenfassungWas ist praktisches Wissen?Die Diskussion über diese Frage hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten darauf konzentriert, das praktische Wissen als ein Wissen- wie aufzufassen. Im Folgenden wird eine weitere Differenzierung dieser Ansicht vorgenommen, indem durch eine Analyse der Syntax des klinischpraktischen Wissens dafür geworben wird, dieses Wissen als eine Kategorie von bedingten Geboten für das ärztliche Handeln in der klinischen Entscheidungsfindung zu betrachten. Syntaktisch gesehen, sind diese Gebote deontische Normen („conditional obligations“). Da sie durch die diagnostisch-therapeutische Forschung (= klinische Forschung) aufgestellt und erforscht werden, muss die klinische Forschung als eine deontische Disziplin angesehen werden. Sie ist deshalb dem Bereich der normativen Ethik zuzuordnen. Im direkten Zusammenhang damit ist die klinische Praxis – als eine überzeitliche Institution, nicht als das Handeln von Einzelpersonen – als praktizierte Moral im Dienste der Menschen („Karitas“) einzustufen, weil sie aus dem Versuch besteht, jene Gebote umzusetzen.

This book is a collection of contributions written by philosophers and scientists active in different fields, such as mathematics, logics, social sciences, computer sciences and linguistics. They comment on and discuss various parts of and subjects and propositions introduced in the Handbook of Analytical Philosophy of Medicine from Kadem Sadegh-Zadeh, published by Springer in 2012. This volume reports on the fruitful exchange and debate that arose in the fuzzy community upon the publication of the Handbook. This was not only very much appreciated by the community but also seen as a critical starting point for beginning a new discussion. The results of this discussion, which involved many different perspectives from science and the humanities and was warmly encouraged by Kadem Sadegh-Zadeh himself, are accurately reported in this volume, which is intended to be a critical companion to Kadem Sadegh-Zadeh ́s handbook. Rudolf Seising is currently an adjunct researcher at the European Centre for Soft Computing in Mieres, Asturias (Spain) and a college lecturer at the Faculty of History and Arts, at the Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich (Germany). Marco Elio Tabacchi is currently the Scientific Director of the Italian National Research & Survey Organization Demopolis, and a research assistant in the Soft Computing Group at University of Palermo (Italy).

What follows is a brief comment on Ludwik Fleck's paper on the foundations of medical knowledge translated by Thaddeus J. Trenn in this issue. Since the original is much older than I am, I have some scruples in presenting the critical thoughts which occurred to me when I read it a few years ago. Despite the criticism, I am very sympathetic to most of what Fleck has told us in his tragically neglected work. Two facts make Fleck's tragedy even more disturbing: (i) others have given rise to post-Fleck revolutions in epistemology by exploiting his ideas while omitting proper references to him, and (ii) sociology of science, precisely what Fleck wanted to promote, has emerged without his work being operative in any sense. In my commentary, I shall examine his concept of social conditioning of knowledge. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

The brief sketch of the problematic character of the traditional semantic conception of meaning demonstrated that meaning cannot be separated from the role the users of a language play in their communication with one another. One of the features of this role is the control of the language use and verbal behavior of individuals by the community. It is thus the community that determines and judges what words and sentences ‘mean’. This is just indicative of the pragmatic dimension of language. Consequently, what medical terms and sentences ‘mean’, and what someone ‘means’ by using a particular medical term or sentence, also depends on pragmatic contexts and circumstances. To understand the importance and practical consequences of this pragmatic perspective, we will now consider the following three central aspects: 3.1 The So-Called Language Games, 3.2 Assertion, Acceptance, and Rejection, 3.3 Speech Acts in Medicine, 3.4 The Pragmatic Impact of Medical Language, 3.5 The Communal Origin of Medical Language.

In Western culture, human medicine has evolved as a healing profession, and as such, it is oriented toward curing sick people, caring for sick people, preventing maladies, and promoting health. This orientation is primarily centered around the healing relationship, a relationship that is usually thought of as a dyadic structure, comprising the physician and the patient. Venerable terms such as “the physician-patient relationship” and “the doctor-patient interaction” reflect this view. A closer look at the structure of a healing relationship reveals, however, that it is more complex than a dyadic structure. For the doctor is not the only determinant of the healing relationship. There are additional components that shape it and its success or failure. Among these components are, for example, the physician’s assistants and the patient’s family members. This complex, polyadic healing structure with its function, effects, and defects will be the subject of our concern in the next chapter. It embraces the physician as one of its most important components.

In a previous paper the concept of disease was fuzzy-logically analyzed and a sketch was given of a prototype resemblance theory of disease (Sadegh-Zadeh (2000). J. Med. Philos., 25:605–38). This theory is outlined in the present paper. It demonstrates what it means to say that the concept of disease is a nonclassical one and, therefore, not amenable to traditional methods of inquiry. The theory undertakes a reconstruction of disease as a category that in contradistinction to traditional views is not based on a set of common features of its members, that is individual diseases, but on a few best examples of the category, called its prototypes, and a similarity relationship such that a human condition is considered a disease if it resembles a prototype. It enables new approaches to resolving many of the stubborn problems associated with the concept of disease

As a science and practice of intervention and control, medicine is concerned with cure and care, the promotion and protection of health, and the prevention of maladies and human suffering. This wide-ranging task is accomplished through medical practice and medical research, though no sharp boundary between them can be drawn. A widespread misconception about medicine has it that medicine is concerned with illness and disease. However, the subject of medicine is the patient, i.e., Homo patiens, but not illness or disease, with the ends being directed toward the relief, prevention of human suffering, and saving human life. Accordingly, medicine needs a theory of the patient first of all. Nosology and pathology as studies of illness and disease may be viewed as elements of such a theory of the Homo patiens. Seen from this perspective, clinical research and practice are to be based on the question: What is a patient? That is, what characteristics distinguish a patient from a non-patient? The present chapter is concerned with this question. The inquiry into what a patient, i.e., Homo patiens, is, intersects with anthropology that is concerned with the question of what is a human being? This is the fundamental philosophical question of medicine because, as an experimental and diagnostic-therapeutic discipline, it undertakes momentous interventions in human life. It therefore needs an image of the human being so as to ascertain whether medical interventions are in accord with, or contravene, that image. For example, it is a legitimate question to ask whether the transplantation of animal cells, tissues, and organs into humans, i.e., xenotransplantation, or whether the designing of offspring by genetic engineering, is morally permissible. Since anthropology is basically a philosophical endeavor, medicine at its foundations turns out to intersect with philosophy. We shall consider the patient as a bio-psycho-social agent who is suffering or whose life is threatened by some occurrences inside or outside of her body, usually called diseases, pathogenic environments, etc. Our aim is to understand what these occurrences may look like and how they may be conceptualized, systematized, recognized, causally analyzed, and controlled. Thus, our discussion consists of the following five sections: 7.1 The Suffering Individual; 7.2 The Bio-Psycho-Social Agent; 7.3 Health, Illness, and Disease; 7.4 Systems of Disease; 7.5 Etiology (= Science of Clinical Causation).

At least as important as a particular item of medical knowledge itself is to know something about the relationships of that knowledge to the experiential world it is talking about. The reason is that the patients the physician is concerned with are parts of that experiential world. So, when using any knowledge in her practice, e.g., some knowledge on infectious diseases, a morally conscientious doctor will be interested in whether, and in what way, this knowledge relates to the ‘world out there’. Does the medical knowledge she employs bear any relevance to the bodies and souls of her patients? Does it enable her to understand the patient’s suffering, illness experience, and illness narrative? Will it help her find useful diagnoses and treatments? Are there in fact any indicators of such qualities of medical knowledge? Why not use astrology, Ayurveda, or exorcism instead of the theory of infectious diseases? A prerequisite for dealing with such questions is the awareness of the relationships between medical knowledge and its referent, i.e., of the semantics of medical knowledge, on the one hand; and of the pragmatic factors beyond this semantics, which influence the role medical knowledge plays in health care, on the other, e.g., social and economic processes. In the present chapter, we shall look at these issues with an eye toward understanding why some particular information is allowed to enter the medical world as knowledge, whereas other information is considered unacceptable or quackery. Is there a clear line of demarcation between medical knowledge and self-deception? To begin with, we will discuss the issues of truth and justification because, as pointed out in Section 10.1 on page 402, knowledge is traditionally defined as justified true belief . These two defining features of knowledge, truth and justifiedness, are due to the classical conception of knowledge as the representation of some ‘reality’. This ancient, representational postulate brings with it that the predominant view on the semantics of medical knowledge is realism, i.e., the view that medical knowledge is concerned with and represents ‘the real world out there’. We shall therefore need to inquire into the philosophy and medical relevance of this doctrine before we proceed to alternative views. Our discussion thus divides into the following five parts: 12.1 Justified True Belief; 12.2 Realism; 12.3 Anti-Realism; 12.4 Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism in Medicine; 12.5 Social Epistemology.