•  88
    We are Borg
    Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3): 611-622. 2005.
  •  94
    The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction', Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue parad…Read more
  •  131
    Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics1
    Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 323-342. 2012.
    In this paper I attempt to respond to the worries of the source incompatibilist, and try to sketch a naturalistically plausible, compatibilist notion of self-authorship and control that I believe captures important aspects of the folk intuitions regarding freedom and responsibility. It is my hope to thus offer those moved by source incompatibilist worries a reason not to adopt what P.F. Strawson called “the obscure and panicky metaphysics of Libertarianism” (P. F. Strawson, 1982) or the panic-in…Read more
  •  219
    A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3): 633-659. 2008.
    This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of na…Read more
  •  69
    The Illusion of Personhood
    American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1): 55-57. 2007.
  •  242
    Neuroethics for the new millennium
    Neuron 35 (1): 21-23. 2002.
    ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem- plate how progress in each will affect the other. The past several months have seen heightened interest <blockquote> _<b>The Ethics of Neuroscience</b>_ </blockquote> in the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided popular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May
  •  157
    In some recent papers, Max Coltheart has questioned the ability of neuroimaging techniques to tell us anything interesting about the mind and has thrown down the gauntlet before neuroimagers, challenging them to prove he is mistaken. Here I analyze Coltheart ’s challenge, show that as posed its terms are unfair, and reconstruct it so that it is addressable. I argue that, so modified, Coltheart ’s challenge is able to be met and indeed has been met. In an effort to delineate the extent of neuroim…Read more
  •  1
    . 2011.
  •  238
    Are neuroimages like photographs of the brain?
    Philosophy of Science 74 (5): 860-872. 2007.
    Images come in many varieties, but for evidential purposes, photographs are privileged. Recent advances in neuroimaging provide us with a new type of image that is used as scientific evidence. Brain images are epistemically compelling, in part because they are liable to be viewed as akin to photographs of brain activity. Here I consider features of photography that underlie the evidential status we accord it, and argue that neuroimaging diverges from photography in ways that seriously undermine …Read more
  •  71
    Neuroimages in court: less biasing than feared
    with N. J. Schweitzer and Michael J. Saks
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (3): 99-101. 2013.
  •  45
    Cinema 1-2-Many of the Mind
    with C. C. Wood
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2): 221-223. 1992.
  •  47
  •  186
    Neuroimaging and inferential distance
    Neuroethics 1 (1): 19-30. 2008.
    Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that althou…Read more
  •  74
    A Puzzle about Empathy
    Emotion Review 3 (3): 378-280. 2011.
    Is empathy important for moral behavior? To answer this we will have to be conceptually clearer, empirically more detailed, and pay attention to the neural mechanisms underlying empathy-related phenomena.
  •  10
    Book reviews (review)
    with Keith Butler, Harold I. Brown, William Ramsey, Don Gustafson, Diane Beals, Janis Nuckolls, and Valerie Gray Hardcastle
    Philosophical Psychology 11 (4): 533-556. 1998.
  •  99
    Running head: Functional neuroimaging Abstract Several recently developed techniques enable the investigation of the neural basis of cognitive function in the human brain. Two of these, PET and fMRI, yield whole-brain images reflecting regional neural activity associated with the performance of specific tasks. This article explores the spatial and temporal capabilities and limitations of these techniques, and discusses technical, biological, and cognitive issues relevant to understanding the goa…Read more
  •  78
    Patients with ventromedial frontal damage have moral beliefs
    Philosophical Psychology 19 (5). 2006.
    Michael Cholbi thinks that the claim that motive internalism (MI), the thesis that moral beliefs or judgments are intrinsically motivating, is the best explanation for why moral beliefs are usually accompanied by moral motivation. He contests arguments that patients with ventromedial (VM) frontal brain damage are counterexamples to MI by denying that they have moral beliefs. I argue that none of the arguments he offers to support this contention are viable. First, I argue that given Cholbi's own…Read more
  •  57
    Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems
    Neuroethics 11 (3): 245-257. 2016.
    Neuroscience has illuminated the neural basis of decision-making, providing evidence that supports specific models of decision-processes. These models typically are quite mechanical, the realization of abstract mathematical “diffusion to bound” models. While effective decision-making seems to be essential for sophisticated behavior, central to an account of freedom, and a necessary characteristic of self-governing systems, it is not clear how the simple models neuroscience inspires can underlie …Read more
  •  299
    Metaethical questions are typically held to be a priori , and therefore impervious to empirical evidence. Here I examine the metaethical claim that motive-internalism about belief , the position that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating, is true. I argue that belief-internalists are faced with a dilemma. Either their formulation of internalism is so weak that it fails to be philosophically interesting, or it is a substantive claim but can be shown to be empirically false. I then provide ev…Read more
  •  166
    The binding problem
    Neuron 24 7--9. 1999.
    (von der Malsburg, 1981), “the binding problem” has with the visual percept of it, so that both are effortlessly captured the attention of researchers across many disci- perceived as being aspects of a single event. I like to plines, including psychology, neuroscience, computa- refer to these sorts of problems as perceptual binding tional modeling, and even philosophy. Despite the is- problems, since they involve unifying aspects of per- sue’s prominence in these fields, what “binding” means cep…Read more
  •  88
    A Strawsonian look at desert
    Philosophical Explorations 16 (2): 133-152. 2013.
    P.F. Strawson famously argued that reactive attitudes and ordinary moral practices justify moral assessments of blame, praise, and punishment. Here we consider whether Strawson's approach can illuminate the concept of desert. After reviewing standard attempts to analyze this concept and finding them lacking, we suggest that to deserve something is to justifiably receive a moral assessment in light of certain criteria – in particular, eligibility criteria (a subject's properties that make the sub…Read more