Lawrence M. Hinman

Search engines play an increasingly pivotal role in the distribution and eventual construction of knowledge, yet they are largely unnoticed, their procedures are opaque, and they are almost completely devoid of independent oversight. In this paper the author examines three areas in which we encounter difficult and persistent ethical issues in search engine technology: The problem of algorithm and the lack of transparency of the search process, the problem of privacy with regards of the possibility to monitor search histories, and the problem of local censorship. The given findings lead to the conclusion that the development of structures of accountability for search engines is an important task for the near future

The title of our session today is “Virtue Ethics from a Global Perspective.” In my remarks, I would like to sketch out an account of what a global perspective on virtue ethics would look like. Here’s how I’ll proceed. First, I would like to explore some of the reasons why we need a global perspective on virtue ethics. This leads naturally to the second issue, which is a clarification of what we mean by a global perspective on virtue ethics. I shall suggest a three part framework—consisting of the object of the virtue, the virtue itself, and the actions through which that virtue is expressed—for a global perspective on virtue ethics. This framework is a pluralistic one, striking a middle ground between absolutism and relativism. Along the way, especially in part two, I will look at several specific virtues, especially respect and courage, to see how this tripartite framework can be applied. The final result, I hope, will be an outline of what a global perspective on virtue ethics would look like.

Distributive Justice is a truly innovative website, one of the first of what we could call “second-generation” websites in ethics. First generation sites may be rich in content, but typically reveal their origins in a print mindset, if not an actual print format. Although first generation sites may contain many hyperlinks and database-driven searches and pages, essentially they still present the reader—and the assumption is that the visitor is a reader—with successive screens full of information.

How are we to make sense of this, especially from a moral point of view? Do we simply say, as some have, that if it’s technologically possible, then it’s morally permissible? Or that, since men have been fathering children at ever more advanced ages, women should be permitted to do the same thing? (We might christen this "The Tony Randall Argument," in honor of the seventy-seven year old actor who is a new father.) Or do we say that such births are simply selfish acts that put the desires of the parents ahead of any consideration about the well-being of the children? Or do we see this as yet one more reflection of our society’s unrelenting quest for eternal youth?

It is a tacit assumption among most contemporary American and British philosophers that the question of style in philosophy is, at most, an issue of peripheral importance. Although it is generally agreed that a well developed sense of style may make a philosopher’s work more accessible and thus be a factor in its acceptance by a wider audience, and although it seems self-evident to many that the apparent inaccessibility of much of continental philosophy is due in part to stylistic vagaries to which it is particularly prone, few would accord to style an importance beyond this. Certainly style is not an integral part of a philosophical position. It is always possible in principle, so the dominant view today suggests, to separate the position being expressed from the style the author employs in expressing it. The position itself is equated with the body of propositions that the philosopher is asserting; the style in which these are expressed either has no bearing on the truth value of the propositions and is consequently irrelevant or else it can be incorporated into either the propositions themselves or the structure of the argument, in which case it is no longer primarily a stylistic consideration. In either case, a philosopher’s style is ultimately not integral to the position which he advances.