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Possible worlds and possibiliaIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
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104Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal SemanticsPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (254): 163-166. 2014.
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24Quinean Scepticism About De Re Modality After David LewisEuropean Journal of Philosophy 15 (1): 40-62. 2007.
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88The analysis of possibility and the possibility of analysisProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2). 1997.
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152Kant's criteria of the a prioriPacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1). 1999.Kant states that necessity and strict universality are criteria of a priori knowledge. Interpreting this dictum standardly and straightforwardly in respect of necessity, it is inconsistent with there being necessary a posteriori truths or contingent a priori truths (cf Kripke). This straightforward interpretation may convict Kant of understandable error (at worst) in the case of necessity, but it is so uncharitable in the case of strict universality that we ought to seek an alternative. I offer …Read more
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112Best opinion, intention-detecting and analytic functionalismPhilosophical Quarterly 44 (175): 239-245. 1994.
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23VIII*—The Analysis of Possibility and the Possibility of AnalysisProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1): 141-160. 1997.John Divers; VIII*—The Analysis of Possibility and the Possibility of Analysis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages
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326Quinean scepticism about de re modality after David LewisEuropean Journal of Philosophy 15 (1). 2007.
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154Modal Reality and (Modal) Logical SpacePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3): 726-733. 2014.
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107Genuine modal realism: Still limitedMind 115 (459): 731-740. 2006.In this reply, we defend our argument for the incompleteness of Genuine Modal Realism against Paseau's criticisms. Paseau claims that isomorphic set of worlds represent the same possibilities, but not only is this implausible, it is inimical to the target of our paper: Lewis's theory of possible worlds. We argue that neither Paseau's model-theoretic results nor his comparison to arithmetic carry over to GMR. We end by distinguishing two notions of incompleteness and urge that, for all that Pasea…Read more
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82Supervenience for operatorsSynthese 106 (1): 103-12. 1996.The modal primitivist who takes a sentential possibility operator as her only modal resource can provide adequate representations of the familiar concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience. The primitivist representations of these concepts can be applied to provide adequate interpretations of speciflc supervenience theses which will be considered. Moreover the modal primitivist is no better and no worse placed than the genuine modal realist to present supervenience as a simple and unifl…Read more
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122The Analysis of Possibility and the Extent of PossibilityDialectica 67 (2): 183-200. 2013.In section 1 I motivate and execute the presentation of a well-defined Lewisian conception of analysis and of what it would be to analyse modality successfully. That conception is then put to two applications. In section 2 various inadequacies are exposed in a (recently popular) separatist approach to the understanding and/or evaluation of Lewis's analysis of modality. Section 3 provides a defence against a resilient argument for the claim that Lewis's analysis of modality cannot be fully reduct…Read more
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409Possible-worlds semantics without possible worlds: The agnostic approachMind 115 (458): 187-226. 2006.If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds (genuine or ersatz). But if we consider an applied theory (an application of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible worlds, then assertion of such a theory, taken at face-value, does appear to bring commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds. Or …Read more
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6Modal CommitmentsIn Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2009.This chapter has three principal aims. Firstly, to promote interest in the question of the function, or utility, of judgements of modality. Secondly, to endorse an alternative to orthodox contemporary methodology, advocating that we prioritize the question of function in modal philosophy. Thirdly, to consider among our modal judgements exactly which are the proper and exact source of various different kinds of substantial philosophical commitments in ontology, epistemology, and elsewhere. An ill…Read more
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137Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise, by Takashi Yagisawa (review)Mind 120 (478): 570-574. 2011.
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32Review of Robert Stalnaker, Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (11). 2004.
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73Modal supereminence and modal realismTheoria 58 (2-3): 99-115. 1992.Colin McGinn proposes that acceptance of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is the natural form of expression of a non-objectual realism about modality. Here, some of the difficulties that arise in applying theses of supervenience to the modal-actual case are discussed. It is then argued: 1)that the truth of many such theses is determined on uncontroversial modal logical and conceptual grounds, and 2) that this and other independent considerations render it highly implausible that the …Read more
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77Arithmaetical platonism: Reliability and judgement-dependencePhilosophical Studies 95 (3): 277-310. 1999.
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74The modal fictionalist predicamentIn Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality, Oxford University Press. pp. 57. 2006.
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215Possible WorldsRoutledge. 2002._Possible Worlds_ presents the first up-to-date and comprehensive examination of one of the most important topics in metaphysics. John Divers considers the prevalent philosophical positions, including realism, antirealism and the work of important writers on possible worlds such as David Lewis, evaluating them in detail
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208A genuine realist theory of advanced modalizingMind 108 (430): 217-239. 1999.The principle of modal ubiquity - that every truth is necessary or contingent - and the validity of possibility introduction, are principles that any modal theory suffers for failing to accommodate. Advanced modal claims are modal claims about entities other than spatiotemporally unified individuals (perhaps, then, spatiotemporally disunified individuals, sets, numbers, properties, propositions and events). I show that genuine modal realism, as it has thus far been explicitly developed, and in s…Read more
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134An inconvenient modal truthAnalysis 74 (4): 575-577. 2014.There is a de re modal truth that proves inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. For this truth requires on that theory, the existence of things (counterparts) that exist in distinct worlds but are also spatiotemporally related
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171Agnosticism about other worlds: A new antirealist programme in modalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3). 2004.The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but…Read more
University of Glasgow
PhD, 1990
Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |