James Ross

(? - 2010)

Philosophy, as Aquinas, and many others, described it-- as a demonstrative progression from self-evident premises to evident (or even necessary [Scotus]) conclusions,-- is rarely attempted nowadays, even by "scholastic" philosophers. Demonstrative success,-- that is, entirely to eliminate competitors to one's conclusions, -- is not the expectation now, nor has it been the achievement of philosophers historically. Thus, some restrictions upon starting points may be relaxed as unnecessary, e.g. that they be self-evident.

The morality of human actions consists in their reasonableness. An act is reasonable if doing that sort of thing under the circumstances is a reasonable application, in the particular circumstances, of general principles of action which are intelligible and obvious to virtually everyone. Such applications to particular events are conclusions, usually guided by derivative and subordinate principles of natural law and of human law, and do not, therefore, have the certitude of science; in fact, natural law principles occasionally have exceptions. The sphere of human law, narrower than the sphere of natural law which includes the whole field of morality, is the interpersonal actions of men which bear some relation to the common good. Much of human law is an expression of or an application of the moral law. A human law is just only insofar as it is reasonably related to the achievement of the common good, the law has been enacted by a competent legislator and the burdens it imposes are not unreasonably distributed. The system of laws is effective to regulate conduct within society as a whole, not because of the individual’s fear of punishment, but because the society regards the law as a standard for right action.

By all indications, the popularity of the Sense-Datum Theory is definitely on the wane. This once-proud theory, which was perhaps the most characteristic feature of British Philosophy during the first half of this century, has been attacked from so many different sides that even its foremost protagonists have either accepted the very watered-down version according to which it is just an alternative language for speaking about the facts of perception or else they hold their peace and let the youngsters play. There are still some diehards who carry on as if nothing had happened, but they are an insignificant minority

Knowledge through what others tell us not only forms a large part of the body of our knowledge but also originates the patterns of appraisal according to which we add beliefs to our present store of knowledge.1 I do not mean merely that what we add is often accepted from persons who have already contributed to our knowledge; beyond that, we have acquired habits of thought, tendencies to suspect and tendencies to approve both other-person-reports and purported perceptions, from our testimonial relationships with others. For instance, who would not hesitate to say he saw a particular acquaintance (John Doe) at a visual distance of half a block, after he had just been told by someone he trusted and someone who ought to have known (e.g., John Doe’s wife) that John Doe had just telephoned from a store two hours travel time away? Yet apart from that report, one might have considered it evident that John Doe was half a block away, just because (ceteris paribus) it looked enough like John Doe; the evidence of our senses can be defeated by the authority we accord to the evidence of testimony.

Mackie examines "the arguments for and against the existence of God carefully and in some detail, taking account both of the traditional concept of God and of the traditional 'proofs' of his existence and of more recent interpretations and approaches". He is fairly comprehensive even though, in my opinion, he misses the best versions of some of the best arguments. He does not, as one would hope, give many arguments that God does not exist, beyond considerations from evil and an implicit one from the supposed human origins of religion.

Mistakes about necessity, possibility, counterpossibility and impossibility distort the notions of being and creation.1 Recently such errors cluster in the understanding of quantified modal logic (QML), a device that was for a while thought especially promising for metaphysics.2 Time has told a different story. The underlying modal platonism is gratuitous, without explanatory force and conflicts with the religion it is often used to explain. There are things to consider here that go beyond diagnosing mistakes.3..