Mario Wenning

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle

Hegel’s conception of a universal history of reason is usually interpreted as a Eurocentric project that is dismissive of the genuine contributions by other cultures. In contrast to this assumption, his views concerning Chinese philosophical traditions evolved significantly in his late Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Hegel increasingly acknowledges a unique contribution of Confucianism and especially Daoism. While Confucianism is depicted as a natural religion of magic in which the emperor governs as the supreme magician, Daoism revolts against the emperor’s nepotism and turns to the Dao to elaborate a speculative philosophy of reason. The paper argues that the search for a rational form of mysticism is the basis for increasingly valuing the Chinese contributions to a conception of reason that incorporates mystical elements.

The gambler’s probing of luck in games of chance cannot be reduced to rational calculation. The art of gambling flourishes at the margins of societies and undermines the correlation of effort and entitlement. This paper interprets the peculiar thrill of gambling in modern times by drawing on social systems theory and critical theory. It argues that gambling is a specific mode of agency that consists in a playful engagement with risk and contingency. The gambler reveals a highly aroused and yet passive consciousness. Success in gambling depends on the art of proper timing as well as a preconscious awareness of fortune.

In an age when the geopolitical dynamics are shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the reception of Asian sources in Europe could be seen as primarily of historical interest. At first sight, the interpretation of Chinese and Buddhist wisdom traditions in early twentieth-century Germany appears to bear little significance for contemporary concerns. In Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought, Eric Nelson proves this assumption wrong and demonstrates that the short-lived cosmopolitan glimmers in between the two world wars set a standard for intercultural dialogue. The Sino-German philosophical encounter presents an exception to the cultural provincialism that has plagued...

The gambler’s probing of luck in games of chance cannot be reduced to rational calculation. The art of gambling flourishes at the margins of societies and undermines the correlation of effort and entitlement. This paper interprets the peculiar thrill of gambling in modern times by drawing on social systems theory and critical theory. It argues that gambling is a specific mode of agency that consists in a playful engagement with risk and contingency. The gambler reveals a highly aroused and yet passive consciousness. Success in gambling depends on the art of proper timing as well as a preconscious awareness of fortune.

Critical theorists have argued that the concept of Enlightenment is paradoxical. While it designates the liberation from superstition through the use of reason, Enlightenment also sets up new forms of superstition. This article focuses on Gan Yang’s and Wang Hui’s rereading of the dynamic processes of Enlightenment in China and in Europe. It argues for a transcultural perspective on Enlightenment’s tendency to give rise to a deformation of reason. Only if the culturally varying forms of reason and unreason in Europe as well as China are being reflected might it be possible to continue pursuing the self-critical project of Enlightenment at a global level.

Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's normative naturalism does neither rest on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency

This essay offers a comparative analysis of the notion of trust in Hegel and Confucius. It shows that Hegel’s two senses of trust depend upon his theory of recognition and recognitive struggle. The competitive thrust of Hegel’s account of trust, it argues, introduces a series of problems that cannot be adequately resolved within his theory, since it presupposes the kinds of trusting relations—self-, intersubjective- and world-trust—that it purports to explain. This essay then turns to the Confucian notions of xin 心 and li 理 to address the problems in the Hegelian account. It concludes by outlining the Confucian account’s salience for critical social theory.