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104WAMs: Why Worry?Philosophical Papers 40 (2). 2011.Abstract One of the most popular objections against epistemic contextualism is the so-called ?warranted assertability? objection. The objection is based on the possibility of a ?warranted assertability manoeuvre?, also known as a WAM. I argue here that WAMs are of very limited scope and importance. An important class of cases cannot be dealt with by WAMs. No analogue of WAMs is available for these cases. One should thus not take WAMs too seriously in the debate about epistemic contextualism.
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498Philosophy Upside Down?Metaphilosophy 44 (5): 579-588. 2013.Philip Kitcher recently argued for a reconstruction in philosophy. According to him, the contemporary mainstream of philosophy has deteriorated into something that is of relevance only to a few specialists who communicate with each other in a language nobody else understands. Kitcher proposes to reconstruct philosophy along two axes: a knowledge axis and a value axis. The present article discusses Kitcher's diagnosis as well as his proposal of a therapy. It argues that there are problems with bo…Read more
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53Mind and World, John McdowellPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (1): 135-144. 1998.A critical discussion of: Mind and World, John Mcdowell
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253Information, Closure, And Knowledge: On Jäger’s Objection To DretskeErkenntnis 64 (3): 403-408. 2006.Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would comm…Read more
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78Epistemic Contextualism: A DefenseOxford University Press UK. 2016.Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. It begins by dealing with the argument from cases and ordinary usage, and then addresses "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the …Read more
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16To thine own self be untrue : against the cable guy paradoxLogique Et Analyse 204 355-363. 2007.In a recent paper, Hájek presents the following alleged paradox. You are certain that a cable guy will visit you tomorrow between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. but you have no further information about when. And you agree to a bet on whether he will come in the morning interval. At first you have no reason to prefer one possibility rather than the other. But you then realise that if you bet on the morning interval, there will certainly be a future time at which you will assign higher probability to an after…Read more
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28Begrenzte Erkenntnisse?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (3): 483-489. 2010.This is a crtiical discussion of Gabriel's "An den Grenzen der Erkenntnistheorie".
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104The case for contexualismAnalysis 70 (1): 149-160. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation).
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170On ReflectionPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 510-512. 2014.Review of Kornblith, "On Reflection".
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56Knowledge, Assertion, and InferenceActa Analytica 29 (4): 487-490. 2014.This paper argues that three plausible principles are mutually inconsistent: One ought to assert only what one knows; If it is proper to assert some proposition q, then it is, barring special and not very common circumstances, proper to assert any proposition p from which q has been competently inferred; and Some propositions are both properly assertible and known by competent inference from propositions which one does not know. Each pair of two principles constitutes an argument against the rem…Read more
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102Experiencing things together: What is the problem?Erkenntnis 66 (1-2). 2007.Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.
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Der Denker als Seiltänzer. Ludwig Wittgenstein über Religion, Mystik und Ethik (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (1). 2003.
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Ludwig Maximilians Universität, MünchenFaculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of ReligionUndergraduate
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Mathematics |