William Grey

Epicurus famously argued that death is never a harm to the one who dies, because there is no time at which the decedent is worse off. While the decedent is still alive death isn't a harm; but after death there is no one to be harmed. Life is death-excluding, and death is harm-excluding. When then can the decedent be worse off? Either: at no particular time; always; before death; at death; or, after death. In an earlier paper ('Epicurus and the harm of Death') I argued that decedents may suffer posthumous harm. Here I answer objections to the posthumous harm proposal, and provide further clarification of this position.

Philosophical interest in ecology is relatively new. Standard texts in the philosophy of biology pay little or no attention to ecology (though Sterelny and Griffiths 1999 is an exception). This is in part because the science of ecology itself is relatively new, but whatever the reasons for the neglect in the past, the situation must change. A good philosophical understanding of ecology is important for a number of reasons. First, ecology is an important and fascinating branch of biology with distinctive philosophical issues that arise from its study. Second, ecology is only one small step away from urgent political, ethical, and management decisions about how best to live in an apparently increasingly-fragile environment. Third, philosophy of ecology, properly conceived, can contribute directly to both our understanding of ecology and help with its advancement. Philosophy of ecology can thus be seen as part of the emerging discipline of “biohumanities”, where biology and humanities disciplines together advance our understanding and knowledge of biology (Stotz and Griffiths forthcoming). In this paper, we focus primarily on this third role of the philosophy of ecology and consider a number of places where philosophy can play an important role in ecology. In the process, we..