Michael Selgelid

Because a newborn baby does not have sufficiently complex psychological capacities to have a concept of continuation of life, according to Tooley, it cannot desire continuation of life, and thus cannot have a right to it.1 A similar position has been advocated by Kuhse and Singer2 ,3—and, more recently, by Giubilini and Minerva.4Key assumptions of Tooley are that being able to desire something is a necessary condition of having a right to it and having a concept of something is a necessary condition of being able to desire it. Despite their plausibility, these premises are at least open to question—that is, these are things that there can presumably be reasonable disagreement about. I …

This article reviews the history of smallpox and ethical issues that arise with its threat as a biological weapon. Smallpox killed more people than any infectious disease in history-and perhaps three times more people in the 20th Century than were killed by all the wars of that period. Following a WHO-sponsored global vaccination campaign, smallpox was officially declared eradicated in 1980. It has since been revealed that the Soviet Union, until its fall in the early 1990s, manufactured tens of tons of smallpox for military purposes. A worry is that some of this may have fallen into the hands of "rogue" nations or terrorists. Current U.S. debate questions whether smallpox vaccine should therefore be made available to the American public, which-like the rest of the world-now lacks immunity. Because the vaccine is considerably dangerous, public dialogue cannot resolve this matter if evidence material to the likelihood of attack is classified (i.e. secret). I conclude by recommending numerous future areas for ethics research related to the weaponization of smallpox.

The influential public health ethics framework proposed by Childress et al. includes five “justificatory conditions,” two of which are “necessity” and “least infringement.” While the framework points to important moral values, we argue it is redundant for it to list both necessity and least infringement because they are logically equivalent. However, it is ambiguous whether Childress et al. would endorse this view, or hold the two conditions distinct. This ambiguity has resulted in confusion in public health ethics discussions citing the Childress et al. framework, as demonstrated by debate between Resnik and Wilson and Dawson. We analyse this debate to resolve these ambiguities. Finally, we argue that the necessity/least infringement principle of the Childress et al. framework applies only in cases in which only one intervention is to be implemented to achieve one specific goal. In other cases, it is not essential to require that only the least infringing intervention be implemented.

Although smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980, there are fears that stocks of the virus manufactured for military purposes by the Soviet Union may have fallen into the hands of “rogue nations” or terrorists. Worries about bioterrorism have thus sparked debate about whether or not the smallpox vaccine, which can be dangerous, should be offered to the general public. Meaningful public debate on this issue requires expert information about the likelihood that the virus will in fact be used as a weapon. Informed voluntary individual decision making, about whether to get vaccinated if vaccine is made available to the public, would similarly require appreciation of the likelihood of attack. Public deliberation and private deliberation thus both require briefing by the intelligence community

People are worried that advances in genetics will lead to a revival of eugenics. Such worries are often associated with eugenic practices carried out early in the 20th century---the forcible sterilization of feebleminded persons in the United States and the Nazi program of Racial Hygiene. A "new eugenics" involving prenatal genetic testing and the selective abortion of fetuses diagnosed with severe genetic disorders might, nonetheless, be acceptable. In chapter one I examine the history of eugenics and discuss what might make a new eugenics more tolerable. ;Chapters two and three discuss reproductive decision making by individuals . Chapter 2 investigates the morality of abortion. I conclude that the moral status of the fetus is ultimately uncertain. In exceptional circumstances, such as the case where a fetus would develop into a severely disabled infant, there are good reasons for thinking that abortion is morally permissible. It is plausible, for example, that the value of a fetal life is a function of its future quality of life. ;In chapter three I discuss what quality of life consists in. I develop a pluralistic perspective according to which quality of life is a function of multiple independent components. When deciding to bring a child into existence parents should consider the quality of life expected for the child and also take into account the likely impact on their own lives, the lives of other family members, and society as a whole. ;Chapter four asks whether or not governmental restrictions should be placed on the kinds of genetic interventions which will be permitted. A worry is that interventions aimed at enhancement would only be available to the financially fortunate and thus promote unjust social inequalities. Another worry is that the development and use of such interventions would drain medical resources away from more fruitful purposes and thus have a negative impact on aggregate utility. The social aim to promote liberty, on the other hand, speaks against the imposition of restrictions. Faced with conflicting social values, we need to think more about how to make trade-offs between liberty, equality, and aggregate utility

The proliferation of prenatal genetic testing likely to follow from advances in genetic science invites reconsideration of the moral status of abortion. In this article I examine arguments surrounding the moral status of the fetus. I conclude that secular philosophy should ultimately admit that the moral status of the fetus is uncertain, and that this uncertainty itself makes abortion morally problematic. While this does not imply that abortion is always morally wrong or that it should be legally prohibited, it does recommend a presumption in favor of preserving fetal life except in special circumstances. A relevant worry is that the rise of eugenic abortion gives new force to slippery slope arguments that we will be led down a path to a situation where more fetuses are terminated for relatively trivial reasons and that this will promote other bad social consequences. This might justify legislative discouragement of certain genetic interventions.

This issue of Journal of Medical Ethics includes a pair of papers debating the implications of moral bioenhancement for human freedom–and, especially, the question of whether moral enhancement should potentially be compulsory. In earlier writings Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that compulsory moral bioenhancement may be necessary to prevent against catastrophic harms that might result from immoral behaviour.1 In “Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias” Vojin Rakic agrees with P&S that moral bioenhancement is important, but he argues that bioenhancement interventions should be voluntary rather than compulsory .Both Rakic and P&S disagree with Harris, who denies that moral enhancement could involve interventions beyond cognitive enhancement. Moral enhancement would essentially involve cognitive enhancement, according to Harris, because moral behaviour requires ability to distinguish right from wrong–ie, awareness and rational capacity.2 While Harris admits that those who know what is right might not always do what is right, he argues that we could not altogether prevent people from doing what is wrong without destroying freedom essential to their moral agency.According to Rakic, however, the fact that people who know what is right might not always do what is right reveals that mere cognitive enhancement would be inadequate to prevent immoral behavior–because much immoral behaviour results from weakness of will. Because people could freely chose to undergo moral enhancement, furthermore, according to Rakic, “our freedom will not be curtailed by it”. Presumably Rakic here supposes that if a person freely choses to be in State A then State A is necessarily compatible with–and a reflection of–her human freedom. Forcing a person to be in State A, on the other hand, …

Central to the argument of ‘Biodefense and the Production of Knowledge: Rethinking the Problem’ are claims that the vast majority of ethical debate about biodefense research to date has focused on the dual use problem, and the focus of ethical discussion of dual-use research has been on the need to strike ‘a proper balance of only two dominant values: biosecurity and “open science”’ —the idea being that ‘under current conditions other values can and ought to be ignored because the stakes are so high’.1With regard to , Buchanan and Kelley's main point is that policy making regarding biodefense and dual use should be seen as an ‘optimisation problem’—the aim should be to achieve the greater good of society, where all relevant values are taken into account, rather than limiting attention to just two values—security and open science—in particular. While, as other commentators have argued, it is questionable whether these authors have provided an accurate account of ethical discussion of biodefense and dual use to date, in this brief commentary my purpose is to argue that the values of security and open science should themselves be seen as proxies for other values and that solution to …

Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, The Australian National University, LPO Box 8260, ANU, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia. Email: michael.selgelid{at}anu.edu.au ' + u + '@ ' + d + ' '/ /- ->. Home page: http: //www.cappe.edu.au/staff/michael-selgelid.htmThis article advocates the development of a moderate pluralist theory of political philosophy that recognizes that utility, liberty and equality are legitimate, independent social values and that none should have absolute priority over the others. Inter alia, such a theory would provide a principled means for striking a balance, or making trade-offs, between these values in cases of conflict. Recent developments in public health ethics have made progress in thinking about how to make trade-offs between liberty and utility in particular. While public health ethicists often claim that the least restrictive alternative should be used to achieve the public health goal in question, I argue that a plausible but under-recognized idea is that the least restrictive alternative might sometimes involve improvement of global health via redistributive taxation—i.e., rather than coercive social distancing measures. I conclude by demonstrating that the proportionality principle leaves open the question of when exactly utility outweighs liberty or vice versa—and I argue that, rather than speaking about the morality of liberty-infringing public health interventions in categorical/binary terms, it would be more fruitful and realistic to think and speak about the degree to which a liberty-infringing public health intervention is morally appropriate. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

The American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs' new “Guidelines to Prevent the Malevolent Use of Biomedical Research” are both timely and appropriate. These guidelines are a product of the increasing realization of the “dual use” potential of life science discoveries. Although biomedical research usually aims at the development of new medicines, vaccines, diagnostics, and so on, the very same discoveries that could benefit humankind in these ways also often have implications for the development of biological weapons. The CEJA Guidelines draw attention to this fact and hold that physician–researchers have responsibilities regarding the uses to which their discoveries are put. Medical researchers should assess the likely social benefits and harms of their work and avoid projects where the latter outweigh the former. Knowledge and the advancement of science should not be the only aims of scientists; “commitment to public welfare and safety” are also essential. Toward the aim of preventing the malevolent use of research discoveries, the CEJA states that “regulatory oversight” of research, increased ethics education of physician researchers, and sometimes perhaps even censorship of research findings, are warranted

ABSTRACT This paper reviews the dynamics behind, and ethical issues associated with, the phenomenon of drug resistance. Drug resistance is an important ethical issue partly because of the severe consequences likely to result from the increase in drug resistant pathogens if more is not done to control them. Drug resistance is also an ethical issue because, rather than being a mere quirk of nature, the problem is largely a product of drug distribution. Drug resistance results from the over‐consumption of antibiotics by the wealthy; and it, ironically, results from the under‐consumption of antibiotics, usually by the poor or otherwise marginalized. In both kinds of cases the phenomenon of drug resistance illustrates why health (care) – at least in the context of infectious disease – should be treated as a (global) public good. The point is that drug resistance involves ‘externalities’ affecting third parties. When one patient develops a resistant strain of disease because of her over‐ or under‐consumption of medication, this more dangerous malady poses increased risk to others. The propriety of free‐market distribution of goods subject to externalities is famously dubious – given that the ‘efficiency’ rationale behind markets assumes an absence of externalities. Market failure in the context of drug resistance is partly revealed by the fact that no new classes of antibiotics have been developed since 1970. I conclude by arguing that the case of drug resistance reveals additional reasons – to those traditionally appealed to by bioethicists – for treating health care as something special when making policy decisions about its distribution.

Though the reputation of eugenics has been tarnished by history, eugenics per se is not necessarily a bad thing. Many advocate a liberal new eugenics—where individuals are free to choose whether or not to employ genetic technologies for reproductive purposes. Though genetic interventions aimed at the prevention of severe genetic disorders may be morally and socially acceptable, reproductive liberty in the context of enhancement may conflict with equality. Enhancement could also have adverse effects on utility. The enhancement debate requires a shift in focus. What the equality and/or utility costs of enhancement will be is an empirical question. Rather than philosophical speculation, more social science research is needed to address it. Philosophers, meanwhile, should address head-on the question of how to strike a balance between liberty, equality, and utility in cases of conflict (in the context of genetics)

CAPPE LPO Box 8260 ANU Canberra ACT 2601 Australia Tel: +61 (0)2 6125 4355, Fax: +61 (0)2 6125 6579; Email: michael.selgelid{at}anu.edu.au ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract This article reviews ethically relevant history of tuberculosis and recent developments regarding extensively drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB). It argues that tuberculosis is one of the most important neglected topics in bioethics. With an emphasis on XDR-TB, it examines a range of the more challenging ethical issues associated with tuberculosis: individual obligations to avoid infecting others, coercive social distancing measures, third-party notification, health workers' duty to treat contagious patients, and international justice. In each of these cases, key philosophical questions are highlighted and the need for empirical research/information is demonstrated. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?