Michael Tooley

According to the Special Theory of Relativity, there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity, contrary to the view defended in the book. However, this chapter demonstrates that the Special Theory of Relativity can be modified so as to allow absolute simultaneity. This modification involves reference to absolute space and the causal relations between space‐time points, and drops the assumption that the one‐way speed of light is constant through all frames of reference. Contrary to the orthodox theory, the modified version has the additional advantage of avoiding a clash with quantum mechanics, such as brought out by the Einstein‐Podolsky‐Rosen thought experiment and Bell's Theorem.

Discusses an argument from preventability to the effect that the past and the present are real, while the future is not. The argument draws on an analysis of ‘It is a fact that p at time t’ as ‘p, and it is logically impossible for there to exist anyone who would have been able, at t, to prevent it from being the case that p’. However, there are two strong objections to the argument from preventability, one relating to backward causation and causal loops, and one relating to the truth conditions for subjunctive conditionals.

Defends both the concepts of truth at a time and of truth simpliciter. It rejects arguments against truth at a time, according to which this concept involves a confusion between propositions and propositional functions. It argues that tensed views of time should employ three valued logics, and that alleged problems with the latter can be overcome by distinguishing between factual truth and logical truth. Finally, the chapter defends the concept of truth simpliciter: Tensed views of time still require this concept so as to apply it to propositions involving atemporal entities.

Gives a brief summary of the results reached in the book and their advantages. It recapitulates the differences between the dynamic view of the world defended in the book and traditional tensed conceptions of time. While the latter hold that tensed facts are fundamental, the former holds that tensed facts reduce to tenseless facts even in a dynamic world, where what tenseless facts there are depends on what time it is. The different roles of causation for the present approach are summed up: Causation defines the direction of time, and can be used to analyse temporal relations; There can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not.

The fundamental issue with which John Bishop is concerned in this book is the compatibility of a naturalistic perspective on the world with an ethical perspective in which we view people as performing actions for which they are morally responsible. In the first chapter Bishop outlines the basic problem. Traditionally, there has seemed to be a prima facie conflict between freedom and determinism. Bishop argues that this is a mistake and that there is, in fact, a much more fundamental problem--one that exists regardless of whether or not determinism is true. The basic difficulty, he contends, is that our concept of an action seems to involve the idea of behavior which is caused by an agent, whereas the only type of causation that is countenanced by scientific theories, be they deterministic or indeterministic, is causation among events or states of affairs. The question, then, is how there can be agents in a world where all causation is event-causation.

Discusses several philosophical objections against the view of time defended in the book. Objections against the unreality of the future that relate to bivalence are rejected by denying that disjunction is truth‐functional. The charge that a vicious regress of meta‐times is entailed is shown not to apply to the dynamic view defended here. Mellor's and Dummett's variants of McTaggart's argument against the reality of time are rejected, as are independent arguments of Mellor's against the reality of tensed facts.

Completes the defence of the claim that tenseless concepts are more basic than tensed ones. It argues for three theses. First, not all tensed statements involve indexicals, and those that do not are analytically more basic. Second, these non‐indexical tensed statements can be used to give truth conditions for indexical tensed statements. Third, non‐indexical tensed statements can be analysed in terms of tenseless statements together with the concept of what is actual as of, or true at, a given time. In particular, the tensed concept of lying in the present can be analysed following this strategy.

This essay deals with the morality of abortion. We argue that abortion is morally unobjectionable and that society benefits if abortion is available on demand. We begin by setting out a preliminary case in support of the practice of abortion. We then examine moral objections to abortion and show why those objections are unsound. We conclude by considering what properties something needs in order to have a serious right to life, and we show that a human fetus does not possess those properties. Thus, since there is no moral objection to abortion, the practice must be viewed as both permissible and desirable, in the light of the advantages outlined in the first section of our paper.

The term "positivism" is generally used to refer to philosophical approaches that involve the acceptance of a verifiability principle. In this book, however, Richard Miller uses the term with a somewhat different sense, according to which "positivism is the assumption that the most important methodological notions--for example, explanation, confirmation and the identification of one entity with another--can each be applied according to rules that are the same for all sciences and historical periods, that are valid a priori, and that only require knowledge of the internal content of the propositions involved for their effective application". Miller maintains that positivism, so understood, is fundamentally flawed. At the same time, however, he does not wish to embrace either a relativistic view of scientific theories--such as has been advanced by Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty--or an antirealist view--defended, for example, by Bas van Fraassen. Miller attempts, therefore, to develop an alternative approach to the philosophy of science that, on the one hand, will avoid the difficulties which positivism encounters, and, on the other, will provide a satisfactory foundation for a defense of scientific realism.

Provides an analysis of temporal relations in causal terms. Qualitative temporal relations, that is, the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority, are analysed in terms of actual causal relations and spatial relations. A reduction of quantitative temporal relations, such as the relation of temporal distance, in causal terms is feasible as well, but, the chapter argues, a realist view should be preferred. The causal theory of time put forward is defended against charges of circularity and against putative counterexamples.

The invitation that I received indicated that the "Dewey Foundation's intent is to have senior American philosophers reflect on their careers in philosophy, taking a generally broad perspective," and it said that "Dewey Lecturers in the past have usually included some account of their philosophical education and some views on the state of the profession, or the ways in which it has changed through their careers." I shall attempt to follow this invitation, though when I turn to some remarks on the state of the profession, I shall focus somewhat closely on one problem area in which I am especially interested.

Chapter 1 addresses some preliminary issues that it is important to think about in formulating arguments from evil. Chapter 2 is then concerned with the question of how an incompatibility argument from evil is best formulated, and with possible responses to such arguments. Chapter 3 then focuses on skeptical theism, and on the work that skeptical theists need to do if they are to defend their claim of having defeated incompatibility versions of the argument from evil. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses evidential arguments from evil, and four different kinds of evidential argument are set out and critically examined.

Is there a prima facie obligation to produce additional individuals whose lives would be worth living? In his paper ‘Is it Good to Make Happy People?’, Stuart Rachels argues not only that there is, but, also, that precisely as much weight should be assigned to the quality of life that would be enjoyed by such potential persons, if they were to be actualized, as to the quality of life enjoyed by actually existing persons. In response, I shall argue, first, that Rachels’ view is exposed to very serious objections, and secondly, that his arguments in support of his position involve a crucial assumption, which cannot be sustained, concerning the relation between, on the one hand, propositions about good‐making and bad‐making properties, and, on the other, propositions about right‐making and wrong‐making ones. I shall then argue that there is a very plausible position concerning the conditions under which an action can be morally wrong which entails the following asymmetry: there is a prima facie obligation not to bring into existence individuals whose lives are not worth living, but there is no corresponding obligation to create additional individuals whose lives would be worth living.

This paper is concerned with the question of the truth conditions of nomological statements. My fundamental thesis is that it is possible to set out an acceptable, noncircular account of the truth conditions of laws and nomological statements if and only if relations among universals - that is, among properties and relations, construed realistically - are taken as the truth-makers for such statements. My discussion will be restricted to strictly universal, nonstatistical laws. The reason for this limitation is not that I feel there is anything dubious about the concept of a statistical law, nor that I feel that basic laws cannot be statistical. The reason is methodological. The case of strictly universal, nonstatistical laws would seem to be the simplest case. If the problem of the truth conditions of laws can be solved for this simple subcase, one can then investigate whether the solution can be extended to the more complex cases. I believe that the solution I propose here does have that property, though I shall not pursue that question here.1