•  409
    If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds (genuine or ersatz). But if we consider an applied theory (an application of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible worlds, then assertion of such a theory, taken at face-value, does appear to bring commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds. Or …Read more
  •  6
    Modal Commitments
    In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    This chapter has three principal aims. Firstly, to promote interest in the question of the function, or utility, of judgements of modality. Secondly, to endorse an alternative to orthodox contemporary methodology, advocating that we prioritize the question of function in modal philosophy. Thirdly, to consider among our modal judgements exactly which are the proper and exact source of various different kinds of substantial philosophical commitments in ontology, epistemology, and elsewhere. An ill…Read more
  •  76
    Modal supereminence and modal realism
    Theoria 58 (2-3): 99-115. 1992.
    Colin McGinn proposes that acceptance of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is the natural form of expression of a non-objectual realism about modality. Here, some of the difficulties that arise in applying theses of supervenience to the modal-actual case are discussed. It is then argued: 1)that the truth of many such theses is determined on uncontroversial modal logical and conceptual grounds, and 2) that this and other independent considerations render it highly implausible that the …Read more
  •  140
    Genuine modal realism limited
    with Joseph Melia
    Mind 112 (445): 83-86. 2003.
  •  79
    Arithmaetical platonism: Reliability and judgement-dependence
    Philosophical Studies 95 (3): 277-310. 1999.
  •  76
    The modal fictionalist predicament
    with Jason Hagen
    In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality, Oxford University Press. pp. 57. 2006.
  •  217
    Possible Worlds
    Routledge. 2002.
    _Possible Worlds_ presents the first up-to-date and comprehensive examination of one of the most important topics in metaphysics. John Divers considers the prevalent philosophical positions, including realism, antirealism and the work of important writers on possible worlds such as David Lewis, evaluating them in detail
  •  98
    Critical notice: Rethinking realism
    Mind 103 (412): 519-534. 1994.
  •  112
    Advanced modalizing de dicto and de re
    Analysis 78 (3): 415-425. 2018.
    Lewis’ analysis of modality faces a problem in that it appears to confer unintended truth values to certain modal claims about the pluriverse: e.g. ‘It is possible that there are many worlds’ is false when we expect truth. This is the problem of advanced modalizing. Divers presents a principled solution to this problem by treating modal modifiers as semantically redundant in some such cases. However, this semantic move does not deal adequately with advanced de re modal claims. Here, we motivate …Read more
  •  265
    The analytic limit of genuine modal realism
    with Joseph Melia
    Mind 111 (441): 15-36. 2002.
    According to the Genuine Modal Realist, there is a plurality of possible worlds, each world nothing more than a maximally inter-related spatiotemporal sum. One advantage claimed for this position is that it offers us the resources to analyse, in a noncircular manner, the modal operators. In this paper, we argue that the prospects for such an analysis are poor. For the analysis of necessity as truth in all worlds to succeed it is not enough that no modal concepts be used in the realist's account …Read more
  •  58
    On the prohibitive cost of indiscernible concrete possible worlds
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3). 1994.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  202
    Coincidence and form
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1): 119-137. 2008.
    I compare a Lewisian defence of monism with Kit Fine's defence of pluralism. I argue that the Lewisian defence is, at present, the clearer in its explanatory intent and ontological commitments. I challenge Fine to explain more fully the nature of the entities that he postulates and the relationship between continuous material objects and the parts of those rigid embodiments in terms of which he proposes to explain crucial, modal and sortal, features of those objects.
  •  128
    Belief in Absolute Necessity
    with José Edgar González-Varela
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 358-391. 2012.
    We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher-order attitudes involving two distinct kinds of supposition (A-suppo…Read more
  • Possible worlds and possibilia
    In Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
  •  137
    Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction
    Analysis 72 (4): 824-831. 2012.
  •  24
    Quinean Scepticism About De Re Modality After David Lewis
    European Journal of Philosophy 15 (1): 40-62. 2007.
  •  155
    Kant's criteria of the a priori
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1). 1999.
    Kant states that necessity and strict universality are criteria of a priori knowledge. Interpreting this dictum standardly and straightforwardly in respect of necessity, it is inconsistent with there being necessary a posteriori truths or contingent a priori truths (cf Kripke). This straightforward interpretation may convict Kant of understandable error (at worst) in the case of necessity, but it is so uncharitable in the case of strict universality that we ought to seek an alternative. I offer …Read more
  •  23
    VIII*—The Analysis of Possibility and the Possibility of Analysis
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1): 141-160. 1997.
    John Divers; VIII*—The Analysis of Possibility and the Possibility of Analysis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages
  •  21
    Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3): 660-685. 2004.
    The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world‐talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but…Read more
  •  210
    A genuine realist theory of advanced modalizing
    Mind 108 (430): 217-239. 1999.
    The principle of modal ubiquity - that every truth is necessary or contingent - and the validity of possibility introduction, are principles that any modal theory suffers for failing to accommodate. Advanced modal claims are modal claims about entities other than spatiotemporally unified individuals (perhaps, then, spatiotemporally disunified individuals, sets, numbers, properties, propositions and events). I show that genuine modal realism, as it has thus far been explicitly developed, and in s…Read more
  •  137
    An inconvenient modal truth
    Analysis 74 (4): 575-577. 2014.
    There is a de re modal truth that proves inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. For this truth requires on that theory, the existence of things (counterparts) that exist in distinct worlds but are also spatiotemporally related