Thomas Icard

The provability logic of a theory $T$ is the set of modal formulas, which under any arithmetical realization are provable in $T$. We slightly modify this notion by requiring the arithmetical realizations to come from a specified set $\Gamma$. We make an analogous modification for interpretability logics. We first study provability logics with restricted realizations and show that for various natural candidates of $T$ and restriction set $\Gamma$, the result is the logic of linear frames. However, for the theory Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA), we define a fragment that gives rise to a more interesting provability logic by capitalizing on the well-studied relationship between PRA and I$\Sigma_1$. We then study interpretability logics, obtaining upper bounds for IL(PRA), whose characterization remains a major open question in interpretability logic. Again this upper bound is closely related to linear frames. The technique is also applied to yield the nontrivial result that IL(PRA) $\subset$ ILM

Subjective probability plays an increasingly important role in many fields concerned with human cognition and behavior. Yet there have been significant criticisms of the idea that probabilities could actually be represented in the mind. This paper presents and elaborates a view of subjective probability as a kind of sampling propensity associated with internally represented generative models. The resulting view answers to some of the most well known criticisms of subjective probability, and is also supported by empirical work in neuroscience and behavioral psychology. The repercussions of the view for how we conceive of many ordinary instances of subjective probability, and how it relates to more traditional conceptions of subjective probability, are discussed in some detail.

We present a formal system for reasoning about inclusion and exclusion in natural language, following work by MacCartney and Manning. In particular, we show that an extension of the Monotonicity Calculus, augmented by six new type markings, is sufficient to derive novel inferences beyond monotonicity reasoning, and moreover gives rise to an interesting logic of its own. We prove soundness of the resulting calculus and discuss further logical and linguistic issues, including a new connection to the classes of weak, strong, and superstrong negative polarity items