Lawrence M. Hinman

Rarely has a philosopher demanded such a purity of moral motives. Even when he discusses those “many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that, without any further motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them and can take delight in the contentment of others as their own work,” Kant maintains that, “in such a case an action of this kind, however right and however amiable it may be, still has no genuinely moral worth.” Because the action is done from inclination rather than duty, it cannot qualify as a morally good action in Kant’s eyes. Indeed, this seems to suggest that from a moral point of view the person who is naturally unsympathetic to others almost has an advantage, at least in terms of the opportunity for moral action, over those who are naturally inclined to altruistic acts. Kant hardly seems to shrink from such a conclusion. His own words best convey his position here.

Search engines play an increasingly pivotal role in the distribution and eventual construction of knowledge, yet they are largely unnoticed, their procedures are opaque, and they are almost completely devoid of independent oversight. In this paper the author examines three areas in which we encounter difficult and persistent ethical issues in search engine technology: The problem of algorithm and the lack of transparency of the search process, the problem of privacy with regards of the possibility to monitor search histories, and the problem of local censorship. The given findings lead to the conclusion that the development of structures of accountability for search engines is an important task for the near future

The title of our session today is “Virtue Ethics from a Global Perspective.” In my remarks, I would like to sketch out an account of what a global perspective on virtue ethics would look like. Here’s how I’ll proceed. First, I would like to explore some of the reasons why we need a global perspective on virtue ethics. This leads naturally to the second issue, which is a clarification of what we mean by a global perspective on virtue ethics. I shall suggest a three part framework—consisting of the object of the virtue, the virtue itself, and the actions through which that virtue is expressed—for a global perspective on virtue ethics. This framework is a pluralistic one, striking a middle ground between absolutism and relativism. Along the way, especially in part two, I will look at several specific virtues, especially respect and courage, to see how this tripartite framework can be applied. The final result, I hope, will be an outline of what a global perspective on virtue ethics would look like.