•  114
    In Defence of Ockhamism
    Philosophia 40 (3): 617-631. 2012.
    Ockhamism implies that future contingents may be true, their historical contingency notwithstanding. It is thus opposed to both the Peircean view according to which all future contingents are false, and Supervaluationist Indeterminism according to which all future contingents are neither true nor false. The paper seeks to defend Ockhamism against two charges: the charge that it cannot meet the requirement that truths be grounded in reality, and the charge that it proves incompatible with objecti…Read more
  •  445
    Frege, relativism and faultless disagreement
    In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford University Press. pp. 225. 2008.
  •  89
    Fallibility and Trust
    Noûs 49 (3): 616-641. 2015.
    I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far-reaching consequences for our account o…Read more
  •  103
    Fitch back in action again?
    Analysis 64 (1): 67-71. 2004.
  • Analyomen 1
    De Gruyter. 1994.
  •  96
    Realism about tense is the view that the contrast between what was, what is and what will be the case is real, and not merely a projection of our ways of thinking. Does this view entail realism about temporal passage, namely the view that time really passes, in the same sense of ‘real’? We argue that the answer is affirmative for many versions of tense realism, and indeed for all sensible versions. We thereby address an important conceptual issue regarding these two forms of realism and rebut re…Read more
  •  1
    Agnosticism and Vagueness
    In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  40
    The Formalities of Temporaryism without Presentness
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 61 (2): 181-202. 2020.
    Temporaryism—the view that not always everything always exists—comes in two main versions: presentism and expansionism (aka the growing block theory of time). Both versions of the view are commonly formulated using the notion of being present, which we, among others, find problematic. Expansionism is also sometimes accused of requiring extraordinary conceptual tools for its formulation. In this paper, we put forward systematic characterizations of presentism and expansionism which involve neithe…Read more
  •  16
    A review of Eccles' arguments for dualist-interactionism (review)
    In Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 1, De Gruyter. pp. 689-694. 1994.
  •  257
    Agnosticism as a third stance
    Mind 116 (461): 55-104. 2007.
    Within certain philosophical debates, most notably those concerning the limits of our knowledge, agnosticism seems a plausible, and potentially the right, stance to take. Yet, in order to qualify as a proper stance, and not just the refusal to adopt any, agnosticism must be shown to be in opposition to both endorsement and denial and to be answerable to future evidence. This paper explicates and defends the thesis that agnosticism may indeed define such a third stance that is weaker than sceptic…Read more
  •  105
    Being in a Position to Know and Closure: Reply to Heylen
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1): 68-72. 2016.
  •  177
    Presentism without Presentness
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1): 19-27. 2015.
    We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds…Read more
  •  382
    On the relation between modality and tense
    with Fabrice Correia
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (6): 586-604. 2020.
    ABSTRACT We critically review two extant paradigms for understanding the systematic interaction between modality and tense, as well as their respective modifications designed to do justice to the contingency of time’s structure and composition. We show that on either type of theory, as well as their respective modifications, some principles prove logically valid whose truth might sensibly be questioned on metaphysical grounds. These considerations lead us to devise a more general logical framewo…Read more
  •  26
    Return of the living dead: reply to Braddon-Mitchell
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9. 2015.
    This chapter responds to criticismsmade in Volume 8 of this series, in reply to another chapter of that volume. The initial chapter resurrected the Growing Block Theory from its grave, devising a coherent formulation of it and arguing that its burial was premature. It aimed to show that GBT has the wherewithal to explain how we might easily come to know that we are living on the edge of reality posited by GBT. Braddon-Mitchell, in the reply, remained unconvinced. His objections are addressed her…Read more
  •  130
    Temporal existence and temporal location
    Philosophical Studies 177 (7): 1999-2011. 2020.
    We argue that sensitivity to the distinction between the tensed notion of being something and the tensed notion of being located at the present time serves as a good antidote to confusions in debates about time and existence, in particular in the debate about how to characterise presentism, and saves us the trouble of going through unnecessary epicycles. Both notions are frequently expressed using the tensed verb ‘to exist’, making it systematically ambiguous. It is a commendable strategy to avo…Read more
  •  159
    9. Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block!
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8 333. 2013.
    In this paper, we clarify what proponents of the Growing Block Theory (GBT) should and what they should not say, and what they consistently can say. Once all the central tenets of the view are on the table, we address both David Braddon-Mitchell’s and Trenton Merricks’ recent eulogies for GBT, based on what is representative of a certain type of argument meant to show that GBT is internally incoherent. We argue that this type of argument proceeds from a mistaken assumption about GBT’s core, viz.…Read more
  •  146
    Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2). 2012.
    In recent publications, Kit Fine devises a classification of A-theories of time and defends a non-standard A-theory he calls fragmentalism, according to which reality as a whole is incoherent but fragments into classes of mutually coherent tensed facts. We argue that Fine's classification in not exhaustive, as it ignores another non-standard A-theory we dub dynamic absolutism, according to which there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and yet undergo qualitative changes as time goe…Read more