Lea Ypi

This chapter explores Kant’s analysis of systematic unity in relation to the question of whether there are any laws of nature and, if so, whether they can be known by us. The chapter begins by noting how Kant’s theory of systematic unity has inspired different accounts of the laws of nature and explores the relation between a necessitarian account of laws and a reflection-based one. Focusing in particular on the Critique of Pure Reason, I suggest that Kant’s analysis of systematic unity relies on a principle of purposiveness which is not based on the analogy with reason’s practical causality but on an assumption of natural purposiveness indebted to Kant’s earlier theory of germs and dispositions. The difficulty of reconciling his pre-critical views on natural purposiveness with the analysis of scientific laws put forward in the first Critique is, I suggest, what leads Kant to abandon the proto-necessitarian theory in favor of an alternative, reflection-based, account.

Matteo Bonotti’s book on Partisanship and Public Reason in Diverse Societies is grounded on a theory of partisanship that sees the demands of public reason as internal to the very definition of a party. Bonotti suggests that partisanship is not only compatible with but essential to the stability and legitimacy of a well-ordered liberal society. My paper aims to raise some questions internal to the liberal account of partisanship so as to probe the methodological foundations and plausibility of the liberal framework taken as a whole. My argument is that the assumption of a sufficiently just liberal society on which the book grounds its defence of partisanship makes us ill-equipped to face some of the most critical challenges that liberal societies face in the world that we live.

This article defends the importance of the idea of historical progress for constructivist justifications of moral normativity inspired by Kant’s analysis of practical reason. Focusing on some key methodological requirements that must be satisfied for the constructivist vindication of practical normativity to succeed, the article focuses on the concept of purposiveness as it develops within Kant’s moral and political philosophy. It concludes that without a critical notion of ‘purposiveness’ and related philosophical analysis of history, the constructivist rejection of scepticism is at risk of circularity.

This article aims to contextualise, explain and defend the relevance of Marx’s analysis of the dictatorship of the proletariat for contemporary debates on political legitimacy. I call my reconstruction of the Marxist contribution to this debate: the limited legitimacy theory of political authority. Such a theory, I contend, offers a plausible alternative to existing liberal and anarchist accounts and has important implications for a number of key debates in political theory, including the normative significance of the state, the relationship between authority and freedom, the role of democracy, and the meaning and relevance of communist utopia.

Written by an international team of leading political and legal theory scholars whose writings have contributed to shaping the field, Migration in Political Theory presents seminal new work on the ethics of movement and membership. The volume addresses challenging and under-researched themes on the subject of migration, and debates the question of whether we ought to recognize a human right to immigrate, and whether it might be legitimate to restrict emigration. The authors critically examine criteria for selecting would-be migrants, and for acquiring citizenship, as well as the tensions between the claims of immigrants and existing residents, and tackle questions of migrant worker exploitation and responsibility for refugees. All of the chapters illustrate the importance of drawing on the tools of political theory to clarifying, criticize and challenge the current terms of the migration debate

In this article, we examine how language and linguistic membership might feature in luck egalitarianism, what a luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice would look like, and, finally, what the emphasis on language teaches us about the validity of standard luck-egalitarian assumptions. We show that belonging to one language group rather than another is a morally arbitrary feature and that where membership of a specific linguistic group affects individual chances, the effects of such bad brute luck ought to be neutralized on the luck-egalitarian view. We assess two ways of redressing those kinds of unjustified inequalities: the ‘universal language’ option and the ‘linguistic advantages for all’ option. But we also argue, in the second part, that exploring luck egalitarianism through the lens of language exposes some difficulties intrinsic in many existent luck-egalitarian theories. We argue that treating circumstances one identifies with as choices is problematic. In addition, we argue that the linguistic preconditions of both the capacity to be responsible as well the exercise of responsibility complicate the idea of individual responsibility on which most luck-egalitarian theories rely. We conclude by suggesting the need to develop a luck-egalitarian theory of justice which is less reliant on causal features of the distinction between choice and circumstance and which is more sensitive to the idea of collective cooperation as opposed to individual responsibility.

This chapter examines the relation between colonialism and commerce in Kant’s political writings, linking Kant’s thought on these issues to the teleology that developed from his 1784 essay on universal history to the _Critique of Judgment_ and later political writings. Starting by discussing the place of race and commerce in Kant’s earlier political writings, and linking it to the account of germs and dispositions in his philosophy of biology, the chapter illustrates how Kant’s thought moves from a positive evaluation of the contribution of the commercial spirit to the development of moral dispositions to one of increasing scepticism towards the unregulated expansion of trade and subsequent colonialism. It is argued that this development coincides with Kant’s increased emphasis on the conscious role played by human agents in historical transformation and a more nuanced, reflective account of the relation between natural teleology and the process of moral development of human beings.

This paper makes the case for amnesty of irregular migrants by reflecting on the conditions under which a wrong that is done in the past can be considered superseded. It explores the relation between historical injustice and irregular migration and suggests that we should hold states to the same stringent standards of compliance with just norms that they apply to the assessment of the moral conduct of individual migrants. It concludes that those standards ought to orient migrants and citizens’ moral assessment of how their states handle questions of irregular migration and to inform political initiatives compatible with these moral assessments.

© © Cambridge University Press 2015. Long-term immigrants often have the option but not the obligation to acquire citizenship in their state of residence. Contrary to the received wisdom, this article defends the idea of mandatory citizenship for immigrants. It suggests that the current asymmetry in the distribution of political obligations between native-born citizens and immigrants is unfair. It also argues that mandatory citizenship is required by the principle that those who persistently affect others should share a democratic setting. Finally, it claims that mandatory citizenship is more compatible with the ideal of democratic equality and more conducive to a stable society.