The goal of this dissertation is to develop a foundationalist theory of the epistemic justification of our perceptual beliefs about physical objects. In particular, we will expose the value of a specific kind of epistemic justification, 'reflective justification', and argue that such justification is only possible within a foundationalist framework. The Achilles heel of all foundationalist theories is the notion of non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs or experiences. We will argue t…
Read moreThe goal of this dissertation is to develop a foundationalist theory of the epistemic justification of our perceptual beliefs about physical objects. In particular, we will expose the value of a specific kind of epistemic justification, 'reflective justification', and argue that such justification is only possible within a foundationalist framework. The Achilles heel of all foundationalist theories is the notion of non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs or experiences. We will argue that when it comes to perception this foundation is non-doxastic in character, thereby tying our foundationalism to the notion of a 'given' element in perceptual experience. This will bring us to a discussion of Wilfred Sellars's 'myth of the given' and a recent attempt by Laurence BonJour to defend a foundationalist theory that escapes the Sellarsian dilemma. Our consideration of BonJour will propel us to a defense of a direct realist theory of perception and, after a critical appraisal of Donald Davidson and John McDowell on the nature of concepts, the development of a non-constructivist theory of conceptualized perceptual awareness. The conjunction of these two positions---direct realism and non-constructivism---lays the theoretical basis for our decisive claim that the perceptual awareness of physical objects provides non-inferential justification for our perceptual beliefs about those physical objects