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12Representaatio: tiedon kivijalasta tieteiden työkaluksi (edited book)Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press. 2010.
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7Language Technological Models as Epistemic Artefacts: The Case of Constraint Grammar ParserIn Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Susan Stuart (eds.), Computation, Information, Cognition: The Nexus and the Liminal, Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 280--289. 2007.
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192How do models give us knowledge? The case of Carnot’s ideal heat engineEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3): 309-334. 2011.Our concern is in explaining how and why models give us useful knowledge. We argue that if we are to understand how models function in the actual scientific practice the representational approach to models proves either misleading or too minimal. We propose turning from the representational approach to the artefactual, which implies also a new unit of analysis: the activity of modelling. Modelling, we suggest, could be approached as a specific practice in which concrete artefacts, i.e., models, …Read more
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50In which respects do modeling and experimenting resemble or differ from each other? We explore this question through studying in detail the combinatorial strategy in synthetic biology whereby scientists triangulate experimentation on model organisms, mathematical modeling, and synthetic modeling. We argue that this combinatorial strategy is due to the characteristic constraints of the three epistemic activities. Moreover, our case study shows that in some cases materiality clearly matters, in fa…Read more
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101Causal isolation robustness analysis: the combinatorial strategy of circadian clock researchBiology and Philosophy 26 (5): 773-791. 2011.This paper distinguishes between causal isolation robustness analysis and independent determination robustness analysis and suggests that the triangulation of the results of different epistemic means or activities serves different functions in them. Circadian clock research is presented as a case of causal isolation robustness analysis: in this field researchers made use of the notion of robustness to isolate the assumed mechanism behind the circadian rhythm. However, in contrast to the earlier …Read more
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405Modelling as Indirect Representation? The Lotka–Volterra Model RevisitedBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4): 1007-1036. 2017.ABSTRACT Is there something specific about modelling that distinguishes it from many other theoretical endeavours? We consider Michael Weisberg’s thesis that modelling is a form of indirect representation through a close examination of the historical roots of the Lotka–Volterra model. While Weisberg discusses only Volterra’s work, we also study Lotka’s very different design of the Lotka–Volterra model. We will argue that while there are elements of indirect representation in both Volterra’s and …Read more
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66Contradictions of Commercialization: Revealing the Norms of Science?Philosophy of Science 79 (5): 833-844. 2012.The proponents of the entrepreneurial university have claimed that it implies adjustments in the normative structure of science. In this article, I will critically examine whether a qualitatively new kind of academic ethos can emerge from the commercialization of academic research. The traditional conception of norms of science as institutionalized imperatives is distinguished from the constructivist conception of norms as strategic or ideological resources. An empirical case study on the commer…Read more
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102Isolating Representations Versus Credible Constructions? Economic Modelling in Theory and PracticeErkenntnis 70 (1): 59-80. 2009.This paper examines two recent approaches to the nature and functioning of economic models: models as isolating representations and models as credible constructions. The isolationist view conceives of economic models as surrogate systems that isolate some of the causal mechanisms or tendencies of their respective target systems, while the constructionist approach treats them rather like pure constructions or fictional entities that nevertheless license different kinds of inferences. I will argue…Read more
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611Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representationStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2): 262-271. 2011.The recent discussion on scientific representation has focused on models and their relationship to the real world. It has been assumed that models give us knowledge because they represent their supposed real target systems. However, here agreement among philosophers of science has tended to end as they have presented widely different views on how representation should be understood. I will argue that the traditional representational approach is too limiting as regards the epistemic value of mode…Read more
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354Deidealization: No Easy ReversalsPhilosophy of Science 86 (4): 641-661. 2019.Deidealization as a topic in its own right has attracted remarkably little philosophical interest despite the extensive literature on idealization. One reason for this is the often implicit assumption that idealization and deidealization are, potentially at least, reversible processes. We question this assumption by analyzing the challenges of deidealization within a menu of four broad categories: deidealizing as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, deidealizing as concretizing, and deide…Read more
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32Basic science through engineering?: Synthetic modeling and the idea of biology-inspired engineeringStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2): 158-169. 2013.Synthetic biology is often understood in terms of the pursuit for well-characterized biological parts to create synthetic wholes. Accordingly, it has typically been conceived of as an engineering dominated and application oriented field. We argue that the relationship of synthetic biology to engineering is far more nuanced than that and involves a sophisticated epistemic dimension, as shown by the recent practice of synthetic modeling. Synthetic models are engineered genetic networks that are im…Read more
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103A parser as an epistemic artifact: A material view on modelsPhilosophy of Science 70 (5): 1484-1495. 2003.The purpose of this paper is to suggest that models in scientific practice can be conceived of as epistemic artifacts. Approaching models this way accommodates many such things that working scientists themselves call models but that the semantic conception of models does not duly recognize as such. That models are epistemic artifacts implies, firstly, that they cannot be understood apart from purposeful human activity; secondly, that they are somehow materialized inhabitants of the intersubjecti…Read more
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230Biological Control Variously Materialized: Modeling, Experimentation and Exploration in Multiple MediaPerspectives on Science 29 (4): 468-492. 2021.This paper examines two parallel discussions of scientific modeling which have invoked experimentation in addressing the role of models in scientific inquiry. One side discusses the experimental character of models, whereas the other focuses on their exploratory uses. Although both relate modeling to experimentation, they do so differently. The former has considered the similarities and differences between models and experiments, addressing, in particular, the epistemic value of materiality. By …Read more
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56Basic science through engineering? Synthetic modeling and the idea of biology-inspired engineeringStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2): 158-169. 2013.Synthetic biology is often understood in terms of the pursuit for well-characterized biological parts to create synthetic wholes. Accordingly, it has typically been conceived of as an engineering dominated and application oriented field. We argue that the relationship of synthetic biology to engineering is far more nuanced than that and involves a sophisticated epistemic dimension, as shown by the recent practice of synthetic modeling. Synthetic models are engineered genetic networks that are im…Read more
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2An objectual approach to scientific understanding: The case of modelsIn Henk De Regt, Sabina Leonelli & Kai Eigner (eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives, University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 146--168. 2009.